Mayfield v. Mayfield

• Decision Date: 23 May 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 114655.
• Parties: In re Marriage of Shannon MAYFIELD, Appellee, v. Howard R. MAYFIELD, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2013 IL 114655

989 N.E.2d 601

371 Ill.Dec. 11

In re Marriage of Shannon MAYFIELD, Appellee,

v.Howard R. MAYFIELD, Appellant.

Docket No. 114655.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 23, 2013.

Burt L. Dancey, of Elliff, Dancey & Bosich, P.C., of Pekin, appellant.

David M. Lynch, of Lynch and Bloom, P.C., of Peoria, for appellee.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Diane Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for amicus curiae Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services.

OPINION

Justice THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[371 Ill.Dec. 12]¶ 1 Howard Mayfield appeals the decision of the appellate court, which affirmed the decision of the circuit court of Woodford County to award his ex-wife, Shannon Dykes, 20% of a lump-sum workers' compensation settlement as child support. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 1995, Mayfield and Dykes married. They had two children: Zachary and Jessica. In 2003, Mayfield and Dykes divorced. Because Dykes was the custodial parent, the trial court ordered Mayfield to pay $158.50 per week in child support.

¶ 4 In 2004, Mayfield filed a petition to modify child support, asserting that he had been laid off and would apply for unemployment benefits. Dykes responded with a petition for rule to show cause, asserting that Mayfield was in arrears on child support.The trial court denied Mayfield's petition to modify, and granted Dykes' petition for rule to show cause. The trial court found that Mayfield was in arrears by $1,580 and ordered him to pay an additional $32 per week in child support.

¶ 5 In 2009, Mayfield filed another petition to modify child support because Zachary began living with him. To reflect the new living arrangements, and the parties' respective child support obligations, the trial court ordered Mayfield to pay $37.57 per week in child support.

¶ 6 In 2011, Dykes filed a petition to modify child support because Zachary had reached the age of majority, ending her child support obligation to him. At a hearing on that petition,¹ Mayfield testified that, in 2007, he suffered a workplace injury and, in 2010, he received a lump-sum workers' compensation settlement of $300,000, which was reduced to $239,920 after deducting attorney fees and medical expenses. Under section 10.1 of the Workers' Compensation Act, the settlement agreement prorated the lump sum over Mayfield's life expectancy. See 820 ILCS 305/10.1 (West 2010). The settlement agreement stated, “It is the parties['] intent and agreement that this shall constitute the equivalent of monthly payments for the duration of [Mayfield's] life expectancy of 34 years which comes out to $580.30 per month.” The agreement further stated that Mayfield's average weekly income before the injury was $969.60, and that he was seeking employment that could accommodate his medical restrictions.

¶ 7 Apparently, Mayfield did not testify about the injury or his restrictions, but he did testify that he spent most of the settlement by paying off his home mortgage and a $9,000 loan, buying hunting property for $44,000 and a motorcycle for $10,000, taking a $5,000 Florida vacation, and extensively remodeling his home. Mayfield's financial affidavit showed that he owned three cars free of liens; a money market account with $31,204.36; $20,000 of furniture and appliances in his home; and $3,000 of jewelry and furs. Mayfield admitted that he did not notify Dykes of his workers' compensation claim or his settlement.

¶ 8 Dykes testified that Jessica was 14 years old and needed support, but that Zachary had reached the age of majority. Dykes further testified that after Mayfield's injury, he was unemployed, which caused a significant reduction in child support.

¶ 9 Pursuant to a request, Dykes' attorney mailed to the trial court copies of, inter alia, In re Marriage of Dodds, 222 Ill.App.3d 99, 164 Ill.Dec. 692, 583 N.E.2d 608 (1991), and In re Marriage of Schacht, 343 Ill.App.3d 348, 277 Ill.Dec. 889, 797 N.E.2d 236 (2003), which held that lump-sum workers' compensation settlements were income for purposes of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act's child support provisions. Mayfield then filed a memorandum in opposition to Dykes' petition to modify. In that memorandum, Mayfield attempted to distinguish those cases because the issues there did not involve apportionment of a workers' compensation settlement. Mayfield argued:

“Where the child is a teenager, and where clearly the award is to compensate for limited monthly payments over the life expectancy of the workman's compensation petitioner, it would be manifestly unfair to award a 20% portion of the entire settlement, to the former spouse. Such an award would grant the former spouse child support, in this case, effectively, for 25 years after the child has reached her majority.”

