Mayer Unified School Dist. v. Winkleman
| Decision Date | 19 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CV 2007-0126.,2 CA-CV 2007-0126. |
| Citation | 220 Ariz. 378,207 P.3d 631 |
| Parties | MAYER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT and Gadsen Elementary School District, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Mark WINKLEMAN, in his capacity as State Land Commissioner; The Arizona State Land Department; The State of Arizona; Apache County; Cochise County; Coconino County; Graham County; Greenlee County; Maricopa County; Mohave County; Navajo County; Pima County; Pinal County; Santa Cruz County; Yavapai County; Yuma County; Maricopa County Flood Control District; Arizona Department of Transportation; Town of Carefree; City of Tucson; City of Flagstaff; Town of Gila Bend; City of Glendale; City of Globe; Magma Flood Control District; Town of Marana; City of Peoria; City of Phoenix; City of Scottsdale; City of Sierra Vista; and City of Tempe, Defendants/Appellees. Mayer Unified School District and Gadsen Elementary School District, Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. City of Peoria and City of Scottsdale, Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Deborah W. Robberson, Scottsdale City Attorney By Bruce Washburn, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant City of Scottsdale.
Michael G. Rankin, Tucson City Attorney By Tobin Rosen, Tucson, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee City of Tucson.
¶ 1 In 2004, parents of children attending various public schools in Arizona, later joined by Mayer Unified School District and Gadsen Elementary School District ("the school districts"), sued the State Land Commissioner, the Arizona State Land Department, and the State of Arizona, (collectively, "the State Defendants"), alleging these defendants had failed to obtain compensation from numerous easement holders who had been granted easements between 1929 and 1967 across state school trust lands, in violation of the Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act, Act of June 20, 1910, Pub.L. No. 219, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 ("Enabling Act"). The plaintiffs claimed the easements ("09 easements")1 were void, the defendants had breached their fiduciary duty in conveying the easements without obtaining compensation, and the plaintiffs requested an accounting of the trust property and declaratory relief. After dismissing the parent plaintiffs for lack of standing and joining the various easement holders as defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the claims were barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The school districts appealed. We affirm, but for a different reason than that stated by the trial court.
¶ 2 In reviewing a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss, we assume the facts alleged in the complaint are true. Doe ex rel. Doe v. State, 200 Ariz. 174, ¶ 2, 24 P.3d 1269, 1270 (2001). On October 15, 2004, individual plaintiffs, as residents of Arizona and parents of public school children, sued the State Defendants, alleging they had breached their duties as trustees of the state land trust by granting easements across state trust lands without obtaining compensation. In their prayer for relief, the plaintiffs requested an accounting, a declaration that the state had disposed of trust property without compensation in violation of the Enabling Act, rendering the dispositions null and void, and compensation to the trust for the value of the property.
¶ 3 The State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P., arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing, failed to file a notice of claim, and failed to file their lawsuit within the applicable statute of limitations period. They also separately moved to join all grantees of the disputed easements as indispensable parties pursuant to Rule 19, Ariz. R. Civ. P. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, adding the school districts as plaintiffs and amending their claim for breach of fiduciary duty to include a request for an order requiring the state to obtain compensation for the trust from the easement holders or, alternatively, an order requiring the state to compensate the trust.
¶ 4 The trial court denied the State Defendants' motion to dismiss, finding the action had been filed within the limitations period prescribed for claims against public entities, see A.R.S. § 12-821, and that the notice of claim statute did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims, see A.R.S. § 12-821.01. The court also found the school district plaintiffs had standing to sue, while the parent plaintiffs did not. The court then granted the State Defendants' motion to join the individual easement grantees as defendants (collectively the "county-municipal defendants"), over the plaintiffs' objection.2 The school districts filed a second amended complaint to include the county-municipal defendants, who answered the complaint and filed motions to dismiss based variously on the statute of limitations, notice of claim statute, laches, standing, justiciability of the claim, and the bona fide purchaser for value doctrine. The trial court specifically addressed each of the grounds on the merits and dismissed the lawsuit based on its conclusion that the claims were barred by laches. The court rejected all other grounds for dismissal raised by the defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed the court's order dismissing the case on laches grounds, and the defendants have filed various cross-appeals and asserted cross-issues, challenging the court's denial of the motions on the additional grounds. Because the trial court considered and ruled on each additional ground raised by the defendants, any of which would be dispositive of this case and support the court's judgment below, we consider them all. See Bowman v. Bd. of Regents, 162 Ariz. 551, 558-59, 785 P.2d 71, 78-79 (App.1989) (). We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101.
¶ 5 As a condition of its admission to the United States, Arizona was required to accept and adopt the terms of the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act. Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep't, 155 Ariz. 484, 486-87, 747 P.2d 1183, 1185-86 (1987) (hereinafter "Asarco I"). Under the Enabling Act, the United States granted to Arizona, in trust, four sections of land from each township—approximately ten million acres—to be used exclusively for the support of schools and other public institutions. Enabling Act §§ 24, 25, 28; Forest Guardians v. Wells, 201 Ariz. 255, ¶ 2, 34 P.3d 364, 365 (2001); Asarco I, 155 Ariz. at 486, 747 P.2d at 1185. The Act placed significant restrictions on the disposition of trust lands, representing a "complete and absolute departure from the enabling acts under which other states were admitted." Murphy v. State, 65 Ariz. 338, 350, 181 P.2d 336, 344 (1947).
¶ 6 Before the adoption of the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, twenty-three states had entered the Union through various acts of admission. Id. Like Arizona, these states had been granted land for specifically delineated purposes, but unlike Arizona, the state legislatures were not restricted in how they could dispose of the land or collect and maintain the trust assets for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. Id. This discretion resulted in "dissipation of the funds by one device or another, sanctioned or permitted by the legislatures of the several states, [and] left a scandal in virtually every state." Id. In fact,...
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