MAXFIELD v. LEVY
| Decision Date | 01 April 1797 |
| Citation | 4 U.S. 330 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
THE opinion of the Court was delivered in this case, in the following terms;
A motion was made for a rule to show cause, why these ejectments should not be dismissed, upon an allegation tht it appeared, by an answer to a bill in equity, for a discovery in this court, brought by the defendants in these ejectments, against the lessor of the plaintiff, that they are in reality the suits of a citizen of this state (viz. Samuel Wallis) though under the name of a citizen of another state, to whom it is alleged, conveyances were made without any consideration, for the sole purpose of making him a nominal lessor of the plaintiff in these ejectments.
A rule to show cause was granted, and, upon the day appointed, the case was fully heard and argued on both sides, the proceedings in equity on the bill for a discovery having been exhibited to the Court and read. [330-Continued.]
The importance of the present question is evident, because it concerns the constitution and laws of the United States, in a point highly essential to their welfare, to wit, the proper boundaries between the authority of a single state, and that of the United States.
This, not only the constitution itself has been anxious to ascertain by precise and particular definitions, but the congress, in carrying into effect that part of the constitution which concerns the judiciary, has been solicitous to preserve with the greatest caution. The strong instance of this is a provision in the judicial act, to the following effect:
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'That no district or circuit Court shall have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note, or other chose in action, in favour of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such Court to recover the said contents, if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.' Sect. 11. 1 vol. p. 55.
This I adduce as a strong instance to show the solicitude of congress on this subject, for the regulation extends to a bon a fide assignment in the instances specified, as well as to one mala fide: but the provision goes to all, more effectually to prevent any practices of deception by means of the latter.
Nothing is more evident than that if this be a controversy between citizens of different states, it is a controversy determinable in this Court, and of which, therefore, the Court must sustain jurisdiction. On the other hand, if it be not a controversy between citizens of different states, but between citizens of the same state, it not being one of those cases which entitle citizens of the same state to any exercise of jurisdiction by this Court, it ought not to be determined here. But if it shall appear, from a consideration of the facts, that this is not a case which the lessor of the plaintiff was entitled to bring into this Court, it will still remain to be inquired, whether the remedy pursued on the present occasion is proper. The first question, therefore, is, Whether it sufficiently appears to the Court, that this is a controversy subsisting between citizens of the same, state, and not between citizens of different states, so as to authorise a dismission of the suit, in case the remedy be in point of law a proper one? The evidence, upon which the charge is alleged, is an answer to a bill filed in the equity side of this Court by the defendants in the ejectments, in order to obtain a discovery by the oath of the lessor of the plaintiff. This is admitted to be competent evidence on a question at law, and therefore (supposing the method of proceeding in other respects proper) I am only to consider, if it affords satisfactory evidence of the facts suggested: The facts admitted by the answer, in substance, are these: That there were certain applications to the land-office of this state for 64 tracts of land, in the county of Luzerne, containing 27,400 acres: That the applications were made (as the respondent has been informed and believes) by and for the use of Samuel Wallis of the county of Northumberland in this state: That in April 1784, conveyances were executed to Maxfield the present lessor of the plaintiff, by which the legal title to the lands therein described was conveyed and assigned to Maxfield, as he apprehends and believes. That Maxfield paid no consideration, either pecuniary, or of any other nature, for the lands, and, therefore, he apprehends and believes, that the equitable title is in Samuel Wallis. That Maxfield consented to stand the trustee of the lands, for the use and benefit of Wallis, and left the management, direction, and prosecution, of the business to Wallis, by whose direction Maxfield apprehends and believes, that the caveats mentioned in the complainant's bill were filed, and all subsequent proceedings had. In comparing the facts thus admitted, with the bill he was called upon to answer, it is very remarkable, that the last interrogatory was expressed in such particular and pointed terms, that if it had been directly and positively answered, it would have
been decisive one way or the other. But it is not so answered, and his own counsel now object, that he did not answer directly to the question, and, therefore, the only remedy was to except to the answer for insufficiency, and compel a better answer. This objection, I think, may be easily obviated by the following considerations. 1st. If the question had been an improper one, it might have been demurred to. By that not being done, it is confessed that the question was proper, and of course it ought to have been answered. And it is little short of an insult on the Court now to tell it, that the lessor of the plaintiff purposely declined answering a question fairly put to him, which he might and ought to have answered, but by his not doing it he now sets the Court at defiance. 2d. If for want of a fuller answer, no evidence was before the Court, the objection might possibly be of weight. But all the other facts admitted by the answer, are open to all proper inferences, as well such as arise from this wilful and insolent omission, as from any other part of the case. The object was to effect a discovery, whether certain conveyances were actually given for the sole purpose of evading the constitutional limits, as to jurisdiction, prescribed to this Court. Such a design could be expected only to be disclosed by direct confession, or a number of concurring circumstances. 3d. It does not appear that he will ever given a better answer. He may chuse to go through all the processes of contempt for not answering sufficiently, as he appears already to have done for not answering at all. He may even submit to perpetual imprisonment. Is the case never to be decided, until he thinks fit to consent it shall be? 4th. The jurisdiction of this Court is not prima facie general, but special. A man must assign a good reason for coming here. If the fact is denied, upon which he grounds his right to come here, he pust prove it. He, therefore, is the actor in the proof; and, consequently, he has no right, where the point is contested, to throw the onus probandi on the defendant. As this undoubtedly is the general principle, I see no reason to depart from it on the present occasion, when the knowledge of all the circumstances of the case is fully possessed by the lessor of the plaintiff, and he is regularly called upon to disclose them. For these reasons, I am clearly of opinion, that Maxfield's forbearing to give a fuller answer, is no reason for my not weighing the amount of the answer, which he has thought proper to give; and considering whether it sufficiently establishes the allegations of the defendants in these causes. But it is objected, that Maxfield's answer, though evidence against him, is no evidence against Wallis, who is said to be the cestui que trust, and Maxfield a bare trustee.
Answer. Upon the face of these ejectments Wallis's name no where appears. Maxfield, therefore, is the only person to be considered here. If a cestui que trust has a right to support an ejectment, but is forced, upon legal principles, to use the name of his trustee, he must take the consequences. This Court, as a Court of law, cannot punish the trustee for a breach of trust, though in another capacity it may. But if it had been material to have made Wallis a party, a great, if not an insuperable, difficulty has been alleged in doing it. Wallis and the defendants being citizens of the same state, it is very doubtful whether a bill in equity would have lain against Wallis in this Court, though it was merely incidental to the suit at law. But, it is clear, that the objection in this case is merely frivolous, because upon the return of the rule to show cause, an ex parte affidavit might be produced. Wallis's affidavit undoubtedly might have been, as well as any others. Why has it not been? No reason has been assigned to show it could not be done, or that he desired, or that his counsel wished, he should do it. Nor has time been solicited for his putting in such an affidavit, though it is so seriously alleged, that it was highly important to him to have had an opportunity of answering this charge.
It is alleged, that Maxfield was a trustee, and as such authorised to come into this Court.
A trustee for what purpose? There is not the least shadow of evidence, that he was a trustee for any other purpose, than that Wallis should have a colour for suing in this Court, in his name. The deed is not even stated to have been delivered. No fair object of the trust is specified. Wallis lived in Pennsylvania; the land lies in Pennsylvania: Maxfield lived in Delaware. What was he to do? It appears, from his own acknowledgment, that he has done nothing hitherto, nor does he state he was to do any thing.
But, it is...
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