Maxwell v. Maxwell, 33063.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1920
• Docket Number: No. 33063.,33063.
• Citation: 189 Iowa 7,177 N.W. 541
• Parties: MAXWELL v. MAXWELL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

189 Iowa 7

177 N.W. 541

MAXWELL

v.MAXWELL.

No. 33063.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 15, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Jasper County; Henry Silwold, Judge.

Action to recover damages for alleged false arrest and imprisonment.Verdict for the defendant.Plaintiff appeals.Reversed and remanded.Holly & Holly, of Des Moines, and Campbell & Campbell, of Battle Creek, for appellant.

J. E. Cross and C. O. McLain, both of Newton, for appellee.

GAYNOR, J.

This action is to recover damages for an alleged false arrest and imprisonment.The plaintiff and the defendant are father and son.At the time of the happening of the matters herein complained of plaintiff was about 78 years of age.He complains that on or about the 18th day of October, 1916, his son, the defendant, without probable cause for believing there was any necessity therefor, maliciously caused him to be arrested by the sheriff of Jasper county and transported in an automobile to the defendant's home, and from thence to the Soldiers' Home at Marshalltown.There is no dispute in the evidence that on or about the date alleged the defendant caused the sheriff of Jasper county to take plaintiff into his custody and transport him to the Soldiers' Home at Marshalltown; that the sheriff did take possession of plaintiff's person against his will, and did transport him to the Soldiers' Home at Marshalltown and left him there, free to remain or leave; that he voluntarily remained a few days and then returned to his home.

The defendant urges in justification that the plaintiff was of unsound mind, suffering from delusions which involved him in a state of mental uncertainty as to the true relationship which existed between himself, the members of his family, and the world; that these delusions consisted in an unfounded belief that members of his family were persecuting him in various ways without cause; that he had important rights of action against persons, especially members of his own family, which must be preserved and realized upon through extensive litigation; that these delusions, operating upon his mind, led him to walk and ride about the country seeking evidence of his imaginary wrongs; that these excursions exposed him to all kinds of inclement weather, and endangered his health and life; that in these migrations through the country he threatened various parties with litigation and with physical violence, without having any rational reason therefor and without any basis in fact for his conduct; that in fact the disordered condition of his mind rendered him dangerous to himself and to others; that the plaintiff, being the son of the defendant, and noting the danger to which he was exposing himself and the peril to others involved in his conduct, caused the said sheriff to come to plaintiff's home and take him into custody, but only for the purpose of returning him to the Soldiers' Home at Marshalltown, at which place he had previously been on his own initiative; that the only thought and purpose of the defendant in the matter was to change the surroundings of the plaintiff, in hope that a change would be beneficial to him through rest and quiet, and to afford the public the protection it was justly entitled to.

The defense may be divided into two parts: (1) That the plaintiff was in such a condition of mind as rendered it unsafe for him to be at large, subject to the vagaries of his own mind; that he was in fact of unsound mind; that the restraint placed upon him was only such as was reasonably necessary to protect him from himself and to protect the public from injury.(2) That the relationship existing between the plaintiff and the defendant was such that the defendant owed the plaintiff a moral and legal duty to exercise some supervision over him; that the condition of plaintiff's mind was such that he appeared to be in need of supervision, and restraint was necessary to that end; that in doing what he did he acted as a reasonably prudent person would act under like circumstances, honestly believing that the plaintiff was so mentally deranged as to be incapable of rational self-control, and that the best interests of the plaintiff and the public required the action taken, and that what was done was without malice, and was done for the sole benefit of the plaintiff.It will be noted that this second offense omits a charge of actual necessity for restraint.

[1][2] If the plaintiff was, at the time he was restrained, of unsound mind, and by reason thereof incapable of caring for himself and incapable of exercising rational self-control, and this condition of mind imperiled his own safety and rendered reasonable restraint necessary to protect him from injury, or if by reason of his mental condition he was incapable of exercising rational self-control, and the lack of such power imperiled the safety of others, then one sustaining the relationship to him which this defendant sustained would be justified, under the law, in placing him under such restraint as was reasonably necessary to protect himself against himself and the public from the dangers incident to his condition.Or, in other words, if the mental condition of the plaintiff was such that there was danger to himself or to others in permitting him to be at large, subject to the whims and caprices of an insane mind, then reasonable restraint would be justified, and would afford him no basis for complaint.We think the general rule is that where it is made to appear that one is not capable of rational self-control, and by reason thereof his own safety or the public safety is imperiled, one who by relationship or otherwise is the natural or proper custodian of an insane person may lawfully restrain him in some proper place for treatment, for the good of the patient or for the protection of the public, and this without warrant and without judicial proceedings.The right to restrain an insane person is not governed by the general law which provides that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.Restraint under such conditions does not offend against the constitutional inhibition.

We find no authorities going so far as to say that one sustaining the close relationship which this defendant sustained to this plaintiff is not justified in temporarily restraining him of his liberty, when such restraint is made necessary for his own protection or the public safety.If this were the only question, and the record sustained the necessity for the restraint adverted to, we would have no hesitancy in affirming this case.For a full discussion of this phase of the question seeVan...