May v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.

• Citation: 370 P.2d 390,189 Kan. 419
• Decision Date: 07 April 1962
• Docket Number: No. 42416,42416
• Parties: Perry A. MAY, Appellant, v. SANTA FE TRAIL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation, Clarence Offenstein, William D. Bray and Frank W. Jester, Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

Page 390

370 P.2d 390

189 Kan. 419

Perry A. MAY, Appellant, v. SANTA FE TRAIL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation, Clarence Offenstein, William D. Bray and Frank W.

Jester, Appellees.

No. 42416.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

April 7, 1962.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In the absence of a contract, express or implied, between an employee and his employer covering the duration of employment, the employment is terminable at the will of either party, and the employee states no cause of action for breach of contract by alleging that he has been discharged.

2. The seniority right of an employee is not inherent. It must stem either from a statute or a lawful administrative regulation made pursuant thereto, or from a contract between the employer and the employee, or from a collective bargaining agreement between the employees and their employer.

3. Before there can be a civil action for conspiracy, the plaintiff must plead facts which establish the elements required as a matter of law. A petition which fails to plead any unlawful act or acts does not allege a conspiracy.

4. There is no way that a corporate defendant can be guilty of inducing itself, or 'conspiring' with itself, to take a course of action that it may lawfully take concerning its own contract.

5. Where individual defendants are named and described as officials of the corporate defendant in a petition, with no allegations that these individual defendants acted other than in their official capacities on behalf of the corporate defendant, and no allegation remotely indicates that they were pursuing their course as individuals or for individual advantage, the acts of the individual defendants must be regarded as the acts of the corporation, and when so acting they cannot conspire with the corporation of which they are a part.

Manford Holly, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

J. B. Reeves, Topeka, argued the cause, C. J. Putt, W. E. Treadway and William A. Walton, Topeka, were with him on the brief for appellees.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This is an action against the Santa Fe Trial Transportation Company and three of its officials for an alleged unlawful discharge of the plaintiff from employment. Appeal has been perfected from an order of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to the second amended petition as amended (hereafter referred to as the petition).

The question is whether the petition states a cause of action on the ground that the defendants (appellees) unlawfully conspired to cause the discharge of the plaintiff (appellant) from employment.

The petition is framed in two counts wherein damages in the total sum of $98,640 are sought. In the first count the appellant seeks actual damages and in the second count punitive damages.

Insofar as material herein the petition alleges that the appellant was employed by the Santa Fe since the year 1931 as a welder in the body shop under an oral contract of employment, and 'that there was no agreement except as to wages and hours of work, which was from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., each working day.' On August 6, 1959, he was not feeling well and at noon notified the appellee, William D. Bray, foreman of the body shop, that he was ill and unable to work in the afternoon. After notifying Mr. Bray he 'clocked out.' Thereupon, the appellant returned home and rested the remainder of the day, and on the following day when his condition had not improved his wife advised the appellee, Frank W. Jester, shop superintendent and agent of the Santa Fe, by telephone that the appellant was not well and was unable to return to work that day because he was going to the doctor. On that day, August 7, 1959, the appellant was treated by a chiropractor, and on the following day he was treated by a medical doctor.

The petition then specifically alleged:

'That on the following Monday, August 10, 1959, when his condition had improved sufficiently, the plaintiff returned to work, and was preparing to 'clock in' when he was advised by the aforementioned defendants Bray and Jester that he had voluntarily quit and was no longer considered by the company as an employee of the defendant company. That the plaintiff insisted and advised the agents and employees of the defendant company, the above mentioned defendants Bray and Jester, that he had not voluntarily quit; but all to no avail. That the defendant Jester joined with the defendant Clarence Offenstein, who was the general manager of the Eastern Division of the defendant company, in declaring that the plaintiff had voluntarily terminated, when in truth and fact he had not done so.

