May v. State
| Decision Date | 31 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-2360 |
| Citation | 173 N.E.3d 1078 (Table) |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Parties | Darrin N. MAY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Attorney for Appellant: Ronald K. Smith, Muncie, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Courtney L. Staton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Darrin N. May ("May") was convicted of rape1 as a Level 1 felony and was adjudicated as an habitual offender.2 He raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
[2] We affirm.
[3] In late 2008, May began dating N.C., and she moved in with May and May's father. Amended Tr. Vol. 2 at 40. They had a daughter together but ended their relationship in 2011. Id. May and N.C. continued to communicate to raise their daughter and periodically discussed the possibility of reuniting. Id. at 43. In 2015, N.C. married another man, but that relationship ended in late 2018 or early 2019. Id. at 42. In October of 2019, May and N.C. rekindled their relationship, so May moved in with N.C. Id. at 43. Their attempt to reconcile soon derailed, so in late January or early February of 2020, N.C. ended the relationship, and May moved out. Id. at 45-46.
[4] May and N.C. continued to talk, and May implored N.C. to reestablish their relationship. Id. at 46-47. On February 22, 2020, May was "begging" and "pleading" for N.C. to meet so he could convince her to patch up their relationship. Id. at 47. Eventually, N.C. agreed to meet May and picked him up. Id. at 48. N.C. told May that she wanted to reunify but would not do so until May improved his behavior. Id. at 49-50. After ninety minutes, N.C. dropped May off. Id. at 51. May was upset that N.C. dropped him off because he thought their conversation went well and that N.C. would invite him over. Id. N.C. returned to her apartment. Id. at 51-52.
[5] N.C. began to prepare to go out with her friends that evening. Id. May sent N.C. several text messages, telling her to cancel her plans and to get together with him instead. Id. at 51-52. Eventually, N.C. turned off her phone. Id. at 52. As N.C. applied her makeup, she turned and noticed May standing in the doorway to her bedroom. Id. at 53-54. N.C. could tell that May was angry and noticed that his face was "really weird" and that his eyes were "black." Id. at 55. May called N.C. a "whore" and accused her of getting ready to go out with a different man. Id. at 55. In an attempt to ignore May, N.C. walked toward her closet to finish getting ready, but May grabbed her from behind and threw her onto the bed. Id. at 55-56.
[6] May began yanking on N.C.’s clothes. Id. at 56. While N.C. tried to wrestle away, she saw that May was brandishing a knife. Id. May held the knife against N.C.’s neck and threatened to slit her throat. Id. N.C. pleaded with May to not stab her, and she began to crawl away from the bed. Id. at 56-57. May grabbed her from behind and positioned her so that she was bent over the bed. Id. at 57. May pulled N.C.’s pants down, inserted his penis into her vagina, and had intercourse with her until he ejaculated onto her buttocks. Id.
[7] N.C. immediately went to her friend's house and told her friend that May had raped her. Id. at 59-61. N.C. did not go to the hospital or call the police because she did not want to be responsible for sending May, the father of her daughter, to jail. Id. at 61-62. However, the next morning she sent a text message to May to express her anger toward him. Id. at 62. N.C. continued to text May for the next two days, hoping he would apologize. Id. at 65. By the third day, May had not apologized, so N.C. decided to get a restraining order against May. Id. N.C. spoke met with a victim advocate and told the victim advocate that May had raped her. Id. at 65-66. After N.C. made her disclosure, she also told an officer with the Muncie Police Department that May had raped her. Id. at 67-68.
[8] N.C. was then taken to a hospital for a sexual assault examination. Id. at 71. On February 25, 2020, she met with Chandra McCord ("McCord"), a sexual assault nurse examiner, and told McCord that May had raped her. Id. at 71-72, 93, 201. As part of the examination, N.C. filled out an Application for Benefits from the Sex Crime Victim's Services Fund ("Application for Benefits"), and in the Application for Benefits, N.C. repeated her claim that May had raped her. Id. at 202. McCord told N.C. that the exam would involve an invasive pelvic examination. Id. at 72. Because she was exhausted, N.C. decided to not go through the sexual assault examination. Id.
[9] On March 3, 2020, the State charged May with Level 1 felony rape, Level 2 felony burglary, Level 3 felony criminal confinement, and Level 5 felony intimidation. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 5-8. On April 27, 2020, the State filed a notice of intent to seek an habitual-offender enhancement. Id. at 46. The State later dismissed the Level 2 felony burglary charge. Id. at 169-70.
[10] On October 26, 2020, May's jury trial commenced. Amended Tr. Vol. 2 at 20. McCord testified that she helped N.C. complete the Application for Benefits, in which N.C. had alleged that May had raped her, and that N.C. had told McCord that May had raped her. Id. at 202-03. May objected, arguing that N.C.’s allegation in the Application for Benefits was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 203. The State countered that the identity of N.C.’s assailant was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements related to medical diagnosis and treatment. Id. The trial court agreed with the State and overruled May's objection. Id. at 203-04.
[11] Caryn Burton ("Burton"), a training coordinator with the Indiana Coalition Against Domestic Violence, also testified for the State. Id. at 228; Amended Tr. Vol. 3 at 8. The State asked Burton, "in dealing with survivors in your training, experience and education, is there a misconception about victim disclosure?" Id. at 18. Burton replied that it is "not abnormal for a victim to delay disclosure" and that "it takes time for a survivor to process" and "weigh all of their options" before deciding whether or not to report an assault. Id. at 18-19. May did not object to this testimony. Id.
[12] At trial's end, the jury found May guilty as charged. Id. at 20; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 227, 229, 231. It also determined that May was an habitual offender. Amended Tr. Vol. 3 at 165; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 244. On November 30, 2020, the trial court vacated May's convictions for criminal confinement and intimidation due to double jeopardy concerns. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 86. On the remaining conviction for Level 1 felony rape, the trial court imposed a thirty-two-year sentence to the Indiana Department of Correction and enhanced that sentence by eight years for May's status as an habitual offender. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 36-41.
[13] May now appeals. We will provide additional facts as necessary.
[14] May argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing McCord to testify that N.C. told her that May raped her because this testimony violated May's right to confront a witness under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the right to meet a witness face-to-face under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. May has waived this issue. When May objected to McCord's testimony, he did not claim admission of McCord's testimony violated his rights under the federal and Indiana constitutions but instead asserted that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Amended Tr. Vol. 2 at 203. "[A] defendant may not argue one ground for objection at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal." Hitch v. State , 51 N.E.3d 216, 219 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Gill v. State, 730 N.E.2d 709, 711 (Ind. 2000) ).3 Because May's argument on appeal is not the same argument he made during trial, he has waived this issue. Nonetheless, we will address May's arguments on the merits.
[15] In more specific terms, May argues that McCord's testimony about what N.C. told her was testimonial hearsay and was thus inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004) : Appellant's Br. at 11.
[16] The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within a trial court's discretion, and we afford it great deference on appeal. Steele v. State , 42 N.E.3d 138, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We will reverse a ruling only if it is clearly contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case or misinterprets the law. Id. Hearsay is a statement "not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial ... and ... is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Ind. Evidence Rule 801(C). The Indiana Supreme Court has described a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as follows:
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state...
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