Maxwell v. Michael P. Doyle, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. COA03-475.,COA03-475.
• Citation: Maxwell v. Michael P. Doyle, Inc., 595 S.E.2d 759, 164 N.C. App. 319 (N.C. App. 2004)
• Parties: William A. MAXWELL, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL P. DOYLE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

595 S.E.2d 759

164 NC App. 319

William A. MAXWELL, Plaintiff, v.MICHAEL P. DOYLE, INC., Defendant.

No. COA03-475.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 18, 2004.

Morgan, Reeves & Gilchrist, by Robert B. Morgan and C. Winston Gilchrist, Lillington, for plaintiff-appellant.

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., by Christopher J. Blake and Reed J. Hollander, Raleigh, for defendant-appellee.

GEER, Judge.

PlaintiffWilliam A. Maxwell sued defendantMichael P. Doyle, Inc., alleging that he was entitled, under an oral agreement, to half of the commission received upon the sale of an apartment complex.At trial, the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence.Because we hold that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of breach of an enforceable agreement to withstand a motion for a directed verdict, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Facts

William A. Maxwell is a real estate broker and agent specializing in commercial properties in the Cumberland County market.DefendantMichael P. Doyle, Inc. is a corporation located in Charlotte that provides commercial real estate brokerage services.Michael Doyle is the president and sole stockholder of the company and a licensed commercial real estate broker.

Plaintiff's evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, tended to show the following.Beginning as early as 1997, Doyle had attempted to convince Tom Wood, the owner of the Cambridge Arms apartments in Fayetteville, to allow Doyle to attempt to sell the apartments.On 13 August 1997, Doyle wrote to Wood concerning the apartments, but did not receive a response.Doyle subsequently telephoned Wood a number of times to try to interest him in selling the apartments.Although Wood did not always return Doyle's telephone calls, Doyle did speak with Wood on the telephone approximately five times.Nevertheless, Doyle's efforts proved unsuccessful and Wood refused to sell the apartments.

On 13 September 2000, Doyle called Maxwell to discuss the Fayetteville real estate market.The two met in Fayetteville the following day and toured several properties.Later that day, Doyle asked if Maxwell knew Tom Wood.Doyle, who was called by Maxwell as an adverse witness, explained:

I wanted to see if Bill Maxwell could give me some help on a property called Cambridge Arms, that I had failed to sell.And so I said to Bill ... if you can make Mr. Tom Wood—the person that I had been talking to on and off for three or four years ...— a seller—meaning he would sell his apartments—you and I can split a fee.

Maxwell testified that Doyle offered to split any commission from a sale of the apartments if Maxwell arranged a meeting with Wood and gave Doyle access to his Cambridge Arms files.

After agreeing to the proposition, Maxwell made his file available to Doyle, who removed various items.Maxwell also called Wood and convinced him to meet with Maxwell and Doyle at Wood's office on 19 September 2000.At the meeting, Wood stated that the apartments were not on the market and declined to sign a listing or commission agreement.He agreed, however, to consider any offers that plaintiff and Doyle might bring to him.After the meeting, Maxwell obtained some additional materials relating to the Cambridge Arms apartments that he forwarded to Doyle.

Although no commission agreement was signed at the 19 September 2000 meeting, Doyle, unbeknownst to Maxwell, subsequently did obtain a listing and commission agreement from Wood for the sale of the Cambridge Arms.Wood telephoned Doyle approximately ten days after the 19 September meeting and the two met in early October.As a result of this meeting, Doyle prepared a listing and commission agreement that Wood signed on 15 October 2000.Doyle signed the agreement, which provided for a two percent commission upon the sale of the Cambridge Arms, on 21 November 2000.

The Cambridge Arms was sold on 29 March 2001 for $14,000,000.00.Defendant earned a commission of $280,000.00 on the sale.Although Doyle and Maxwell had remained in contact during that time frame regarding other real estate matters, Doyle never informed Maxwell of his subsequent contacts with Tom Wood.Maxwell did not learn of the Cambridge Arms sale until he read about it in the newspaper.When he called Doyle and requested half of the commission, Doyle refused to pay him anything.

