Maya v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1996
• Docket Number: Civil No. 96-347 BB/WWD.
• Citation: 953 F.Supp. 1245
• Parties: Phillip MAYA, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., Burt Chevrolet, Inc., and U.S. West Communications, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

953 F.Supp. 1245

Phillip MAYA, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., Burt Chevrolet, Inc., and U.S. West Communications, Defendants.

Civil No. 96-347 BB/WWD.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

December 5, 1996.

E. Justin Pennington, Pennington Law Offices, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

James P. Lyle, Butt, Thornton & Baehr, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant General Motors Corp. David M. Prichard, Ball & Weed, P.C., San Antonio, TX, for Defendants General Motors Corp. and Burt Chevrolet, Inc.

Norman F. Weiss, Simone, Roberts & Weiss, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant U.S. West Communications.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BLACK, District Judge.

This Opinion addresses two pending motions. The Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties and the relevant law, and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that (1) Defendant U.S. West's September 5, 1996 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for sanctions (Doc. 15) should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and (2) Plaintiff's October 16, 1996 motion to amend complaint (Doc. 26) should be GRANTED.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff Phillip Maya makes the following allegations in his complaint:

On March 24, 1993, Plaintiff was a passenger in a 1991 Suburban motor vehicle traveling south on New Mexico Highway 44 near San Isidro, New Mexico. While the Suburban was traveling at a high rate of speed, its rear axle assembly broke or disassembled, causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle. The Suburban crashed into a ditch, and as a result of the accident, Plaintiff suffered physical injury requiring extensive medical treatment, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, lost wages, lost career opportunities, and lost wage-earning capacity. Defendant General Motors Corporation ("General Motors") designed and manufactured the Suburban involved in the accident. General Motors also distributed the Suburban to Defendant Burt Chevrolet, Incorporated ("Burt Chevrolet"), which sold or leased the Suburban to Defendant U.S. West Communications ("U.S. West").

On March 13, 1996, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserts causes of action against General Motors based on negligence, strict products liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa loquitur. Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Burt Chevrolet based on strict products liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa loquitur. Finally, Plaintiff asserts a cause of action against U.S. West based on the New Mexico Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act ("MFRA"). N.M.Stat.Ann. §§ 66-5-201 to 66-5-239 (Michie 1994). After Defendants answered Plaintiff's complaint, U.S. West filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for sanctions, on September 5, 1996. On October 16, 1996, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint to add certain negligence claims against U.S. West. These motions are now before the Court.

II. Analysis

When, as here, a federal court sits in diversity, it must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits.¹ Tucker v. R.A. Hanson Co., 956 F.2d 215, 217 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-22, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)). The New Mexico Supreme Court's pronouncements of state law are binding on this Court while sitting in diversity. Perlmutter v. United States Gypsum Co., 4 F.3d 864, 869 n. 2 (10th Cir.1993) (citing Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1464 n. 15 (10th Cir.1988)). Where the New Mexico Supreme Court has not addressed an issue, this Court must anticipate how that court would rule and hold accordingly. Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist. No. 28-J v. GAF Corp., 959 F.2d 868, 871 (10th Cir. 1992). In so predicting, the Court will consider "state court decisions, decisions of other states, federal decisions, and the general weight and trend of authority." Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1988). The Court will consider the parties' motions in light of these standards.

A. U.S. West's Motion to Dismiss and for Sanctions

The Court may not grant a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) unless "it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Maez v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1496 (10th Cir.1995). The Court must "accept all well-pleaded allegations as true," id., and "indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[]." Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.1987).

In support of its motion to dismiss, U.S. West observes that Plaintiff bases his claims against U.S. West exclusively on the MFRA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that according to this statutory enactment, U.S. West is vicariously liable for the injuries Plaintiff suffered because U.S. West owned the vehicle that caused the injuries.² U.S. West counters that the MFRA does not render a vehicle owner vicariously liable for any injuries his or her vehicle causes while being driven by a third party. The operative provisions of the MFRA state:

[n]o owner shall permit the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle ... upon the streets or highways of New Mexico unless the vehicle is specifically exempted from the provisions of the [MFRA].... No person shall drive an uninsured motor vehicle ... upon the streets or highways of New Mexico unless the vehicle is specifically exempted from the provisions of the [MFRA].... Any person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.