'* * * That the agents of the defendant company knew or should have known that the plaintiff had not voluntarily quit or terminated his employment. That the defendant company, acting by and through its agents, as above alleged, knowingly and deliberately acted to the detriment and damage of this plaintiff in refusing him admittance to the premises and employment as above alleged and in reporting to their company superiors that the plaintiff had voluntarily terminated his employment with the defendant company.

'That this plaintiff had provoked the ire of his superiors above named herein, by making complaints about bad working conditions, and the defendant company acting by and through the codefendnats herein desiring to discharge the plaintiff, and by fraud and subterfuge as alleged herein, deliberately, wrongfully and without just cause declared that the plaintiff had voluntarily terminated, when in truth and in fact he had not done so.

'That the defendants, Clarence Offenstein, William D. Bray and Frank W. Jester, as agents, servants and employees of the defendant company, acted jointly and concurrently in all the acts of commission and omission as alleged herein.'

Further allegations set forth the appellant's tenure of office, seniority rights, life expectancy and average weekly earnings.

The second count incorporated the allegations of the first and alleged that the appellees 'acted jointly and concurrently in a conspiracy which amounted in law and in fact to intentional and deliberate fraud and subterfuge, for the specific purpose of harming this plaintiff in his contract of employment with the defendant company, subjecting the defendants to liability for punitive damages.'

The appellant concedes that unless a cause of action is stated in Count I for actual damages no cause of action is stated in Count II which would entitle him to recover punitive damages. (Stoner v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 383, 394, 36 P.2d 999; Estell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 164 Kan. 712, 192 P.2d 194; Branstetter v. Robbins, 178 Kan. 8, 14, 283 P.2d 455; and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 795 v. Kansans for the Right to Work, 189 Kan. 115, 368 P.2d 308.)

The appellant's brief is confined to two pages in which he quotes authorities defining 'conspiracy' and the meaning of the word 'unlawful.' He cites Rogers v. J. R. Oil and Drilling Co., 149 Kan. 807, 89 P.2d 847, for the essentials necessary to plead conspiracy, and Rickel v. Atwood Equity Cooperative Exchange, 113 Kan. 592, 600, 215 P. 1015, and Hutson v. Imperial Royalties Co., 135 Kan. 718, 13 P.2d 298, for the proposition that a conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence. (See, also, State v. Borserine, 184 Kan. 405, 337 P.2d 697.)

The contract of employment alleged by the appellant in his petition was an oral contract of employment, indefinite as to time, and terminable at the will of either party.

The appellant's initial petition was squarely based upon a contract between the Santa Fe Trial Transportation Company and the National Association of Machinists of which the appellant alleged he was a member, and that he was being deprived of his rights under this union contract. The union contract was attached and made a part of the petition by incorporation. It exhaustively covered all matters relating to conditions of employment, including such items as rates of pay, hours of service, seniority, hospitalization, vacations and working conditions. It also had an article dealing with 'grievances and arbitration.'

The trial court sustained a demurrer to this initial petition of the appellant and granted him time to file an amended petition. The second amended petition as amended, which is presently before the court, eliminates all reference to a 'union contract' or to the appellant's membership in the union. He merely alleges that his contract of employment was oral, and that there was no agreement except as to wages and hours of work, which were from 8:00 a. m., to 5:00 p. m., each working day.

Here on demurrer we are confined to the facts of the petition presently before the court. It merely alleges and oral contract of employment, and makes no reference to a union contract or union membership.

In the absence of a contract, express or implied, between an employee and his employer covering the duration of such employment, no action for discharging the employee from service can be maintained against the employer. (Swart v. Huston, 154 Kan. 182, 117 P.2d 576, Syl. p4.)

Decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and of the Federal District Court of Kansas are in harmony with the rule in the Swart case. (Mitchell v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., [U.S.C.A.10th], 184 F.2d 837; Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., [C.C.A.10th], 46 F.2d 385; and Kunz v. Colnon, [D.C.Kan.], 54 F.Supp. 673.)

In Mitchell v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., supra, the court held:

'* * * It is not the function of the courts in the absence of a contract to compel a person to accept or retain another in his employ, nor is it the function of the courts...