Mayfield asked the trial court to order child support from the settlement “based upon the weekly amount upon which it was calculated.” According to Mayfield, his child support should be $116.06 per month, or 20% of the prorated monthly amount of the settlement, retroactive to the date of the settlement.

¶ 10 The trial court granted Dykes' motion. The court's short written order provided:

“The Court has reviewed the authorities provided. This Court is compelled to follow [Dodds ]. [Dodds ] found workers compensation awards to be income and approved a percentage distribution of the total lump sum payment for child support. [Mayfield] is correct in pointing out that the lump sum payment he received represented his wage differential basis over his 34 year life expectancy. However 820 ILCS 305/9 provides that workers may elect to receive the compensation due them resulting from work injury in a lump sum payment. The compensation however is an amount which will equal the total sum of the probable future payments capitalized at their present value. If [Mayfield] desired to pay his child support in weekly or monthly payments, he could have ignored the election and taken his compensation over his life expectancy.”

The trial court ordered Mayfield to pay $47,984, or 20% of the entire settlement, within 30 days.²

¶ 11 Mayfield filed a motion to reconsider. He again argued that Dodds was inapposite because it only addressed whether a lump-sum workers' compensation settlement was income, not how it should be allocated. According to Mayfield, the latter issue was one of first impression, and the trial court was not bound by Dodds. Instead, the court was free to determine a “fair and equitable” amount of child support, considering “the nature of the award, the child's age, and the circumstances of the case,” including the fact that the settlement stated a prorated monthly amount. Thus, Mayfield contended, the court had “clear evidence as to what his monthly income was calculated at, for purposes of the settlement. The fact that he chose to take it as a lump sum does not alter or undermine the nature of the compensation.” The trial court denied Mayfield's motion, and he appealed.

¶ 12 The appellate court affirmed. 2012 IL App (4th) 110737–U, 2012 WL 7037368. The appellate court initially noted that its standard of review was de novo, because Mayfield challenged the trial court's interpretation of section 505(a) of the Dissolution Act. Id. ¶ 17. However, the appellate court further noted that Mayfield conceded “workers' compensation awards should be treated as income for purposes of child support” under Dodds.Id. ¶ 22. The court still analyzed that issue:

“As workers' compensation payments are intended to replace lost wages, it is only logical that [they are] a type of ‘income’ under the Act. These payments consist of a financial benefit received by the obligor parent that has a positive impact on the parent's ability to support his children. Including workers' compensationas income is consistent with the policy of including all income from all sources as it improves a parent's economic situation at the time of the payment. Therefore, we agree that workers' compensation payments are included in the statutory definition of ‘net income.’ ” Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 13 The appellate court then turned to the issue of apportionment. Mayfield contended that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay 20% of the total settlement because that would constitute child support beyond Jessica's majority, and the settlement was intended to replace lost wages over his life expectancy. Id. ¶ 31. The appellate court rejected this argument, concluding that the lump-sum workers' compensation settlement constituted current income: “[H]ad a lump sum like the award in this case been realized through employment or investment, it would be ordinary income for purposes of determining child support.” Id. ¶ 32. According to the appellate court, this approach is consistent with Dodds.Id. The appellate court noted that trial courts always possess the authority to deviate from the statutory guidelines when appropriate, provided they explain their reasoning. Id. ¶ 33.

¶ 14 This court allowed Mayfield's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). This court also allowed the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Dykes. Ill. S.Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 Under section 505(a) of the Dissolution Act, a trial court has the authority to order either or both parents to pay “an amount reasonable and necessary for [the] support” of the child. 750 ILCS 5/505(a) (West 2010). Calculating this amount is a two-step process. The trial court must determine the parties' income, then apportion that income, setting an amount of child support for the noncustodial parent. See In re Marriage of McGrath, 2012 IL 112792, ¶ 13, 361 Ill.Dec. 12, 970 N.E.2d 12. Section 505(a)(3) of the Dissolution Act governs the first step. It provides a...