Maxwell v. State Compensation Director, 12476

• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Writing for the Court: CALHOUN
• Citation: 144 S.E.2d 493,150 W.Va. 123
• Parties: Kiter MAXWELL v. STATE COMPENSATION DIRECTOR et al.
• Docket Number: No. 12476,12476
• Decision Date: 12 October 1965

Page 493

144 S.E.2d 493 150 W.Va. 123 Kiter MAXWELL
v.
STATE COMPENSATION DIRECTOR et al. No. 12476. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Submitted Sept. 7, 1965.
Decided Oct. 12, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

1. 'In case of an injury resulting in the death of an employee, the statute governing compensation to the dependents of the deceased, in effect at the date of the original injury, controls the award, and not the statute in force at the date of the death of the employee.' Point 1 Syllabus, Hardin

Page 494

v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board et al., 118 W.Va. 198, 189 S.E. 670.

2. The workmen's compensation statutes, including amendments thereof, become an integral part of and must be read into the contract of employment existing between the employer and the employee.

3. Workmen's compensation statutes, or amendments of such statutes, which affect merely the procedure may be construed to have a retroactive operation; but any such statute or amendment which affects the substantial rights or obligations of the parties to the contract arising from the employment relationship or which impairs the obligation of such a contract cannot be construed to operate retroactively.

4. A workmen's compensation statute, or any amendment of such a statute, which becomes effective after the employee ceases his employment and which increases the amount of benefits payable to a dependent of the employee cannot be construed to operate retroactively.

5. To the extent that Webb v. State Compensation Commissioner, 138 W.Va. 21, 76 S.E.2d 248, and Peak v. State Compensation Commissioner, 141 W.Va. 453, 91 S.E.2d 625, are inconsistent with the decision of the Court expressed in this opinion, they are expressly overruled.

[150 W.Va. 124] Dayton, Campbell & Love, George W.S. Grove, Jr., Charleston, for appellant.

Patrick J. Flanagan, Welch, for appellee.

CALHOUN, Judge.

This case is before the Court on an appeal by the employer, United States Steel Corporation, from an order of the workmen's compensation appeal board dated May 10, 1965, which affirmed a ruling of the workmen's compensation director dated December 15, 1964, by which Kiter Maxwell was awarded benefits as a dependent widow at the rate of $75.00 a month.

The pertinent facts are undisputed. The primary question presented for decision is whether the widow is entitled to benefits at the rate of $75.00 a month under the statute which was in effect when her husband died on May 22, 1963, as a result of third stage silicosis, or whether she is entitled to benefits at the rate of $65.00 a month under the statute in effect when the deceased husband terminated his employment in the employer's coal mine on November 22, 1960, because of ill health. The husband did not file a claim for workmen's compensation benefits during his lifetime, but an autopsy disclosed that his death resulted from third stage silicosis.

Counsel for the respective parties agree that at the time the employee ceased work on November 22, 1960. Code, 1931, 23-4-10, as amended in 1957, provided for benefits to a dependent widow at the rate of $65.00 a month; and that at the time of the employee's death on May 22, 1963, Code, 1931, 23-4-10, as a consequence of the 1961 amendment, provided for benefits to a dependent widow at the rate of $75.00 a month. The sole question presented for decision is, therefore, one of law.

In Hardin v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board et al., 118 W.Va. 198, 189 S.E. 670, the holding of the Court [150 W.Va. 125] was summarized in the first point of the syllabus as follows: 'In case of an unjury resulting in the death of an employee, the statute governing compensation to the dependents of the deceased, in effect at the date of the original injury, controls the award, and not the statute in force at the date of the death of the employee.' Previous cases holding workmen's compensation statutes not to be retroactive in operation are Collett et al. v. State Compensation Commissioner, 116 W.Va. 213, pt. 1 syl., 179 S.E. 657; Cherry v. State Compensation Commissioner, 115 W.Va. 180, 174 S.E. 889; Carbon Fuel Co. v. State Compensation Commissioner et al., 111 W.Va. 639, 163 S.E. 62; Bonner v. State Compensation Commissioner, 110 W.Va. 38, 39, 156 S.E.

Page 495

847, 848; Jenkins v. Heaberline, 107 W.Va. 287, 148 S.E. 117. The same general legal principle was adhered to subsequently in Lester v. State Compensation Commissioner, 123 W.Va. 516, 520, 16 S.E.2d 920, 923; Greer v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner et al., 123 W.Va. 270, 15 S.E.2d 175; Lancaster v. State Compensation Commissioner, 125 W.Va. 190, 23 S.E.2d 601; State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 131 W.Va. 442, 48 S.E.2d 9; Taylor v. State Compensation Commissioner et al., 140 W.Va. 572, 86 S.E.2d 114. The holdings of these cases are based on the presumption that statutes, including amendatory statutes, are intended to operate prospectively only and not retroactively; and upon the principle that workmen's compensation statutes become an integral part of the contract of employment between the employer and the employee. These decisions point out that a statute, if possible, will be given a construction which will avoid its unconstitutionality and that an amendment of a workmen's compensation statute cannot be construed to have a retroactive operation if the effect thereof would be to impair the obligation of the employment contract or to impair or destroy a substantial right.

The general legal principle relating to prospective operation of workmen's compensation statutes was apparently adhered to without deviation in decisions of this Court until the decision was made in Webb v. State Compensation Commissioner, 138 W.Va. 21, 76 S.E.2d 248. In that case, the employee was awarded benefits for silicosis in the third [150 W.Va. 126] stage under a 1945 statute which required that third stage silicosis be accompanied by tuberculosis of the lungs. The employee died in 1951, after a 1949 amendment of the statute eliminated the requirement of tuberculosis. An autopsy disclosed that the employee's death resulted from silicosis unaccompanied by tuberculosis. The Court held that the 1949 act was applicable to the claim of the dependent widow and, accordingly she was awarded benefits, notwithstanding the fact that the husband's silicosis was not accompanied by tuberculosis. In a dissenting opinion,...