Maxfield v. Cain
Decision Date | 03 January 2019 |
Docket Number | A163470 |
Citation | 295 Or.App. 553,435 P.3d 779 |
Parties | Brandon MAXFIELD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Brad CAIN, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Dennis N. Balske, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and Garrett, Judge pro tempore.
This post-conviction case comes to us for a second time after we initially reversed and remanded the judgment denying petitioner relief. See Maxfield v. Nooth , 278 Or. App. 684, 377 P.3d 650 (2016). In this proceeding, petitioner argues, and the superintendent concedes, that the post-conviction court exceeded the scope of remand by revisiting the issue of whether trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment instead of addressing the issue of prejudice under the correct standard. For the reasons set out below, we agree with the parties that the post-conviction court exceeded the scope of remand and we remand again to the post-conviction court to determine whether trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced petitioner.
Our first opinion set out the circumstances of petitioner’s conviction and petition for post-conviction relief:
Id. at 685-86, 377 P.3d 650 ( ).
In his first appeal, petitioner challenged the post-conviction court’s prejudice determination, arguing that the court’s ruling illustrated that it had erroneously required petitioner to prove that it was more likely than not that the omitted mitigation evidence would have affected the court’s sentencing decision. Id. at 686, 377 P.3d 650. We agreed and held that the post-conviction court had applied an incorrect legal standard to decide prejudice under both Article I, section 11, and under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 688, 377 P.3d 650. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded "for the post-conviction court to evaluate prejudice under the legally correct standard." Id. at 689, 377 P.3d 650. Notably, the superintendent did not challenge on appeal the post-conviction court’s determination that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 686, 377 P.3d 650.
On remand, it appears that the post-conviction court invited the parties to file written submissions summarizing the parties’ claims and arguments, which the superintendent did.1 The post-conviction court then entered an amended general judgment denying petitioner relief on the basis of deficient performance. The post-conviction court explained:
As noted above, on appeal petitioner asserts, and the superintendent agrees, that the post-conviction court exceeded the scope of remand.
To evaluate an inadequate assistance of counsel claim, a court engages in a two-step inquiry: First, it must determine whether petitioner demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel failed to exercise reasonable skill and judgment; and then second, if the court determines that petitioner met that first burden, the court must further determine whether petitioner proved that counsel’s deficient performance had a tendency to affect the result of the trial. See , e.g. , Lichau v. Baldwin , 333 Or. 350, 359, 39 P.3d 851 (2002) ; Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ( ). In this case, we agree with petitioner and the superintendent that the post-conviction court erred by addressing the deficient-performance prong on remand.
The scope of remand is a question of law that is reviewed for legal error. Allen v. Premo , 251 Or. App. 682, 685, 284 P.3d 1199 (2012). As we explained in Allen :
Id. at 686, 284 P.3d 1199. In this case, our remand exemplified one of the exceptions to the general rule, viz. , we specifically stated in the text of the opinion that "we reverse[d] and remand[ed] for the post-conviction court to evaluate prejudice under the legally correct standard." Maxfield , 278 Or. App. at 689, 377 P.3d 650. Accordingly, by addressing the deficient performance prong of petitioner’s claim, the post-conviction court erred by exceeding the scope of our remand.
Having concluded that the post-conviction court erred by revisiting the deficient performance prong of the analysis, we must decide whether to remand for further proceedings or determine the legal question of prejudice without remand. See , e.g. , Cox v. Persson , 289 Or. App. 825, 828, 412 P.3d 1199 (2018) (...
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Maxfield v. Cain
...post-conviction relief (PCR). Maxfield v. Nooth , 278 Or App 684, 377 P.3d 650 (2016) ( Maxfield I ); Maxfield v. Cain , 295 Or App 553, 435 P.3d 779 (2019) ( Maxfield II ). In this appeal, petitioner argues that the PCR court erred in finding that he was not prejudiced by his trial counsel......
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Vasilash v. Cain, A166487
...prejudice of a constitutional magnitude." Ashley v. Hoyt , 139 Or. App. 385, 396, 912 P.2d 393 (1996) ; see also Maxfield v Cain , 295 Or. App. 553, 557, 435 P.3d 779 (2019) (confirming that determination of prejudice is a legal question that appellate court may decide, although ultimately ......