Mayer v. Smith

• Decision Date: 02 March 2015
• Docket Number: 32,338.,No. 35,207.,35,207.
• Citation: 350 P.3d 1191
• Parties: Janeka MAYER, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Susan SMITH, Defendant, and Marilyn Jones, Gary Jones, Robert Long, and Stephanie Long, Intervenors/Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

350 P.3d 1191

Janeka MAYER, Plaintiff–Appellee

v. Susan SMITH, DefendantandMarilyn Jones, Gary Jones, Robert Long, and Stephanie Long, Intervenors/Defendants–Appellants.

32,338.

No. 35,207.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

March 2, 2015.

Certiorari Denied, April 30, 2015,

Alex Chisholm, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Ronald T. Taylor, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} Janeka Mayer (Plaintiff) owns property which is burdened by an easement. She erected a fence using trees within the easement as posts and thus encroached onto the easement. Gary and Marilyn Jones (Jones) and Robert and Stephanie Long (Long) (collectively, Intervenors), owners of the dominant estate, intervened in a suit Plaintiff had filed against another neighbor, but involving the same easement. Jones and Long sought to enforce the easement and force removal of Plaintiff's fence. The district court ruled against Intervenors, restricting the scope and ownership of the easement and leaving the fence undisturbed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} The physical relationships between properties are depicted in the appended illustration, which appears in the record as Intervenors' Exhibit F, provided to aid in understanding the facts presented herein.

{3} Jones bought his property, Tract 5B and 5C, in 1977. In 1979, he purchased an easement from Anne Clarke and Peggy Clarke (Clarke). Carlos Arguello bought Tract 5A, immediately north of Tract 5B and 5C from Clarke. In 2002, Plaintiff purchased land, Tract 5–1B, from Arguello. It is undisputed that land was subject to the easement Jones purchased from Clarke in 1979. The easement served Tracts 5B and 5C, which Jones has owned since 1972. In addition to a detailed description of the servient estate, the easement at issue provides the following language:

WHEREAS, the family of ... Jones [seeks] a non[-]exclusive [e]asement across the lands of the “grantors” for the personal use of theirselves, their families, their heirs, and their assigns, for ingress and egress over and across “grantors” property for household purposes[.]

NOW, THEREFORE, for valuable consideration ..., the undersigned hereby grant to ... Jones, and to their families, heirs, and assigns, the non[-]exclusive right of ingress and egress, for household and non[-]commercial purposes, over and across a [t]wenty[-]foot[-]wide portion of the afore described property inside and along the [n]orthernmost and [w]esternmost boundaries thereof.

Jones cleared trees to create the path that is in the easement now and used it to access a portion of his land that was inaccessible by vehicle via any other existing roads due to a “boulder strewn and tree covered, eroded, and very steep” ridge that divided his property. Jones used the land “at least [fifty] times a year ... for landscaping, ... wood cutting, pinon picking, [and] picnicking[,]” and his sons learned how to drive there. The easement was occasionally used to bring in a wood chipper to dispose of unwanted brush piles, and Jones plowed the easement to remove snow. In 2009, Jones sold a portion of his land, specifically Tract 5C, which was accessible using other existing roadways, to Long. The tracts owned by Jones and Long together make up the dominant estate as Jones owned it when the easement was purchased in 1979. After the sale to Long of Tract 5C, the easement on Plaintiff's property was the only 2 vehicular access to Tract 5B, which Jones still owns.

{4} This lawsuit began when Plaintiff brought suit against another neighbor to prevent the cutting and removal of trees within the easement. Intervenors intervened at the district court's invitation in order to enforce their rights against Plaintiff to allow them full use of the twenty-foot easement over the servient estate. As the trees grew in the easement, Plaintiff used her fence to include them in her property, resulting in a nine-to eleven-foot area becoming inaccessible to Intervenors.

{5} In the district court, Intervenors presented their case.¹ Plaintiff moved for directed verdict. The district court stated: “I'm granting in part and denying in part the motion for [d]irected [v]erdict.” In its written judgment, the district court stated that “[t]he dominant estate belongs to the property of ... Long” and “does not, as a matter of law, belong to both Intervenors.” The district court held that “[t]he intended use of the easement was for household purposes, which was historically limited to occasional use as a hiking ... [and] vehicle [trail].” Next, the district court limited Intervenors' rights to the easement by stating that they had “no authority to expand the historic use, boundaries[,] or existing cleared portion of the easement.” The district court allowed for Plaintiff's fence to remain inside the easement boundaries.

