Mayfield v. Currie

• Decision Date: 22 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-60331,19-60331
• Citation: 976 F.3d 482
• Parties: Robin MAYFIELD; Owen Mayfield; William Mayfield; The Estate of Mark Stevens Mayfield, Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. Vickie CURRIE, Individually and in her Official Capacity, Defendant—Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

976 F.3d 482

Robin MAYFIELD; Owen Mayfield; William Mayfield; The Estate of Mark Stevens Mayfield, Plaintiffs—Appellees,

v.Vickie CURRIE, Individually and in her Official Capacity, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 19-60331

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED September 22, 2020

REVISED September 23, 2020

Dorsey Reese Carson, Jr., Carson Law Group, P.L.L.C., Steve C. Thornton, I, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Roy Allen Smith, Jr., Esq., Steven James Griffin, Esq., Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, P.A., Jackson, MS, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Dennis, Graves, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:

This is a qualified immunity suit in which Defendant-Appellant challenges the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss. We REVERSE and REMAND.

I

Mark Mayfield ("Mr. Mayfield"), a lawyer, was a founder of the Mississippi Tea Party. In 2014, he supported State Senator Chris McDaniel's primary challenge to then-sitting U.S. Senator Thad Cochran. The facts underlying this case involve four other supporters of Mr. McDaniel: John Mary; Rick Sager; Clayton Kelly; and Richard Wilbourn III (collectively, "the conspirators").

As the district court describes it, the conspirators "thought [Senator] Cochran was a hypocrite and an adulterer who lived with his longtime aide in Washington, D.C.[,] while his aging wife, Rose, was left alone in a Madison, Mississippi assisted living facility called St. Catherine's Village." They therefore planned to take a photo of Mrs. Cochran in her room at St. Catherine's and use it in an attack ad against her husband. The conspirators sought the assistance of Mr. Mayfield, whose mother lived in the same facility. Mr. Mayfield refused to photograph Mrs. Cochran himself but agreed to show the conspirators the location of her room. In late March or early April of 2014, Mr. Mayfield met one of the conspirators at St. Catherine's and pointed "down the hall" to the location of Mrs. Cochran's room. On April 20, 2014, one of the conspirators went to Mrs. Cochran's room and took a video of her lying in bed. He posted an attack ad on YouTube six days later. The ad, which contained a still photo of Mrs. Cochran in her bed, went viral before being taken down in a matter of hours.

About one month later, the Madison Police Department arrested Mr. Mayfield and two of the conspirators. The basis for Mr. Mayfield's arrest warrant was the affidavit of Officer Vickie Currie, who stated that Mr. Mayfield had communicated with the conspirators and assisted them in their effort to photograph Mrs. Cochran. The police, based on an affidavit from Officer Chuck Harrison ("Mr. Harrison"), also executed search warrants at Mr. Mayfield's home and office. Mr. Mayfield's largest client left him the next day, causing the "complete collapse of his law practice." Mr. Mayfield became depressed and was prescribed medication for sleep, depression, and anxiety. On June 27, 2014, Robin Mayfield ("Mrs. Mayfield") found her husband dead of a gunshot wound

to the head. The coroner ruled the death a suicide.

Mrs. Mayfield, her sons, and Mr. Mayfield's estate (together, "Plaintiff-Appellees") filed suit against several parties, including Officer Currie, based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988. Officer Currie and Officer Harrison filed a motion to dismiss. The district court found that Plaintiff-Appellees’ claims were timely, but "require[d] additional briefing to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim sufficient to overcome Officer Currie and Harrison's qualified immunity defense." It therefore granted the officers’ motion in part and denied the motion in part, without prejudice to refiling. Shortly thereafter, Officer Currie filed a renewed motion to dismiss. The district court denied that motion, finding only that "[i]t was not objectively reasonable for her to present to the judge such a bare-bones warrant application lacking any underlying facts and circumstances showing [Mr. Mayfield's] unlawful conduct." This appeal followed.

II

"On interlocutory appeal, we review a district court's denial of a qualified-immunity-based motion to dismiss de novo." Benfield v. Magee , 945 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton , 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) ). "We accept all well-pleaded facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor." Id. "We do not, however, accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or ‘ "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." ’ " Id. at 336–37 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead factual allegations that, if true, "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "That is, the well-pleaded facts must make relief plausible, not merely possible." Benfield , 945 F.3d at 337 (citing Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages liability when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal." Morgan v. Swanson , 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). "To defeat a claim of qualified-immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense." McLin v. Ard , 866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp. , 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005) ). The plaintiff must show "(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Whitley v. Hanna , 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ). We "have discretion to decide which prong of the qualified-immunity analysis to address first." Morgan , 659 F.3d at 371 (citing Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ).

III

Plaintiff-Appellees’ Section 1983 claim against Officer Currie is rooted in the Fourth Amendment.¹ They allege that Officer Currie violated Mr. Mayfield's constitutional rights when she "submitted to a municipal judge a warrant-application affidavit that (a) was completely devoid of facts showing the elements of any crime, much less the crime cited in the warrant, and (b) withheld known facts that would have shown no crime was committed ... and that the intent of the accused target was political speech protected by the First Amendment." Based on that allegedly defective affidavit, the municipal court judge issued a warrant for Mr. Mayfield's arrest. Officer Currie responds that there was no constitutional violation because the issuance of the arrest warrant broke the causal chain, immunizing her from liability.

"It is well settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary's decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party." Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 170 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Taylor v. Gregg , 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Castellano , 352 F.3d at 949 (en banc)) (quotation marks omitted).

But that shield against liability, known in this circuit as the independent-intermediary doctrine, is not absolute. There are two ways to overcome the doctrine relevant here. First, in Malley v. Briggs , the Supreme Court held that an officer can be held liable for a search authorized by a warrant when the affidavit presented to the magistrate was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." 475 U.S. 335, 344–45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). "The Malley wrong is not the presentment of false evidence, but the obvious failure of accurately presented evidence to support the probable cause required for the issuance of a warrant." Melton v. Phillips , 875 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citing Michalik v. Hermann , 422 F.3d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 2005) ). And second, under Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), and its progeny, officers who "deliberately or recklessly provide[ ] false, material information for use in an affidavit" or who "make[ ] knowing and intentional omissions that result in a warrant being issued without probable cause" may still be held liable. Melton , 875 F.3d at 264 (citing Hart v. O'Brien , 127 F.3d 424, 448 (5th Cir. 1997), and Michalik , 422 F.3d at 258 n.5 ). Officer Currie invoked both Malley and Franks in her motion to dismiss. The district court denied that motion but cabined its analysis to Malley . So that's where we begin.

"The question to be asked, under Malley , is whether a reasonably well-trained officer in [Officer Currie's] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for a warrant." Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist. , 877 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Officer Currie argues that "the information [she] and other investigators provided to [the magistrate] throughout the course of their investigation clearly was sufficient to establish probable cause to issue a warrant for Mayfield's arrest." We agree.

The affidavit submitted by Officer Currie in support of the arrest warrant application for Mr. Mayfield was indeed sparse. If it were the only document before the court, the analysis would quickly resolve in Plaintiff-Appellees’ favor. But it is not. In the week preceding Mr. Mayfield's arrest, Officer Currie and her colleagues presented a series of affidavits and warrant applications in connection with the Cochran case. Those materials were all reviewed and signed by the same municipal judge. And they were...