May v. Spokane Cnty.

Citation481 P.3d 1098
Decision Date23 February 2021
Docket NumberNo. 37179-4-III,37179-4-III
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Parties In the Matter of: That Portion of Lots 1 & 2, Block 1, Comstock Park Second Addition, According to Plat Recorded in Volume 2 of Plats, Page 84, Situate in the City And County of Spokane, Washington, Lying Easterly of the Following Described Line: Beginning at the Northwest Comer of Said Lot 1; Thence N89°59'27''E, Along the North Line of Said Lot 1, 11.00 Feet; Thence S09°39' 47'W, Generally Along a 6.0° Foot Board Fence, to the South Line of Said Lot 2 and the Point of Terminus; Except a Portion Thereof Described as Follows: Beginning at the Southeast Comer of Said Lot 2; Thence Southwesterly Along the Southerly Line of Said Lot 2 to the Southwest Comer Thereof; Thence Northerly Along the Westerly Line of Said Lot 2 A Distance of 38.0 Feet; Thence Northeasterly to the Point of Beginning; Alex MAY, owner of said property, Appellant, v. SPOKANE COUNTY, necessary party; and Vicky Dalton, Spokane County Auditor, in her official capacity, necessary party, Respondents.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Pennell, C.J.

¶ 1 In 1948, the United States Supreme Court declared racially discriminatory real estate covenants unenforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Shelley v. Kraemer , 334 U.S. 1, 23, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948). Despite this ruling, racist housing practices persisted for decades and discriminatory language continued to be inserted into various real estate documents.1 Fair housing laws passed in the late 1960s2 did much to halt real estate discrimination. But vestiges of offensive and illegal practices continue to be reflected in various recorded real estate instruments.

¶ 2 In 1987, the legislature added a new provision to Washington's Law Against Discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW. See LAWS OF 1987, ch. 56, §§ 1-2. Codified as RCW 49.60.227, it provided a method for property owners, and later other interested parties, to petition to strike racially discriminatory provisions from real property contracts. The statute was passed out of a recognition that discriminatory language in real estate documents is "repugnant to many property owners and diminishes the free enjoyment of their property." LAWS OF 1987, ch. 56, § 1.

¶ 3 Although RCW 49.60.227 is over 30 years old, it has received little judicial attention. At issue here is the novel question of what it means to "strike" racially discriminatory language under RCW 49.60.227. Must the offending language be physically and permanently removed from existing records? Or is it sufficient that a court order declares the language stricken, thereby removing the language as a matter of law? Our statutory analysis favors the latter approach. We therefore affirm the order of the superior court.

FACTS

¶ 4 In 1953, William H. Cowles Jr. and John McKinley, executors of the estate of William Hutchinson Cowles, owned lots located in an area of Spokane known as "Comstock Park Second Addition." In August of that year, they recorded a declaration of protective covenants for all their lots, which remained undeveloped. These covenants bound all subsequent purchasers in the future residential neighborhood. The third of these covenants, provision (c), placed the following racial restriction in the recorded declaration:

No race or nationality other than the white race shall use or occupy any building on any lot, except that this covenant shall not prevent occupancy by domestic servants of a different race or nationality employed by an owner or tenant.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 34.

¶ 5 Sixty years later, Katherine Gregory conveyed her home, located within the Comstock neighborhood at 3010 South Post Street, to Aaron and Sadie Lake. In a statutory warranty deed recorded February 7, 2013, Ms. Gregory removed the language referencing provision (c) from the deed by including the following bulleted item:

SUBJECT TO:
....
• Covenants, conditions, restrictions and/or easements; but deleting any covenant, condition or restriction indicating a preference, limitation or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, family status, or national origin to the extent such covenants, condition or restrictions violate Title 42, Section 3604(c), of the United States Codes: Recorded: August 14, 1953. Recording Information: 189339B.

Id . at 63. Despite Ms. Gregory's efforts, the 1953 declaration of covenants remained recorded with no modification.

¶ 6 In 2017, the Lakes transferred the property by statutory warranty deed to Alex and Alexandra May. The Lakes’ deed conveying the property does not include the language deleting the racial covenant found in the deed given to them by Ms. Gregory. The deed merely states:

Subject To: This conveyance is subject to covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements, if any, affecting title, which may appear in the public record, including those shown on any recorded plat or survey.

Id . at 38.

¶ 7 At the time of the conveyance from the Lakes, and today, the language in the 1953 declaration of restrictive covenants remains unaltered and within the public records of which the Spokane County Auditor's Office is custodian. When purchasing his home in September 2017, Mr. May became aware of provision (c) of the protective covenants during the title search of his property.

