Maxwell v. School Bd. of Broward County

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MAGER; CROSS; WALDEN
• Citation: Maxwell v. School Bd. of Broward County, 330 So.2d 177 (Fla. App. 1976)
• Decision Date: 26 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75--1285,75--1285
• Parties: 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2553, 80 Lab.Cas. P 53,994 Betty MAXWELL et al., Appellants, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, Appellee.

Page 177

330 So.2d 177

92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2553, 80 Lab.Cas. P 53,994

Betty MAXWELL et al., Appellants, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, Appellee.

No. 75--1285.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 26, 1976.

Rehearing Denied May 5, 1976.

Richard H. Frank and Ronald G. Meyer of Law Offices of Frank & Meyer, Tampa, for appellants.

Joseph A. Caldwell of Muller & Mintz, Miami, for appellee.

MAGER, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, the trial court finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. In particular, the trial court found that the activities alleged in the complaint were 'labor matters' preempted by Chapter 447, Florida Statutes.

The complaint was filed by several persons in their individual and representative capacity seeking declaratory relief and money damages. ¹ Counts I through IV of the complaint alleged in essence that prior to the 1974--1975 school year the School Board of Broward County, defendant, established and maintained a program known as the Basic Incentive Award; and that in reliance upon such program plaintiffs undertook to complete the necessary steps to participate therein and were qualified to receive the benefits thereunder but that such program was unilaterally rescinded and canceled by the defendant. ² Plaintiffs sought damages to compensate them for the alleged losses incurred as a result of such cancellation.

The plaintiffs contend that the issues raised by the complaint are judicial controversies within the jurisdiction of the trial court and Not 'labor matters' within the framework of Part II, Chapter 447, Florida Statutes.

In 1974 the legislature enacted Chapter 74--100 (creating Part II, Chap. 447, F.S.) which among other things established a Public Employees Relations Commission (Section 447.205, F.S.; see also sections 447.201--447.607, F.S.) The subject legislation was a culmination of efforts to establish standards and guidelines governing collective bargaining by public employees in order to implement the rights guaranteed to public employees under sec. 6, Art. I, Fla. Constitution. See Dade County Class. Teach. Ass'n, Inc. v. Legislature, 269 So.2d 684 (Fla.1972). The purposes and objectives of the legislative enactment are recited in section 447.201, F.S. as follows:

'447.201 Statement of policy.--It is declared that the public policy of the state, and the purpose of this part, is to provide statutory implementation of s. 6, Art. I of the State Constitution, to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its employees, both collectively and individually, and to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government. It is the intent of the legislature that nothing herein shall be construed either to encourage or discourage organization of public employees. These policies are best effectuated by:

(1) Granting to public employees the right of organization and representation;

(2) Requiring the state, local governments, and other political subdivisions to negotiate with bargaining agents duly certified to represent public employees;

(3) Creating a Public Employees Relations Commission to assist in resolving disputes between public employees and public employers; and

(4) Recognizing the constitutional prohibition against strikes by public employees and providing remedies for violations of such prohibition.'

One of the primary duties and responsibilities of the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) is to investigate and resolve charges of unfair labor practices, as defined under sec. 447.501, F.S. (see Appendix A).

From an analysis of its purpose and objectives and from a review of its provisions it appears that the legislature intended Part II, Chapter 447 to provide an exclusvie method for resolving labor disputes between public employers and public employees, with the Public Employees Relations Commission having preemptive jurisdiction over such matters. In this respect, there is a marked similarity between the functioning of PERC and the National Labor Relations Board; to some extent the provisions of Part II, Chapter 447, have been patterned after the provisions of the federal law creating the NLRB (see, for example, the similarity between sec. 447.501 and 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 defining unfair labor practices). Therefore, reference to case law construing the federal act would be instructive in resolving the primary issue raised in this appeal, particularly whether jurisdiction over labor activities (and the circumstances under which such activities) would be preempted in favor of PERC.

In commenting on the preemption doctrine the Supreme Court of the United States observed:

'(P)rinciples of pre-emption, in whatever field of law they operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have some authority over the subject matter.' Amalgamated Association, etc. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1917, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971).

The application of the principle of preemption was illustrated in Sheetmetal Workers' Int. Ass'n v. Florida H. & P., Inc., 230 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla.1970), where our Florida Supreme Court stated that,

'It is settled law that jurisdiction over labor activities is pre-empted in favor of the National Labor Relations Board, if the activities Arguably are covered by the National Labor Relations Act. In such cases state courts may not exercise jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the Board is paramount and exclusive. Scherer & Sons, Inc. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, Local 415, 142 So.2d 290 (Fla.1962); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775.' (Emphasis ours.)

We, therefore, conclude that principles of preemption are applicable to the functioning of PERC; jurisdiction over labor activities is preempted in favor of PERC if the activities are 'arguably' covered by the provisions of Part II, Chapter 447, supra. It is important to point out however that in Sheetmetal Workers' Int. Ass'n, supra, the Supreme Court held that Florida courts could only determine whether the complained of activities were 'arguably' covered by the federal act and that they could Not go further to initially determine whether a labor dispute existed. In determining whether complained of activities are arguably covered by the federal act, the United States Supreme Court stated in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 488, 99 L.Ed. 546,

'We realize that it is not easy for a state court to decide, merely on the basis of a complaint and answer, whether the subject matter is the concern exclusively of the federal Board and withdrawn from the State. . . . But where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and there the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction. . . .'

In the instant situation there can be no doubt that PERC has exclusive jurisdiction over statutorily enumerated unfair labor practices. See sec. 447.501, F.S. The consideration for this court is whether the trial court could reasonably have found, on the record before it, that the activity complained of as set forth in Counts I through IV 'arguably' constituted an unfair labor practice as defined by section 447.501, F.S. or the type of labor matter or dispute within the contemplation of Part II, Chapter 447.

Measured by the purposes and object of Part II, Chapter 447, and in particular by the statutory enumeration of 'unfair labor practices', Counts I through IV of plaintiffs' complaint do Not in our opinion reflect (labor) activities which are 'arguably' embraced within the provisions of Part II, Chapter 447 and within the preempting jurisdiction of PERC. ³ The cancellation of the incentive awards program for which plaintiffs alleged they have suffered damages is far more removed from an 'arguably' covered (labor)...