May Centers, Inc. v. S.G. Adams Printing and Stationery Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 5-86-0170,5-86-0170
• Parties: , 106 Ill.Dec. 891 MAY CENTERS, INC., Plaintiff-Applicant, v. S.G. ADAMS PRINTING AND STATIONERY COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Respondent. S.G. ADAMS PRINTING AND STATIONERY COMPANY, a Corporation, Counterclaimant-Respondent, v. MAY CENTERS, INC., Counterdefendant-Applicant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 691

506 N.E.2d 691

153 Ill.App.3d 1018, 106 Ill.Dec. 891

MAY CENTERS, INC., Plaintiff-Applicant, v. S.G. ADAMS PRINTING AND STATIONERY COMPANY, a Corporation,

Defendant-Respondent.

S.G. ADAMS PRINTING AND STATIONERY COMPANY, a Corporation, Counterclaimant-Respondent, v. MAY CENTERS, INC., Counterdefendant-Applicant.

No. 5-86-0170.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fifth District.

March 31, 1987.

Rehearing Denied April 29, 1987.

James J. Raymond, Thomas F. Hennessy, III, Thompson & Mitchell, Belleville, for plaintiff-applicant.

Burton C. Bernard, Larry J. Keller, Bernard & Davidson, Granite City, for S.G. Adams.

Justice WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff May Centers, Inc., commenced this action seeking recovery of amounts defendant S.G. Adams Printing and Stationery Company owed pursuant to an "allocable share agreement" between the parties with respect to operating costs for certain "community areas" within Alton Square Shopping Center. Adams counterclaimed alleging plaintiff had breached its duty to deal fairly with defendant with respect to defendant's lease. On plaintiff's motion the circuit court of Madison County ordered the terms of the allocable share agreements between plaintiff and the various tenants of the shopping center be treated as confidential by the parties to the action. Defendant moved the protective orders be vacated, and after an evidentiary hearing the court granted defendant's motion. The trial court stayed its order vacating the protective orders pending plaintiff's appeal to this court. There is no cross-appeal.

According to the record, defendant operates a "specialty shop" as a tenant within Alton Square, a shopping center developed and operated by plaintiff. The remainder of the shopping center is occupied by other tenant specialty stores, as well as two large department stores, J.C. Penney and Famous-Barr. The two large stores own their buildings and are not tenants. In addition to the areas within stores, the mall includes common or community areas. Each tenant is responsible for a share of plaintiff's expenses of maintaining the common areas. This responsibility is the subject of the "allocable share agreements" which are the subject of this appeal. Under its allocable share agreement defendant agreed to pay a monthly community area charge of seven cents per square foot of the leased premises, subject to adjustment by plaintiff for increased costs. Until February, 1980, defendant paid a community area charge of $336.56 per month. After plaintiff notified defendant of a substantial increase in the per-square-foot rate of defendant's common area charge (on or about February, 1980, plaintiff increased defendant's community area charge to $1,001.50 per month), defendant refused to pay, and plaintiff commenced this action to recover the charges. According to defendant's answer, defendant stopped paying the community area charge "because of its belief that an indeterminate part of the charges are invalid." Defendant also counterclaimed seeking damages and rescission of its lease for plaintiff's alleged breach of its duty to disclose facts pertinent to calculation of the community area charges.

On defendant's motion, the trial court ordered plaintiff to produce to defendant all of the Alton Square allocable share agreements since December 6, 1977, with the condition that only defendant's president and defendant's counsel retain copies of the agreements and that defendant keep that material confidential and use it for purposes of this case only. The court later extended the protective order to include all documents, testimony and discovery adduced at certain depositions.

Defendant moved to vacate the protective orders; plaintiff moved to extend them to all future discovery. A hearing was held. Defendant's counsel argued at the hearing that dissemination of the contents of the allocable share agreement was necessary to investigate the possibility of a class action and to explore possible areas of impeachment. The sole witness at the hearing was William Grafstrom, plaintiff's chairman. Grafstrom testified it was "understood" in the industry that to protect the bargaining position of the developer the allocable share agreements were regarded as confidential. Grafstrom also testified that if a major department store, for example J.C. Penney, became aware of all the intricacies of plaintiff's allocable share agreement with Famous-Barr, Penney could use that information to obtain more favorable terms for itself, either at a new shopping center or by withholding approval over matters it had a right to approve or disapprove at any existing location where Penney dealt with plaintiff.

On March 10, 1986, the court entered the order appealed from. The order stated the following findings: In initially entering the protective orders the court had no evidence before it as to the need for such orders, but relied on the good faith statements of plaintiff's counsel that the allocable share agreements were confidential; defendant had not explained to the court the meaning of the allocable share agreements, and its showing of predicted injury in the event of disclosure was conclusional; and unrestricted communication of the information obtained through discovery might lead to discovery of additional evidence or conduct relevant to the issues, and to impeaching statements or conduct. The court also concluded, citing Supreme Court Rule 308 (87 Ill.2d R. 308), that its order involved a substantial question of law as to which there was a substantial grounds for disagreement, and that an immediate appeal might materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The court identified the question as follows:

"In a shopping center developer-landlord's suit against a tenant for an unpaid share of common area maintenance costs incurred by the developer-landlord at the Shopping Center, does testimony by the plaintiff that it treats--and that the shopping center developer industry in the United States treats--the terms of the obligations of the department stores to pay a share of the shopping center's common area maintenance costs as confidential, and, testimony that disclosure of said terms will seriously injure the shopping center developer's business by increasing the bargaining power of tenants and other department stores, require the Court to issue a protective order under Rule 201(c)(1) that the tenant and its counsel also treat the information about said terms as confidential and not communicate it to any person who is not party to the lawsuit?"

Because Rule 308 is an exception to the general rule that only final judgments may be appealed, an appeal under Rule 308 should be limited to the question identified by the trial court. This court should not expand upon the questions brought before us by the trial court in order to answer others which could have been included. Getto v. City of Chicago (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 1045, 1048, 48 Ill.Dec. 588, 590-91, 416 N.E.2d 1110, 1112-13.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 201(c)(1), a circuit court may make protective orders denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating discovery to prevent "unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression." (87 Ill.2d R. 201(c)(1).) Rule 201(c) gives the trial court broad authority to prevent abuses of the liberal discovery afforded under our discovery rules. (See Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110A, par. 201, Historical and Practice Notes, at 233 (Smith-Hurd 1985).) The nature of a Rule 201(c) order depends on the facts of the particular case. (Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware, Inc. (1976), 63 Ill.2d 454, 461-62, 349 N.E.2d 28, 31.) To accomplish the purpose of discovery procedures it is necessary that a degree of flexibility be employed in the application of the rules. (Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware, Inc.) There is ample precedent for the entry of a protective order preventing...