Mayes v. Cent. Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 06 June 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 82.,82. |
| Citation | 279 N.W. 923,284 Mich. 504 |
| Parties | MAYES v. CENTRAL TRUST CO. et al. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit by Lina Mayes against the Central Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of Emma Davenport Morse, deceased, and others for specific performance of an oral agreement to convey realty. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Ingham County, in Chancery; Leland W. carr, judge.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
Pierce, Planck & Ramsey, of Lansing, for appellant Central Trust Co.
Brake, Davis & Miel, of Stanton, for appellant W. Clyde Davenport.
Fred L. Warner, of Lansing, for appellee.
Plaintiff filed a bill against the administrator of the estate of Emma Davenport Morse, deceased, and her heirs, for specific performance of an oral agreement to convey real estate.
Plaintiff was the daughter of deceased and claims in her bill that during the year 1935 she entered into an agreement with her mother whereby in consideration of plaintiff's care and support of deceased during her lifetime, at such time as deceased should need it, deceased would convey certain real estate to plaintiff and her three children.
In August, 1935, deceased concluded to purchase a home and requested the real estate agency through which she was buying the property to arrange that the deed be made to herself, her daughter, the plaintiff, and her three granddaughters. The property was being purchased from a trust company and at the time that the deceased gave such instructions to the real estate agency the deed had already been made out to deceased as sole grantee. The representative of the real estate agency called upon the deceased with the deed and, when she discovered that she was the sole grantee, she refused to accept it. The trust company stated that it could not make the deed out in this way, inasmuch as it would necessitate certain court procedure, but suggested that she instead re-deed it in accordance with her desires. The deed which had been prepared by the trust company was taken to the Crystal Bank where deceased did business. Later, another proposed deed was forwarded to the bank in which deceased was named as grantor and plaintiff and her three daughters as grantees. When this deed was presented to deceased, she refused to sign it for the reason that it did not comply with her instructions.
On behalf of the plaintiff, many witnesses testified as to statements made by deceased with reference to the property. She told the real estate agent that she wanted a place with a downstairs bedroom because there were so many children that three bedrooms were not enough. Plaintiff was the mother of twelve children, only three of whom, however, were living at home. Deceased also gave written instructions to the real estate agency by a letter in which she stated that she wanted the deed to run to herself, her daughter, the plaintiff, and her three granddaughters, children of the plaintiff. These instructions further stated that the property was to be the home of the daughter as long as she lived or needed a home. She further requested the agency to secure the house so that her daughter could move in before the deal was completed. When the deed, which had been prepared by the trust company, was shown to deceased, in which she was named grantee, she stated that she would not accept it because she wanted written in the deed that the property was to go to plaintiff and her three children. During the conversations with the real estate agent, plaintiff was present.
The bank cashier at Crystal, who transacted some of plaintiff's business with regard to this property, heard deceased tell the real estate agent that she would not accept the deed as it was and that she wanted it made jointly with her daughter and granddaughters. Later, when the proposed deed came to the bank in which deceased was named as grantor and plaintiff and her three children as grantees, deceased told the cashier she would arrange it herself among her daughter and grandchildren. Then, when the first deed was again presented to her in which she was named as sole grantee, she accepted it.
Deceased further told the wife of the real estate agent that she had bought the home for her daughter so that when deceased wanted to come there she would have a home; that she could not stay in her home at Crystal in the winter because it was too cold. She had been staying there, but could not do so any more. She told the witness that she had a home with her daughter. Plaintiff's husband testified that at the time deceased was purchasing the property, she told him that she was going to make a joint deed of the property to plaintiff and her three daughters; that she wanted a house with a downstairs bedroom that could be used for her room and that she wanted to make her home with plaintiff's family. She further told him that she was not able to stay alone in her home at Crystal during the winter because she was not capable, physically, of keeping up the fires and looking after herself as she had done in the past. Plaintiff's husband testified that the making of a joint deed by deceased and her making her home with plaintiff's family ‘was the special condition’. During all of this conversation plaintiff was present, and apparently acquiesced.
After plaintiff's family moved to the house, deceased told plaintiff's husband ‘that it was all fixed up so that Lina would get the property at her death’. The occupant of the house before its purchase by deceased testified that on one occasion deceased told her, in the presence of plaintiff and her husband, that she was buying the house for her daughter, and expected to have one of the downstairs bedrooms; that she could not go up and down stairs very well.
Glenn Davenport, a son of deceased, also testified on plaintiff's behalf that deceased had told him she had bought a place for plaintiff and was going to give it to plaintiff; that deceased was to make her home there as long as she lived, if she wanted to; ‘that she had ‘fixed’ it' that she was ‘to have a home here in the winter time or whenever she wanted it * * * she said that that was the agreement that she was to live there whenever she wanted to * * * I did not question her or nothing of the kind, because I did not think it was anything to me, it was okeh with me, the agreement.’
Mr. James Lambert, pastor of a church in Lansing, testified that deceased had told him:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Van Camp v. Van Camp, 33.
...41 N.W. 481;Woodworth v. Porter, 224 Mich. 470, 194 N.W. 1015;Salsbury v. Sackrider, 284 Mich. 493, 280 N.W. 926;Mayes v. Central Trust Co., 284 Mich. 504, 279 N.W. 923.' In Denevan v. Belter, 232 Mich. 664, 206 N.W. 500, we held: ‘Where plaintiffs fulfilled every obligation under their ora......
-
Morten v. Zevalkink
...of frauds is not applicable to an executed verbal agreement. See Salsbury v. Sackrider, 284 Mich. 493, 280 N.W. 926;Mayes v. Central Trust Co., 284 Mich. 504, 279 N.W. 923;Van Camp v. Van Camp, 291 Mich. 688, 289 N.W. 297;Kendzierski v. Kendzierski, 293 Mich. 701, 292 N.W. 537; and Guzorek ......
- De Blouw v. Ramm & Co.
-
In re Heiler's Estate
...134, 176 N.W. 456;Pupaza v. Laity, 268 Mich. 250, 256 N.W. 328;In re Rezmer's Estate, 283 Mich. 545, 278 N.W. 680;Mayes v. Central Trust Co., 284 Mich. 504, 279 N.W. 923. If such repayment were not to be made until her decease, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until that t......