N.M.Stat.Ann. § 66-5-205. The Act also indicates that

[t]he purpose of the [MFRA] is to require and encourage residents of the state of New Mexico who own and operate motor vehicles upon the highways of the state to have the ability to respond in damages to accidents arising out of the use and operation of a motor vehicle.

N.M.Stat.Ann. § 66-5-201.1.

According to Plaintiff, "[t]he plain language of the [MFRA] implies strict liability for damages arising out of the use and ownership of a vehicle." (Pl.'s Resp.Def.'s Mot.Dismiss at 3.) The Court disagrees. Rather, the Court finds that the plain language of the MFRA requires anyone who owns or operates a motor vehicle within New Mexico to obtain liability insurance for that vehicle before operating or permitting the operation of it. See N.M.Stat.Ann. § 66-5-205. This interpretation is consistent with the MFRA's purpose of ensuring that New Mexico residents who own or operate motor vehicles on New Mexico roadways "have the ability to respond in damages to [motor vehicle] accidents." N.M.Stat.Ann. § 66-5-201.1 (emphasis added). The Court notes that Plaintiff's interpretation of the Act, rendering owners vicariously liable, would more accurately correspond with the purpose of ensuring that New Mexico residents who own or operate motor vehicles actually respond in damages to motor vehicle accidents.

Although the New Mexico Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, this Court anticipates that if it were to do so, it would conclude that the MFRA does not render vehicle owners vicariously liable for injuries their vehicles cause while being driven by another. See Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist. No. 28-J, 959 F.2d at 871 (federal court must anticipate state supreme court ruling on substantive law in diversity cases). In addition to the plain language of the statute, the Court relies on New Mexico common law, according to which "the owner of an automobile is not liable for the negligence of a person using it with his permission." Bryant v. Gilmer, 97 N.M. 358, 360, 639 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Ct.App.1982); see also Cordova v. Wolfel, 120 N.M. 557, 559, 903 P.2d 1390, 1392 (1995) ("[T]here is generally no common law basis for imposing upon a bailor liability for a bailee's negligent operation of a bailed vehicle."); Toscano v. Spriggs, 343 Md. 320, 681 A.2d 61, 64 (1996) ("Mere ownership of a car does not impose liability for injuries caused in the driving of it."); compare Oliver v. Davis, 679 So.2d 462, 467 (La.Ct.App.1996) ("Florida imposes vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts it to another ... [u]nder the common law `dangerous instrumentality' doctrine."). This federal Court declines to deviate from New Mexico common law based on a strained reading of the MFRA. See Gonzalez v. Whitaker, 97 N.M. 710, 714, 643 P.2d 274, 278 (Ct.App.1982) ("The common law is only abrogated or repealed by statute when the statute directly and irreconcilably is opposed to the common law.").

The Kansas Supreme Court's reasoning in West v. Collins, 251 Kan. 657, 840 P.2d 435 (1992), further supports the Court's conclusion that the MFRA does not impose vicarious liability on vehicle owners. In West, the plaintiff "argue[d] that the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act (`KAIRA') ... which requires vehicle liability insurance, implies that the car owner is liable or creates a vicarious liability." Id. 840 P.2d at 438. The operative provisions of the KAIRA state that

[e]very owner shall provide motor vehicle liability insurance coverage ... for every motor vehicle owned by such person.... An owner of an uninsured motor vehicle shall not permit the operation thereof upon a highway or upon property open to use by the public.... No person shall knowingly drive an uninsured motor vehicle upon a highway or upon property open to use by the public.... Any person violating any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3104 (Supp.1995). The purpose of the KAIRA "is to provide a means of compensating persons promptly for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles." Kan.Stat.Ann. § 40-3102.

In light of these provisions, the West cour...