Maxwell v. Eastman et al.

• Court: Pennsylvania District and County Court
• Writing for the Court: MacNeille, J.
• Citation: 19D.&C.258
• Docket Number: March T., 1933, No. 7139.
• Decision Date: 28 July 1933
• Parties: Maxwell v. Eastman et al.

19 D.&C. 258

Maxwell v. Eastman et al.

March T., 1933, No. 7139.

The Judicial Districts of Pennsylvania.

July 28, 1933.

Marriage — Inducing breach of agreement — Conspiracy — Liability to injured party — Use of false statements — Action for slander — Loss of marriage as special damages.

1. A party to a marriage agreement has no right of action against third persons who conspire to and succeed in inducing the other party to breach the contract, by advising against the contemplated marriage or by any other means not in themselves unlawful.

2. Breach of a contract to marry is such special injury as will support an action for slander by means of which the other party was induced to break the engagement, although the slanderous statements are not actionable per se.

Pleading — Misjoinder of causes of action — Invalidity of one ground — Leave to amend — Faulty averment of damages — Defendant's right to judgment.

3. There is no misjoinder where one of the two inconsistent causes of action asserted is legally invalid, and under such circumstances plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to amend so as to assert properly the valid cause of action.

4. Judgment may not be entered in defendant's favor on statutory demurrer because of a faulty averment of damages in the statement of claim.

Affidavit of defense raising questions of law. C.P. No. 3, Phila. Co.

Herbert W. Salus and Harry F. Kaiser, for plaintiff.

William T. Connor, for defendant.

MacNEILLE, J., July 28, 1933.

An affidavit of defense raising questions of law has been filed in this case.

In the statement of claim it is alleged that on June 10, 1924, the plaintiff and Lemuel C. Altemus entered into an oral agreement to marry; that the date of said marriage was postponed several times by mutual agreement; that during the spring of 1932 it was agreed that the marriage take place before February 16, 1933; that the defendants, intending to injure the plaintiff and to maliciously effect a breach of said agreement of marriage, did, on December 25, 1932, and for a long time prior thereto and until the present time, conspire to effect a breach of the said marriage agreement; that the defendant James Dobson Altemus, on December 25, 1932, in furtherance of the said conspiracy, assaulted, battered, and beat Lemuel C. Altemus to compel him to breach the marriage agreement; that the defendant Bessie Dobson Altemus Eastman, on December 28, 1932, in furtherance of the conspiracy, induced Lemuel C. Altemus to become a patient in a sanatarium for nervous diseases with the malicious purpose of subjecting him to the influence of the defendants and of preventing the plaintiff from communicating with him; that the defendants have prevented the plaintiff from seeing or communicating with Lemuel C. Altemus for the purpose of preventing the consummation of the marriage agreement; that the defendant Bessie Dobson Altemus Eastman, on a number of occasions in conversations with Lemuel C. Altemus, referred to the plaintiff as "that woman" and "your mistress" and stated to the plaintiff that "she should not waste her time on an old drunken sot"; that both defendants have, in conversations with Lemuel C. Altemus, referred to the plaintiff as a "mistress" and have said: "You do not expect a young girl to be true to an old man. She is just getting after you for your money and she has another man she really loves"; that such statements were untrue and were made for the sole purpose of preventing the consummation of the marriage agreement; that because of the acts of the defendants the said Lemuel C. Altemus has refused to carry out the marriage agreement; and that since June 10, 1924, the plaintiff has maintained her unmarried status, and has been and is still willing to marry the said Lemuel C. Altemus.

The first objection raised in the affidavit of defense is that the plaintiff does not set out a legal cause of action. It is a practically universally recognized rule in this jurisdiction, and in all other jurisdictions in which the question has been raised, that parents who interfere with the marital plans of their children and who induce them to breach their marriage agreement are not liable in a court action for damages. "An engagement to marry is more than a mere executory contract. It involves a status or relationship in which others than the contracting parties have rights recognized by law, e.g., the parents of the contracting parties, and if defendant's mother in this case saw fit, as she had a right to do, to advice against her son's contemplated marriage with plaintiff, the injury to plaintiff resulting therefrom would be damnum absque injuria": Lowenstein v. McGowan, 5 D. & C. 5. To the same effect are the following cases: Hastings v. Gallagher, 76 Pitts. L.J. 503; Leonard v. Whetstone et al., 34 Ind. App. 383; Minsky v. Satenstein et al., 143 Atl. 512 (N.J.); Lukas v. Tarpilauskas, 266 Mass. 498; Guida v. Pontrelli, 114 Misc. Rep. 181, 186 N.Y. Supp. 147.

While the rule is not quite so universal and the question has never arisen in this jurisdiction, yet it has been held in most jurisdictions where the question has arisen that where third persons conspire and do induce a man to breach his marriage agreement, the law does not recognize any legal right of action in the wronged party against the third persons. The most recent case involving this question is Ryther v. Lefferts, 232 App. Div. 552 (N.Y., June 1931), an exhaustive opinion in which the court reviews all the authorities on the question, and concludes that there is no right of recovery. In this case it was said:

"Marriage is an institution upheld and favored by the State as creating a status upon which rests the structure of society. Parties before entering upon that status should not be hindered in securing information and advice from all sources so that they may become thoroughly informed of all facts and circumstances which might affect the desirability of their union. If this form of action be extended, any one who may give advice or information to either of the contracting parties would do so at the peril of being sued for inducing the breach. A field would be opened to distressing litigation. Third parties would be reluctant to speak and their self-interest would counsel silence."

Similar conclusions were reached in the cases of Clarahan v. Cosper, 160 Wash. 642, 296 Pac. 140, Ableman v. Holman et al., 190 Wis. 112, Homan v. Hall et al., 102 Neb. 70, Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, and Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N.E. 491, in which a very convincing dissenting opinion was written by Justice Pierce and assented to by Justice Sanderson. A contrary view has been taken in the cases of Minsky v. Satenstein et al., 143 Atl. 512 (N.J.), and Gunn v. Barr et al., 1 Dom. L.R. [1926] 855 (Alta.).

The great weight of authority is therefore against the recovery for conspiracy by third persons to induce the breach of a marriage contract and the successful culmination of the conspiracy, and the court is therefore compelled to adopt this...