{6} On appeal, neither party attacks the validity of the original twenty-foot easement. Similarly, both parties agree that the easement is appurtenant. We therefore treat the validity and terms of the appurtenant easement as fact on appeal. Varos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 1984–NMCA–091, ¶ 2, 101 N.M. 713, 688 P.2d 31 (acknowledging facts that are not disputed become facts on appeal); see Kikta v. Hughes, 1988–NMCA–105, ¶ 12, 108 N.M. 61, 766 P.2d 321 (allowing characterization of easement to become a fact on appeal where both parties characterized easement at issue as an appurtenant easement).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

{7} Although Plaintiff presented a “legal argument for [d]irected [v]erdict,” the district court, having heard Intervenors' evidence and given its findings, acted as a trier of fact. As such, the motion was actually a motion for involuntary dismissal as provided for by Rule 1–041(B) NMRA. Garcia v. Am. Furniture Co., 1984–NMCA–090, ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 785, 689 P.2d 934 (stating that, in a non-jury trial, “motion for a directed verdict was, in effect, a motion to dismiss under ... Rule [1–041(B) ]”).

{8} Rule 1–041(B) provides for the dismissal of an action upon the motion of the defendant after the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief on the ground that, “upon the facts and the law[,] the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.” The district court as trier of the fact may then “render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.” Id. A dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless the district court specifies otherwise in its order for dismissal. Id. A judge, deciding an involuntary dismissal, “is not bound to give [the] plaintiff's testimony the most favorable aspect[,] but rather should give the testimony such weight as it is entitled to receive.” Carlile v. Cont'l Oil Co., 1970–NMCA–051, ¶ 28, 81 N.M. 484, 468 P.2d 885.

{9} Appellate courts “uphold an involuntary dismissal under Rule 1–041(B) if the dismissal is rationally based on the evidence.” Hull v. Feinstein, 2003–NMCA–052, ¶ 14, 133 N.M. 531, 65 P.3d 266. On appeal, evidence is examined “only to the extent necessary to determine whether it gives substantial support to the [district] court's findings.”

Worthey v. Sedillo Title Guar., Inc., 1973–NMSC–072, ¶ 7, 85 N.M. 339, 512 P.2d 667. Substantial support is that “which is acceptable to a reasonable mind as adequate support for a conclusion.” Id. The appellate courts view evidence in the “most favorable light to support the findings, and evidence inconsistent with or unfavorable to the findings will be disregarded.”Id.

{10} At trial, the district court stated that, in granting the directed verdict, it was “taking all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party putting on the case ... and giving them any benefit of the doubt.” We note that, under Carlile, this is an incorrect standard. See 1970–NMCA–051, ¶ 28, 81 N.M. 484, 468 P.2d 885. The parties failed to address the issue of whether the district court was applying the correct evidentiary standard during the trial and continued to ignore the issue on appeal. Thus, we do not address it. See In re Doe, 1982–NMSC–099, ¶ 3, 98 N.M. 540, 650 P.2d 824 (indicating that an appellate court should not reach issues that the parties have failed to raise in their briefs).

B. Scope of the Easement

1. An Unambiguous Easement Agreement Sufficiently States the Parties' Intent; Evidence of Intent Extrinsic to That Agreement Is Irrelevant

{11} The existence and scope of an express easement are “determined according to the intent of the parties.” Skeen v. Boyles, 2009–NMCA–080, ¶ 18, 146 N.M. 627, 213 P.3d 531. The intent of the parties is derived from the language of the agreement. Id. “[T]he written language of an easement should be conclusive, and consideration of extrinsic evidence is generally inappropriate.” Dethlefsen v. Weddle, 2012–NMCA–077, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 452. Furthermore, “[w]here ... the grant or reservation is specific in its terms, it is ... decisive of the limits of the easement. ” Dyer v. Compere, 1937–NMSC–088, ¶ 12, 41 N.M. 716, 73 P.2d 1356. (Emphasis added.) If the easement language is ambiguous, however, “ ‘the parties' intention must be determined from the language of the instrument as well as from the surrounding circumstances.’ ” Dethlefsen, 2012–NMCA–077, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 452 (quoting Sanders v. Lutz, 1989–NMSC–076, ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 193, 784 P.2d 12 ). As such, we must determine whether the written agreement in this case is ambiguous.

a. The Easement Is Unambiguous

{12} None of the parties nor the district court ever intimated a belief that the grant of easement in this case was ambiguous. In Dethlefsen, this Court conducted a lengthy analysis of easement ambiguity. While concluding that the easement documents in question unambiguously reserved a fifty-foot-wide easement, we also concluded that the easement's scope was ambiguous. This conclusion was based on the omission of necessary terms: “(1) the nature and purpose of the easement, (2) an identification of each of the dominant estate holders, and (3) its...