Plaintiff filed this breach of contract action against defendant on 27 September 2001 and the case was tried before a jury at the 30 September 2002 session of Cumberland County Superior Court.At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict and dismissed plaintiff's claims.

Standard of Review

When considering a motion for a directed verdict, a trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference arising from the evidence.Clark v. Moore,65 N.C.App. 609, 610, 309 S.E.2d 579, 580(1983).Any conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.Davis & Davis Realty Co., Inc. v. Rodgers,96 N.C.App. 306, 308-09, 385 S.E.2d 539, 541(1989), disc. review denied,326 N.C. 263, 389 S.E.2d 112(1990).If there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the non-moving party's claim, the motion for a directed verdict should be denied.Clark,65 N.C.App. at 610, 309 S.E.2d at 580.

As our Supreme Court has explained, questions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand a Rule 50motion for directed verdict"present only a question of law; that question is whether substantial evidence introduced at trial would support a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party."In re Will of Buck,350 N.C. 621, 624, 516 S.E.2d 858, 860(1999).See alsoRoberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds Memorial Park,281 N.C. 48, 53, 187 S.E.2d 721, 724(1972)("A motion for a directed verdict presents the question of whether, as a matter of law, the evidence offered by plaintiff, when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to be submitted to the jury.");Paul A. Bennett Realty Co. v. Hoots,7 N.C.App. 362, 364, 172 S.E.2d 215, 216(1970)("Whether the evidence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury is a question of law and is always to be decided by the court.").Because the trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict addressing the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law, it is reviewed de novo.Denson v. Richmond County,159 N.C.App. 408, 411, 583 S.E.2d 318, 320(2003)("We apply de novo review to ... a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict....").

Nonetheless, defendant urges us to apply an abuse of discretion standard, citing prior decisions of this Court.We are confident that those decisions did not intend to hold, contrary to well-established Supreme Court precedent, that a decision regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, a question of law, should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.Instead, these decisions are more properly construed as applying an abuse of discretion standard only when the trial court has actually exercised its discretion, such as when the court chooses, in a close case, to reserve decision on a motion for a directed verdict until after the jury has rendered a verdict.See, e.g., Turner v. Duke Univ.,325 N.C. 152, 158, 381 S.E.2d 706, 710(1989)("[W]here the question of granting a directed verdict is a close one, we have said that the better practice is for the trial court to reserve its decision on the motion and allow the case to be submitted to the jury.").A court does not exercise discretion when deciding a question of law.

Thus, we apply a de novo standard of review in considering the merits of plaintiff's appeal as to the motion for a directed verdict.This Court's review is limited to "those grounds asserted by the moving party at the trial level."Freese v. Smith,110 N.C.App. 28, 34, 428 S.E.2d 841, 845-46(1993).At trial, defendant argued in support of its motion for a directed verdict(1) that plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence of an enforceable agreement; and (2) that plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that he was the procuring cause of the sale.

Discussion

At the outset, we note that the parties devote much of their briefs to strenuous argument over whether the contract required plaintiff to be the "procuring cause" of the sale.Defendant argues that plaintiff was required to show that he was the procuring cause of the sale and that he failed to do so.Plaintiff contends either that the terms of the contract altered the strict application of the procuring cause rule, or, alternatively, that his evidence was sufficient to establish that he was in fact a procuring cause of the sale.We find that these arguments are beside the point.

Our Supreme Court set forth the procuring cause rule in S & W Realty & Bonded Commercial Agency, Inc. v. Duckworth & Shelton, Inc.,274 N.C. 243, 250-51, 162 S.E.2d 486, 491(1968)(emphasis added; internal citations omitted):

Ordinarily, a broker with whom an owner's property is listed for sale becomes entitled to his commission whenever he procures a party who actually contracts for the purchase of the property at a price acceptable to the owner.If any act of the broker in pursuance of his authority to find a purchaser is the initiating act which is the procuring cause of a sale ultimately made by the owner, the owner must pay the commission provided the case is not taken out of the rule by the contract of employment.

The Court explained the basis for the rule: "The law does not permit an owner to reap the benefits of the broker's labor without just reward if he has requested a broker to undertake the sale of his property and accepts the results of service rendered at his request."Id. at...