Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co.
| Decision Date | 23 June 1881 |
| Citation | 9 N.W. 410,46 Mich. 278 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | MAXWELL v. BAY CITY BRIDGE CO. |
Evidence in this case (for which see note) held not to make out a case of estoppel. Acts of supervisors in 1874, fixing rates of toll for the bridge company owning the Bay City bridge, and the legislation of 1S75 legalizing the rates so fixed operated to legalize such bridge, and make it a lawful structure thereafter; but such action did not operate to cut off any claim a party might have had growing out of its previous illegal character. Nor would it prevent a recovery for consequential damages to docks or wharfs caused by the erection and maintenance of such bridge as a lawful structure.
This case has been before this court and is found reported in 41 Mich. 453, to which reference is made for a statement of the facts and a diagram, showing the location of the bridge swing, property of the plaintiff, etc. Two questions of primary importance, have with others been argued and submitted in the present case, and these were not passed upon on the former hearing: First, did the evidence introduced tend to prove an estoppel as against the plaintiff or his grantor Hart, so that damages could not now be recovered against the company? and, secondly, did the action of the supervisors in 1874 in fixing rates of toll for the bridge company to charge and collect, and of the legislature in 1875 legalizing the rates so fixed, legalize the bridge and make it a lawful structure not only from the date when such act took effect, but from the time the bridge was established by the board of supervisors in May, 1864, as claimed by counsel for the bridge company.
The testimony of Mr. Glasby who built the bridge, was one of the principal stockholders, and who testifies fully as to what Mr. Hart the plaintiff's grantor said and did in reference to the location and construction of the bridge and swing is given with a note herewith, [*] and there is no other testimony in the case tending, more strongly than this, to show acts or conduct of Hart, or reliance thereon by the company, that would estop the plaintiff in this case.
In speaking of an estoppel when this case was before considered it was said the doctrine of estoppel rests upon a party having directly or indirectly made assertions, promises or assurances upon which another has acted, under such circumstances that he would be seriously prejudiced if the assertions were suffered to be disproved or the promises or assurances to be withdrawn, and as the doctrine when applied operates to take away legal rights it is no more than common justice to require that the facts, which are supposed to call for its application shall be unquestionable, and the wrong which is to be prevented be undoubted. The correctness and indeed the justice of the rule as thus laid down will be unquestioned, sustained as it is by an almost unbroken line of authorities. What is there in the evidence to bring this case within the rule thus laid down?
The testimony of Mr. Glasby when taken together, and this is the only way to test it, shows conclusively, that in no way was his conduct--and he then and for this purpose was the company--influenced or affected by the acts, conduct or language of Mr. Hart, different from what it would have been had Mr. Hart not been an actor or interested in the question at all. Mr. Glasby says clearly and distinctly that it was to the board of supervisors he looked and depended for his authority in the premises, in all that he did; that if his actions and doings pleased Hart, he (Glasby) was glad, but beyond this Hart's acts and conduct had no influence with him. It is clear beyond dispute from the evidence, that aside from Hart's signature to the petition presented the board of supervisors asking that the bridge be located at the foot of Third street, he did no act, or said anything, which changed or influenced the conduct of the company, or upon which action was taken by it different from what it otherwise would have been, so that we are unable to see how it can now be said that the company relying upon what he said or did, expended any money or did anything, which justice and equity requires them to be protected in the full enjoyment of, as against Hart or his grantees. The essential elements required by the doctrine of estoppel in order to apply it are wholly wanting in the present case. Were this simply a question as to the weight of the testimony, within the rule laid down in Conely v. McDonald, 40 Mich. 150, and since adhered to, we should not interfere, but in our opinion the evidence failed in essential particulars to establish an estoppel or facts which would warrant a jury in so finding.
Upon the second question we are of opinion that the acts of the supervisors and of the legislature in fixing and legalizing the rates of toll upon this bridge, were such, that the public could not thereafter question the legality of the structure or the right of the company to maintain it under its charter. We are also however of opinion, that such action would not cure or cut off any claim which up to that time the plaintiff may have had, because of its illegal character and the injury he may have sustained in consequence thereof. The legislature did not attempt to legalize the action of the board of supervisors in granting authority to construct the bridge in 1864, even if such an act in 1875 would cut off the right of the plaintiff to recover damages which he had sustained between those dates. The act of the supervisors in 1874 in fixing tolls thereafter to be collected and the legislature in making legal such proceedings of the board, was but a recognition of the legality of the company and its rights after that date. Statutes are not to be given a retrospective construction unless the language thereof shows clearly such to have been the intention of the legislature, and in this case it clearly appears that no such intention existed, but that other and far different reasons existed, for the action of the legislature. We need not therefore discuss at length in this case, what the effect of an act legalizing the structure from 1864 would have been or how the plaintiff might have been affected thereby. This case calls for no such investigation.
But conceding that the effect of the legislation of 1875 in legalizing the previous action of the board of supervisors was to make the bridge and pier a lawful structure, it does not follow that the plaintiff may not maintain an action for the consequential injury to his dock. Neither the supervisors nor the state can directly or indirectly appropriate the plaintiff's use of the shore to public uses without compensation; and if even a lawful bridge and pier is constructed so near it as to produce its profitable use he is entitled to compensation. If the bridge and pier is far enough from the dock so that it may be used but only with inconvenience, the same principle applies, and the question is merely of the extent of the injury. On the part of the plaintiff testimony had been introduced tending to show that certain vessels had not stopped at his dock because of this bridge, which otherwise would have, and the business lost in consequence thereof. The plaintiff was as a witness then asked: "What in your judgment has been the diminution in your business in amount by this prevention or interference with the boats coming there?" Answer. "About $1,000 a year during the years 1873-4-5-6."
The court in charging the jury upon this subject said that such general statement or estimate of damages was not enough for the jury to consider. That it devolved upon the plaintiff, especially if defendants acted in good faith, to show in some satisfactory way a safe basis from which they could determine the amount of his loss or injury. This evidence, following what had then been introduced, was admissible, and the particulars upon which such estimate was formed could be called out by the other side. The estimate for the purpose for which it was introduced was competent, and the weight thereof, was for the jury. If the court desired the jury to understand that while they could consider such estimate of damages, yet that it was not conclusive, but that the facts and circumstances previously testified to should be considered in connection therewith, by them, in estimating the damages, then the charge would have been correct to that extent. It was competent testimony to be considered by them, but under the issue and claim of the plaintiff, the good or bad faith of the defendant had nothing to do with the question. Only actual damages were claimed, and the good or bad faith could have no bearing upon that question. The fact that the plaintiff offered to lease some of the property to the defendant had no proper bearing in the case, and should not have been considered.
The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial ordered.
(The other justices concurred.)
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Notes:
[*] William F. Glasby, sworn for the defendant, testified as follows: I reside in East Saginaw have lived there since 1850. I am a contractor and builder. I built the bridge for the Bay City Bridge Company. I built the most of it in 1864. I owned about or very nearly one-half of the stock. I knew when the company was organized and the preliminary arrangements for locating and building the bridge. I knew Julius B. Hart. He had a store just north of the street where we were building the bridge at that time. I think it was the second store--a warehouse and store together. His was the second block. Park & McDowell had a liquor establishment in the first block. I believe I was acquainted with Mr. Hart before the bridge company was organized. When we were ready to...
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