Mayer v. Once Upon A Rose, Inc.
Decision Date | 30 January 2013 |
Citation | 58 A.3d 1221,429 N.J.Super. 365 |
Parties | Martin MAYER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ONCE UPON A ROSE, INC., and Samuel Grunwald, Defendants–Respondents. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lynch, Lynch, Held, Rosenberg & Perkins and Forman Holt Eliades Ravin & Youngman, attorneys for appellant (Neil S. Weiner, Clifton Park, and Joseph M. Cerra, Paramus, on the brief).
Martin, Kane & Kuper, attorneys for respondents (John F. Gillick, East Brunswick, on the brief).
Before Judges PARRILLO, SABATINO and FASCIALE.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This negligence case arises from the personal injuries that a caterer sustained when a glass vase shattered and his hands were struck and cut by the propelled fragments. The vase contained a floral arrangement, which a florist working at the same catered event had been carrying across the room. The injured caterer sued the florist and the floral company, contending that either the florist had been gripping the vase in a dangerous manner or that the vase had not been adequately inspected for cracks before it was brought to the site.
The trial court granted defendants a directed verdict at the close of the caterer's proofs before the jury, mainly because the caterer had not retained a liability expert to explain why the vase had shattered. We reverse, concluding that it was not essential for this plaintiff to have retained a liability expert in these circumstances.
We describe the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff. See R. 4:37–2(b). On February 15, 2009, plaintiff Martin Mayer, a professional caterer, was setting up for an engagement party at a synagogue in Passaic. Defendant Samuel Grunwald, a florist employed by co-defendant, Once Upon a Rose, Inc., also was at the synagogue with his wife, getting the floral arrangements in place for that same engagement party.
Plaintiff arrived at the synagogue at approximately 3:00 p.m. With the help of his assistant, plaintiff started bringing the food inside. He also moved tables around the banquet room under the direction of the party planner.
Meanwhile, Mr. Grunwald and his wife were setting up the floral arrangements in the room. Mrs. Grunwald is the sole owner of Once Upon a Rose, Inc., and Mr. Grunwald is an employee of the company. Mr. and Mrs. Grunwald brought all the floral materials to the synagogue, and they assembled the arrangements at the event.
The floral vases were stored in individual boxes, which had then been placed in milk crates. The Grunwalds used two similar types of vases, which were both made of glass and had the same width, except some were a couple of inches taller than the others. They assembled five or six arrangements at the synagogue.
According to Mrs. Grunwald's testimony, the same glass vases had previously been used between ten and thirty times. Mrs. Grunwald stated that she had checked all the vases that day for chips and cracks and found none. She did not remove any vases while making the floral arrangements that day. However, she insisted that she would have removed any vase if it had been found chipped or cracked.
During the course of setting up for the engagement party, Mr. Grunwald began to move a floral vase from one table to another. The tables were ten to fifteen feet apart. The vase in question was a tall glass square, which was flat on all sides. It had bamboo and flowers extending a few feet over the top and was nearly filled with water.
From about ten to twelve feet away, plaintiff observed Mr. Grunwald hold the vase with outstretched arms. According to plaintiff, Mr. Grunwald appeared to be applying pressure with the palms of his hands on the sides of the vase, about halfway up on opposite sides.2
No one else was touching the vase as Mr. Grunwald lifted it. He testified that he felt the vase “caving in” and a sensation of the vase pressing inwards.
Upon observing Mr. Grunwald attempting to carry the vase on his own, plaintiff ran towards Mr. Grunwald to help him. According to plaintiff, as he approached, he said in an undertone, “you're going to hurt yourself.”
As plaintiff reached his hands under the vase, the glass vase shattered. Shards of broken glass fell into plaintiff's hands.
The glass shards severely cut plaintiff's hands, which began bleeding. He was in “excruciating pain.” Plaintiff was transported to a local hospital with Mr. Grunwald, who also had been injured.
Plaintiff suffered multiple tendon cuts and nerve damage from the glass shards. He underwent emergency surgery that same day. Plaintiff had physical therapy for over six months to restore movement to his hands. His injuries from this incident have caused him permanent scarring, a loss of grip strength, and various alleged lifestyle restrictions.
In this ensuing lawsuit, plaintiff invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. He argued that he was blameless in connection with the incident, that the vase had been in defendants' exclusive control, and that it was not likely to have exploded in the absence of defendants' fault. Defendants, meanwhile, took the position that this was a spontaneous accident that they could not have reasonably prevented.
At trial, plaintiff testified about the events at the synagogue and his resulting injuries. He also presented testimony from the Grunwalds, who were called as adverse parties, and from an orthopedic surgeon who gave expert testimony about the hand injuries.
After plaintiff rested his case, defendants moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted their motion. In the course of his oral ruling, the judge observedthat he had “two problems” with plaintiff's theory of recovery:
Number one, with regard to pressure having any part whatsoever in the implosion or collapse of this vase, the [c]ourt determines that that is an issue that would require expert testimony. It would be extremely speculative and impermissible to allow the jury to speculate as to whether the way the vase was being carried somehow played a part in its failure. If in fact that is a theory to be pursued, that theory would require expert testimony in order to deal with the issue of ... how much pressure, what type of pressure, thickness of glass, ... [and] other factors and variables that would impact or support such a theory. And we do not have that ... in this case.
The second problem that the [c]ourt has is ... as to whether it is more probable under these circumstances in order to invoke the res ipsa doctrine whether in fact the accident bespeaks negligence. And that is whether it is more probable than not that [Mr. Grunwald's] negligence was a proximate cause of the mishap. We don't know what happened. And the issue is ... is it more probable than not that [Mr. Grunwald's] negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap?
There are other potential explanations. And as [plaintiff's counsel] points out, he need not rule out those other explanations, but there are other explanations. One looming explanation is that there could have been a product defect. ...
....
It's also possible that [the Grunwalds] were negligent. It's possible that there was something that they did with regard to this vase that would have resulted in this accident. But the [c]ourt can't rely on possibilities. It must be that it's probable that there was negligence on the part of [Mr. Grunwald] sufficient to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
[Emphasis added.]
Based on this analysis, the judge discharged the jury and entered final judgment in defendants' favor.
Plaintiff now appeals. He principally argues that the trial court erred in faulting plaintiff for not calling a liability expert. As a secondary point, plaintiff contends that the court was improperly swayed by the mere possibility of other explanations for what may have caused the glass explosion.
A motion for involuntary dismissal at the end of a plaintiff's case is governed by Rule 4:37–2(b). The rule instructs that “such [a] motion shall be denied if the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in plaintiff's favor.” Ibid. “[I]f, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.” Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5, 258 A.2d 706 (1969).
“[T]he judicial function [in evaluating a motion for a directed verdict] is quite a mechanical one.” Ibid. “The trial court is not concerned with the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion.” Id. at 5–6, 258 A.2d 706;see also Quinlan v. Curtiss–Wright Corp., 204 N.J. 239, 276–77, 8 A.3d 209 (2010) ( ).
Defendants' motion for a directed verdict in the present case challenged plaintiff's invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Our Supreme Court has described that doctrine as follows:
In any case founded upon negligence, the proofs ultimately must establish that defendant breached a duty of reasonable care, which constituted a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase meaning “the thing speaks for itself,” is a rule that governs the availability and adequacy of evidence of negligence in special circumstances. The rule creates an allowable inference of the defendant's want of due care when the following conditions have been shown: (a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality [causing the injury] was within the defendant's...
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