PROCEDURE

¶ 8 On March 22, 2018, Mr. May initiated his declaratory judgment action in Spokane County Superior Court. The action eventually included both Spokane County and its elected auditor, Vicky Dalton (collectively the County), as parties. Mr. May sought to have the discriminatory restrictive covenant declared void and to "strike that same subsection from public record and eliminating it from the title of the property" as provided in RCW 49.60.227. Id . at 13. As part of his request for relief, Mr. May specifically sought "[e]ntry of a declaratory judgment that the voided Subsection C of the restrictive property covenant be removed from the covenant." Id . at 7. In the course of litigation, Mr. May explained his request would require physical alteration of the recorded 1953 covenants, though he did not identity a specific method of removing the offending language.

¶ 9 Mr. May brought a motion for summary judgment. The County contested the motion, relying on a declaration from Vicky Dalton. According to Ms. Dalton, documents in a chain of title are not to be physically altered once recorded. Even when a document is recorded in error, it is not destroyed. Instead, a corrected document is re-recorded. Ms. Dalton emphasized that the integrity of a property lot's chain of title is based on the indestructability of recorded documents in the custody of the local recording office.

¶ 10 The trial court denied Mr. May's summary judgment motion, holding that RCW 49.60.227 does not oblige county auditors to physically remove void provisions from the public record. The court further declared provision (c) of the 1953 declaration of protective covenants void under RCW 49.60.224 and that the provision was stricken by order of the court. The court directed a copy of the order be filed with the Spokane County Auditor's Office in the records for Mr. May's property.

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 This case raises the novel issue of how to interpret RCW 49.60.227, which authorizes courts to strike racially restrictive covenants from recorded real property contracts. Specifically, what does it mean for a court to order something stricken? Must the records custodian go through the original record and physically excise void provisions from the property record? Or is the court's order sufficient to serve as a corrective document?3

¶ 12 "The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo." Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C. , 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). When tasked with statutory interpretation, our goal is to carry out the legislature's intent. The best source of that intent is the words chosen by the legislature. But words must not be viewed in isolation. We must also consider context and related statutes. Id . at 10-11, 43 P.3d 4. If, viewed in this light, a statute's meaning is plain on its face, it must be given that effect. Only if a statute is truly unclear may we engage in statutory construction and look at interpretive aids such as legislative history. See id. at 11-12, 43 P.3d 4.

¶ 13 The statute at issue here reads as follows:

Declaratory judgment action to strike discriminatory provision of real property contract—Restrictive covenant modification document as alternative. (1)(a) If a written instrument contains a provision that is void by reason of RCW 49.60.224, the owner, occupant, or tenant of the property which is subject to the provision or the homeowners’ association board may cause the provision to be stricken from the public records by bringing an action in the superior court in the county in which the property is located. The action shall be an in rem, declaratory judgment action whose title shall be the description of the property. The necessary party to the action shall be the owner, occupant, or tenant of the property or any portion thereof. The person bringing the action shall pay a fee set under RCW 36.18.012.
(b) If the court finds that any provisions of the written instrument are void under RCW 49.60.224, it shall enter an order striking the void provisions from the public records and eliminating the void provisions from the title or lease of the property described in the complaint.
(2)(a) As an alternative to the judicial procedure set forth in subsection (1) of this section, the owner of property subject to a written instrument that contains a provision that is void by reason of RCW 49.60.224 may record a restrictive covenant modification document with the county auditor, or in charter counties the county official charged with the responsibility for recording instruments in the county records, in the county in which the property is located.
(b) The
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3 cases
  • May v. Spokane Cnty.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • March 31, 2022
    ...as part of the official property record, there is no additional need to physically alter existing records." May v. Spokane County , 16 Wash. App. 2d 505, 516, 481 P.3d 1098 (2021).¶ 12 Judge George Fearing vehemently disagreed. He saw the majority's reading of the law to ignore the plain la......
  • In re That Portion of Lots 1 & 2, Block 1, Comstock Park Second Addition
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • March 31, 2022
    ...property record, there is no additional need to physically alter existing records." May v. Spokane County, 16 Wn.App. 2d 505, 516, 481 P.3d 1098 (2021). George Fearing vehemently disagreed. He saw the majority's reading of the law to ignore the plain language of the statute and favor archiv......
  • Helmbreck v. McPhee
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • March 9, 2021
    ......99283-5 - Carlton and Margaret Evans v. Spokane County . On March 5, 2021, counsel in the Evans case filed a motion to dismiss review and an order granting that motion was filed on March 8, 2021. ......

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