Maxwell v. City of Miami

• Decision Date: 14 February 1924
• Citation: Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147 (Fla. 1924)
• Parties: MAXWELL v. CITY OF MIAMI.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

100 So. 147

87 Fla. 107

MAXWELL v. CITY OF MIAMI.

Florida Supreme Court

February 14, 1924

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; H. Pierre Branning, Judge.

Action by David Maxwell against the City of Miami. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Municipality operating fire department liable for injuries by negligent operations on streets amounting to nuisance. Whether the operation of a fire department by the city may be technically denominated a governmental or a corporate function, the rule in this state is that a municipality is liable for injuries caused by negligence in not keeping its streets in a reasonably safe condition for lawful uses, and for injuries caused by negligent operations or conditions upon the streets that amount to a nuisance.

Operation of fire equipment on streets not governmental function exempting city from liability for injuries. The operation upon the public streets of an automobile as a part of the fire extinguishment equipment of a city, is not such an essentially or exclusively governmental function as to exempt the city from liability for injuries to persons lawfully using the streets, when such injuries are solely caused by the grossly negligent manner in which the automobile is driven at a high and dangerous rate of speed upon the streets on which persons are lawfully traveling on foot or in permissible vehicles.

Municipality liable for reckless driving of fire equipment. While the right of way should be given to the passage of fire-fighting equipment when a destructive fire is or is supposed to be in progress, yet the rights of persons lawfully upon the streets may not be violated by the reckless driving of fire extinguishing equipment automobiles, thereby causing injuries to others who are in no way at fault in the premises.

Public duties of municipalities must be performed without needless injury to private rights. The public duties of municipalities are by law required to be performed so as to do no injury to private rights that is not immediately essential to conserve the public peace, health, safety, morals, and general welfare.

Municipal authority or police power subject to private rights. Any exertion of municipal authority or of the police power is subject to the provisions of organic law that are designed to conserve private rights.

Individual rights may not be injured by exercise of police power. In the exercise of the police power, property and individual rights may be interfered with or injured or impaired only in the manner and to the extent that is reasonably necessary to conserve the public good.

Unreasonable or unnecessary exertion of municipal authority or police power impairing private rights unconstitutional. An unreasonable or unnecessary exertion of municipal authority or of the police power in the manner or extent in which private personal or property rights are curtailed or impaired, violates organic law in that it deprives persons of liberty and property without authority or due process of law.

Police power to conserve private rights; organic law limits police and municipal powers. Municipalities are given police powers to conserve, not to impair, private rights. The organic law contains limitations upon police and municipal powers that may be sought to be conferred by statute.

When principles of nonliability and damnum absque injuria inapplicable. In view of the organic rights to acquire possess, and protect property and to due process and equal protection of the laws, the principles of nonliability and damnum absque injuria are not applicable when, in the exercise of municipal authority or the police power, private personal, and property rights are interfered with, injured or impaired in a manner or by a means, or to an extent, that is not reasonably necessary to serve a public purpose for the general welfare.

Operation of motor vehicles on public highways at reckless or unreasonable rate of speed denounced by statute. The state law forbids the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways of the state recklessly or at a greater rate of speed than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic and use of the highway so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person, and provides penalties for violation of the law.

Municipality liable for reckless operation of fire trucks. Reckless driving of fire trucks on the streets of a city is manifestly not essential to efficiency in fire fighting, and such conduct needlessly and unreasonably and consequently unlawfully impairs the private rights of those who are lawfully upon the streets with their property. Such conduct renders the streets unsafe, and when permitted by the city liability of the city may arise therefrom if persons and property lawfully on the street are injured in consequence thereof.

Power to abate nuisances and to regulate speed of vehicles carries duty to exercise it. The city of Miami has 'power to prevent or abate nuisances' to 'to regulate the speed at which automobiles and all vehicles may be driven through the streets.' This power carries with it a duty to prevent or abate nuisances and to regulate the speed at which all vehicles are driven through the streets, in the interest of public safety.

COUNSEL

A. B. & C. C. Small and J. H. Swink, all of Miami, for plaintiff in error.

A. J. Rose and J. W. Watson, Jr., both of Miami, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD P.J.

The amended declaration herein contained two counts. For the purpose of this case it will be necessary to state only the controverted portions of the second count, which are as follows:

'(1) Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 10, 1921, the defendant was and still is a municipal corporation existing under the laws of Florida, and at the same time the defendant maintained a fire department consisting of the necessary organization and equipment for the quenching of fires within the said city, and that a part of said equipment the said defendant maintained a certain automobile, which was used by defendant as a part of the equipment of said fire department in the quenching of fires, and that said automobile was operated in the performance of such duties by officers, agents, employees, and members of such fire department, and was so used, among other purposes, to transport officers or members of such fire department to the scene of fires.

'(2) Plaintiff avers that the said automobile hereinabove mentioned had for a long period of time, to wit, for many months before the date alleged above, been used as a vehicle for the purpose of transporting the chief of the fire department of the defendant or other directors of operation or members of the department to the scene of fires being attended by the fire department in its business of quenching fires, and that when the injury occurred said automobile of said fire department was driven by its driver in a grossly negligent and wanton and reckless manner and at a high and dangerous and grossly negligent rate of speed.'

'(4) Plaintiff further avers that at the same time mentioned above plaintiff was driving an automobile along the streets of said city, and was driving the same in a prudent, careful, and reasonable manner, and that while so driving he had occasion to cross the street along which the automobile of the fire department mentioned hereinabove was proceeding, and that said automobile of said fire department was being driven in the negligent, wanton, and reckless manner, and at the reckless and dangerous rate of speed hereinabove set forth, and was negligently and carelessly driven into and against and upon the automobile being driven by plaintiff as aforesaid, to the great damage of plaintiff and plaintiff's automobile,'

--the injuries being stated, damages claimed, and the prerequisite notice of claim being alleged.

A demurrer to the second count contained the following grounds:

'(1) It affirmatively appears from said count that there is no liability on the part of this defendant for the injuries complained of.

'(2) It appears from said count that the injuries complained of were caused by a member of the fire department of the city of Miami in the performance of his duties, and there is not liability on the part of this defendant for the acts of its members of the fire department in the performance of their duties.

'(3) The acts of a municipality connected with its fire department are public and sovereign in their nature, and the defendant corporation is not liable to be sued, either for failure to exercise them or for errors committed in their exercise.

'(4) The members or employees of the fire department are, while acting in the line of duty prescribed for them, not agents of the corporation in the sense which renders it liable for their acts.

'(5) A city is not liable for negligent use or operation of its fire-fighting apparatus.

'(6) The city is not...