Mayfield v. Aerotek, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 July 2022
• Docket Number: 3:20-cv-01947-JAH-JLB
• Parties: TIMEEKA MAYFIELD, an individual, Plaintiff, v. AEROTEK, INC., a Maryland Corporation; KIT NELSON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

TIMEEKA MAYFIELD, an individual, Plaintiff,
v.
AEROTEK, INC., a Maryland Corporation; KIT NELSON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-01947-JAH-JLB

United States District Court, S.D. California

July 11, 2022

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND, [ECF NO. 6];

(2) REMANDING ACTION TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO;

(3) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE, [ECF NO. 4].

JOHN A. HOUSTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Timeeka Mayfield's (“Plaintiff”) timely filed Motion to Remand to State Court, (“Mot. to Remand”, ECF No. 6). Defendants Aerotek, Inc. (“Aerotek”) and Christopher Nelson (“Mr. Nelson”)^[1] (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Remand, (“Opp'n to Mtn. to Remand”

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ECF No. 8), and Plaintiff replied, (“Reply to Mtn. to Remand”, ECF No. 11). Also before the Court is Aerotek's Motion to Strike the Third Cause of Action for Defamation Pursuant to CCP § 425.16 and for an Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees, or Alternatively, to Dismiss the Third Cause of Action, (“Mtn. to Strike”, ECF No. 4). Mr. Nelson filed a Notice of Joinder to the Motion. (“Notice of Joinder”, ECF No. 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants' Motion to Strike.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On August 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego. (“Compl.”, ECF No. 1-2). On October 2, 2020, Defendants removed the action to this Court based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (“Notice of Removal”, ECF No. 1). On November 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand the case to the original court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11. (Mot. to Remand at 2).

B. Plaintiff's Complaint^[2]

Plaintiff is a former employee of Aerotek, a Maryland recruiting and staffing agency, doing business in the County of San Diego. (Compl. ¶ 2). On October 5, 2018, Defendants offered Plaintiff the position of recruiter in its Fairfield, Virginia office. (Compl. ¶ 6). After starting in the Fairfield office, Plaintiff informed her supervisor at the time, Nick Wilson (“Wilson”), of her pregnancy and desire to relocate to the San Diego office, where her husband was to be stationed, to which Wilson indicated would not be an issue (Compl. ¶ 9). On February 27, 2019, Plaintiff emailed Wilson that she intended to return to work for Defendants at the San Diego Office on August 12, 2019. (Id. ¶ 10). Plaintiff

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subsequently sent Wilson another email inquiring about whether she would need to reinterview for the position. (Id. ¶ 11). Wilson responded that she would not need to because he had “vouched” for her. (Id. ¶ 12). On March 15, 2019, Plaintiff emailed Steve Purugganan (“Purugganan”)-the supervisor for the San Diego office at the timeexpressing her excitement about joining the office following her maternity leave. (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff moved to San Diego expecting to return to work in August. (Id. ¶ 15). Plaintiff reached out to Purugganan, who was out of the office on medical leave. (Id.) Mr. Nelson, who was running the San Diego office in place of Purugganan, called Plaintiff in for an interview, which Plaintiff understood to be an informational meeting given her prior correspondences with Wilson. (Id. ¶ 16). During the interview, Plaintiff asked questions about the possibility of working from home in case of an emergency with her infant and whether the office would be able to provide lactation accommodations. (Id.) Mr. Nelson told Plaintiff that she “wasn't a good fit” with the San Diego office, and Defendants subsequently terminated Plaintiff's employment. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18).

Plaintiff alleges that from about March 2019 until Plaintiff's termination, Defendants and their agents and employees engaged in “a continuous course of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation” against Plaintiff “because of her pregnancy and requests and questions concerning lactation accommodation.” (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff further alleges that she is “informed and believes” Defendants defamed her and intentionally, negligently and recklessly published false and defamatory per se statements to justify the improper and illegal termination of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 22). These statements allegedly included express and implied accusations that Plaintiff “violated company polices; that she was a poor performer; that she deserved termination; that she was incompetent; made false complaints; and was dishonest.” (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiff alleges that these statements were published and foreseeably republished, internally and externally, and were understood by the recipients to be about Plaintiff. (Id.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts four causes of action for: (1) sex discrimination; (2) pregnancy discrimination; (3) defamation; and (4) wrongful termination

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in violation of public policy. (Id.) Only the third cause of action for defamation is brought against Mr. Nelson. (Id.)

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The federal court is one of...