Maxim Technologies, Inc. v. City of Dubuque

• Decision Date: 07 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-1355.,03-1355.
• Citation: Maxim Technologies, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 690 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 2005)
• Parties: MAXIM TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Appellant, v. The CITY OF DUBUQUE, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

690 N.W.2d 896

MAXIM TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Appellant, v. The CITY OF DUBUQUE, Appellee.

No. 03-1355.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

January 7, 2005.

Webb L. Wassmer of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Elwood, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Les V. Reddick of Kane, Norby & Reddick, P.C., Dubuque, for appellee.

STREIT, Justice.

A jury found Maxim Technologies improperly monitored construction of a public parking ramp in Dubuque. Maxim now argues the City of Dubuque should pay for its misdeeds because Dubuque agreed to do so. Because we find the parties' agreement does not clearly and unambiguously express an intention that Dubuque indemnify Maxim under the circumstances of this case, we affirm dismissal of Maxim's claim.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

For the purposes of this appeal, we assume the City of Dubuque hired Maxim Technologies, an independent inspection firm, to monitor construction of a public parking ramp.¹ The parties' agreement included a cost proposal and two attached pages of terms and conditions. Maxim drafted the terms and conditions, which were printed in a font small enough to make even the youngest eyes feel old; there are approximately sixty lines and fifteen hundred words on each page.

After construction began, cracks were found in buildings neighboring the jobsite. The owners of these buildings sued Dubuque, Maxim, and others. The plaintiffs claimed installation of the ramp's foundation, which consisted of auger cast piles, had disturbed the soil under their buildings. To create the auger cast piles, workers drilled deep holes into the ground and filled them with grout.

The plaintiffs alleged Maxim did not properly monitor installation of the piles and failed to report problems. Maxim cross-claimed against Dubuque. Maxim maintained Dubuque had agreed in some fashion to defend and indemnify Maxim from third-party lawsuits, even if such a lawsuit was predicated upon Maxim's own negligence. Maxim pointed to the eleventh paragraph of its terms and conditions, which read:

11. Third Party Claims. In the event any third party brings a suit or a claim for damages against Consultant alleging exposure to or damage from materials, elements or constituents at or from the project site before, during or after services are performed by Consultant under this Agreement, which is alleged to have resulted in or caused any adverse condition to any third party or resulted in claims arising from remedial action, cleanup, uninhabitability of property, or other property damage, Client, except to the extent of Consultant's gross negligence or willful misconduct, agrees to defend, indemnify and hold Consultant harmless against any such suit or claim and any obligation or liability arising therefrom.

Dubuque contended this provision did not apply to the facts of the present case and therefore declined to defend or indemnify Maxim.

A jury decided Maxim was liable to the plaintiffs. In a special verdict,² the jury also found Dubuque had a contract with Maxim containing the disputed eleventh paragraph, as well as another paragraph in which Maxim generally agreed to indemnify Dubuque.³

Dubuque moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the cross-claim. Dubuque argued the eleventh paragraph applied only to environmental claims, such as where a chemical migrates onto another's property and requires remedial cleanup. The district court dismissed the cross-claim, and Maxim appealed.

II. Scope and Standards of Review

Appellate review of a grant of a motion notwithstanding the verdict is for correction of errors at law. Lynch v. Saddler, 656 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 2003). Likewise, to the extent this appeal concerns the construction or interpretation of a contract, our review is generally at law. See Ellefson v. Centech Corp., 606 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Iowa 2000); Iowa Waste Sys., Inc. v. Buchanan County, 617 N.W.2d 23, 32 (Iowa Ct.App.2000).

III. The Merits

At issue is the scope of an express contract for indemnification. In an indemnification contract, one party promises to reimburse or hold harmless another party for loss, damage, or liability. See McNally & Nimergood v. Neumann-Kiewit Constructors, Inc., 648 N.W.2d 564, 570 (Iowa 2002). The eleventh paragraph contains such a promise: Dubuque "agree[d] to defend, indemnify and hold [Maxim] harmless against" certain third-party claims. The intent of the parties controls, and in this case the plain language of the agreement manifests the requisite intent. See id. The only issue concerns the scope of that intent, as expressed in the language of the parties' written contract.

