May v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 31 January 1896
• Citation: 42 N.E. 946,14 Ind.App. 251
• Parties: MAY v. ANDERSON.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

14 Ind.App. 251

42 N.E. 946

MAY

v.ANDERSON.

Appellate Court of Indiana.

Jan. 31, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Monroe county; R. W. Miers, Judge.

Action by Mattie B. Anderson against Jonathan May for slander of title of real estate. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

East & Miller and Henley & Wilson, for appellant. Louden & Louden, for appellee.

DAVIS, J.

This was an action instituted by the appellee against the appellant to recover damages for slander of title to real estate. A special verdict was returned, on which judgment was rendered in favor of the appellee for $200. Several questions are presented, but we will first consider whether the appellee was entitled to judgment on the special verdict. The complaint is sufficient if the facts found are sufficient to entitle the appellee to recover. The jury find, in substance, that the real estate was worth $1,000, and that she was in the act of trading it to one Rhorer for $1,200; that, while the trade was pending, said Rhorer inquired of said appellant if he had any claim on said real estate, and thereupon said May stated, in answer to said inquiry, that he claimed to have a lien on said land; that he claimed that his money was used in the purchase of the land, and that, if he (Rhorer) purchased the land, May would give him trouble about it, as he intended to bring suit for it; that said statements were not true; that they were false; that said real estate was not purchased with his money; that the appellant had no lien on or interest in said real estate; that said statements were made maliciously, and to gratify the ill will of the appellant towards the appellee; and that on account of said statements said Rhorer refused to complete the trade. There is no finding that the appellant had any knowledge of the proposed trade between the appellee and Rohrer when he made the alleged slanderous statements. There is no finding that the value of the real estate was depreciated by reason of the statements. There is a finding that the statements were made maliciously, but the jury do not expressly find that the statements were made in order to injure the appellee. Neither is there any finding that the statements were made for the purpose of preventing the trade, or for the purpose of depreciating the value of the land, but the jury do find that because of said statements said Rhorer refused to complete the trade. If the trade had been completed, the facts show that the appellee would have made $200. It was necessary, in order to entitle the appellee to recover, that the finding should show that the statements were made maliciously; that they were untrue; and that she sustained pecuniary loss as a necessary or as a natural and proximate consequence of the slanderous statements. Townsh. Sland. & L. p. 283, § 205; Odgers, Sland. & L. p. 138; Folk. Starkie, Sland. & L. § 128, side paging 132; Andrew v. Deshler, 45 N. J. Law, 167; Like v. McKinstry, 41 Barb. 186. The finding shows that the statements were false; that they were made maliciously; and that thereby the completion of the trade was prevented, to her damage in the sum of $200. It was not necessary for the finding to show, in addition to the facts found, that the appellee had knowledge of the proposed trade, or that the value of the real estate was depreciated, or that the statements were made for the purpose of preventing the trade, or for depreciating the value of the land, or that they were made in order to injure the appellee. All that the appellee was required to allege and prove on this question was that the statements set out in the finding were made maliciously, or with an intent to injure the appellee; that they were false; and that the pending trade, in which she would have made $200 if completed, was thereby prevented. “Maliciously” means “with deliberate intention to injure.” And. Law Dict. In this case the statements are found to have been made maliciously, and to gratify the ill will of the appellant towards the appellee.

The findings that the real estate was not purchased with appellant's money, and that he had no lien on or interest in said real estate were, in connection with the other facts found, sufficient to show that the motive in...