Maxwell v. State, No. 5D04-4177.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: Sawaya
• Citation: 917 So.2d 404
• Parties: Jonathan MAXWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 06 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. 5D04-4177.

917 So.2d 404 Jonathan MAXWELL, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee. No. 5D04-4177. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. January 6, 2006.

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James M. Campbell, Orlando, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Timothy D. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

SAWAYA, J.

The issue we must resolve is whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress two incriminating statements made by Jonathan Maxwell to the police. Resolution of this issue depends upon the adequacy of the Miranda¹ warnings given to Jonathan and whether he was in custody before he made the incriminating statements.

This case evolves from an occurrence that we see far too often, it seems, involving two teenage children who engage in sexual intercourse only to subsequently discover that one of them has committed a crime. The case we now review is especially tragic because both children are mentally challenged and did not know that their entanglement in the tender affairs of life was an illegal act for which Jonathan Maxwell, seventeen years of age, would be held criminally liable. The record reveals that when Jonathan was first confronted by the police, he did not even realize that he had done anything wrong and did not know why the police were questioning him. When Jonathan finally understood that the police were concerned about his sexual escapade with S.B., a female three years younger than he, Jonathan made two incriminating

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statements. After he was charged with lewd and lascivious battery on a person between the ages of 12 and 16, Jonathan filed a motion to suppress the statements claiming that he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights. This motion was denied and Jonathan entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge aforementioned, reserving his right to appeal the suppression issue based on a stipulation by the State that it is dispositive.

It is not necessary to discuss in detail the facts of this case. Suffice it to say that Jonathan was enticed into watching sexually explicit videos and engaging in sexual intercourse by S.B., a neighbor. The incident was discovered by S.B.'s mother, who reported it to the police. Thereafter, Jonathan made two incriminating statements: the first was made outside his home, and the second, a videotaped statement, was made at the police station. Prior to making the first statement, a police officer attempted to advise Jonathan of his Miranda rights from rote. It is uncontested that the officer failed to advise Jonathan that he had a right to have an attorney present during questioning and that an attorney would be appointed to represent him if he could not afford one. The police never again advised Jonathan of his Miranda rights. Although the officer described Jonathan as callow and a naïf, he did declare that he thought Jonathan understood the warnings.

Before we begin our analysis of the issue before us, we pause to note the decision in Brown v. State, 376 So.2d 382 (Fla.1979), wherein the court held that a confession may not be considered dispositive for purposes of an appeal after a nolo contendere plea. The court reasoned that adoption of this rule is appropriate based on the perceived need to avoid a mini-trial regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, which is generally required to determine whether suppression of a confession is dispositive. The court further explained, however, that "[u]nder this rule, the trial judge will have wide discretion to accept or reject [a] nolo plea based upon his perception of the dispositive nature vel non of the legal issue reserved for appeal." Id. at 385. Based upon this statement and because a stipulation eliminates the need for a mini-trial, the courts have held that the rule in Brown does not apply if the defendant and state agree that suppression of the confession is dispositive.² It is beyond

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doubt that Jonathan and the State stipulated that the statements are dispositive, and the State candidly conceded at oral argument that it could not argue otherwise. We, therefore, perceive of no jurisdictional impediment to addressing the issues raised in this appeal, and we begin with the issue whether the Miranda warnings given Jonathan were adequate.

The manifest purpose of the Miranda warnings is to prevent the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation from impinging on the accused's constitutional right to be free from self incrimination. See Everett v. State, 893 So.2d 1278 (Fla.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1865, 161 L.Ed.2d 747 (2005). The adequacy of Miranda warnings is a question of law that we review de novo. Roberts v. State, 874 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("We review de novo the adequacy of Miranda warnings, as a question of law.") (citing C.A.M. v. State, 819 So.2d 802, 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)), review denied sub nom. State v. West, 892 So.2d 1014 (Fla.2005). In order to comply with the dictates of Miranda, the accused must be advised before custodial interrogation commences that: (1) the accused has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything the accused says may be used in court, (3) that the accused has the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and (4) that an attorney will be appointed for the accused before questioning if he or she cannot afford one. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Everett, 893 So.2d at 1284; Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla.1999) ("Suspects must also be informed that they have a right to an attorney during questioning, and that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them without cost.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131, 120 S.Ct. 970, 145 L.Ed.2d 841 (2000); Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla.1992); see also Chavez v. State, 832 So.2d 730 (Fla.2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 947, 123 S.Ct. 2617, 156 L.Ed.2d 637 (2003).³ The requirement to adequately warn an accused of these rights is more than a procedural nicety or legal technicality; the courts require full compliance in order for the warnings to be valid and any resulting confession to be admissible. Ramirez; Traylor.

The State argues that...