By its terms, the indemnification clause applied only if (1) a third party sued Maxim; (2) the third party alleged "exposure to or damage from materials, elements or constituents at or from the project site"; (3) this exposure or damage "resulted in or caused any adverse condition to any third party or resulted in claims arising from remedial action, cleanup, uninhabitability of property, or other property damage"; and (4) Maxim was not grossly negligent and did not commit willful misconduct. If all four of these conditions applied, Dubuque was obligated to defend and indemnify Maxim. The first and fourth conditions were met; the plaintiffs were plainly third parties, and there was no allegation Maxim committed anything more than ordinary negligence.

Maxim takes an expansive view of the potential scope of the eleventh paragraph and seizes upon several of the broad and general phrases in second and third conditions to bolster its case. For example, Maxim argues soil is a "material," "element," or "constituent" because the dictionary defines "element" as "one of the simple substances or principles of which according to early natural philosophers, the physical universe is composed, the four elements pointed out by Empedocles being fire, air, water, earth." Black's Law Dictionary 520 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Maxim also contends it is plain that its negligent acts resulted in an "adverse condition" to the plaintiffs.

The district court took a less expansive view of the provision, and so do we. We do not think the plain language of the contract clearly and unambiguously expresses an intention that Dubuque indemnify Maxim under the circumstances alleged here, where there is no evidence of an environmental-type claim.

In determining the intent of the parties from the plain language of the agreement, a special rule of construction applies when, as here, a party asserts indemnification from its own negligence. McNally & Nimergood, 648 N.W.2d at 571.

This rule provides that indemnification contracts will not be construed to permit an indemnitee to recover for its own negligence unless the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously expressed. See McComas-Lacina Constr. Co. [v. Able Constructors], 641 N.W.2d [841,] 845 [(Iowa 2002)]; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poling, 248 Iowa 582, 588, 81 N.W.2d 462, 465 (1957).... Thus, indemnification contracts claimed to contain these provisions are construed more strictly than other contracts. Exide Corp. v. Millwright Riggers, Inc., 727 N.E.2d 473, 482 (Ind.Ct.App.2000); Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee P'ship, 2 P.3d 534, 541 (Wyo.2000).

Id.; see also 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:20, at 533-34 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter Williston on Contracts] (indemnification provisions, as exculpatory clauses, are frequently construed strictly against the party seeking the benefit). This rule of construction dovetails with one of our rules of interpretation, insofar as any ambiguity in the exceptionally fine print of this contract must also be construed strictly against Maxim, its drafter. See Iowa Fuel & Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 862-63 (Iowa 1991).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the indemnity provision. It is at once broad and narrow. On the one hand, we find broad and seemingly limitless phrases such as "materials, elements or constituents" and "other property damage"; on the other hand, indemnification appears limited to environmental-type claims, insofar as specific and prominent reference is made to indemnification for suits alleging "remedial action," "cleanup," or "uninhabitability of property." We need only, however, focus upon the aforementioned third condition; reference to "remedial action," "cleanup," and "unhabitability of property" indicates this provision was only intended to apply to environmental-type claims.

"Remedial action" is a term of art in federal environmental law. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2000); see also Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Iowa 2000) (employing term "remedial action" in discussion of federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675). A remedial action is defined as a permanent measure taken "to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24); see City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F.Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (remedial actions are generally those long-term measures taken to restore environmental quality). Likewise, the term "cleanup" is plainly associated with environmental practice. See generally Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 577, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2004) (repeatedly employing "cleanup" in discussion of CERCLA). Indeed, "remedial action" itself is a specific form of cleanup. See Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. Cal. EPA, 189 F.3d 828, 833-34 (9th Cir.1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (defining removal action), (24) (defining remedial action). It is also plain that environmental problems may cause damage to property, including rendering it uninhabitable. In light of the use of these environmentally loaded terms, a...