Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n For Stock Car Auto Racing Inc

• Decision Date: 18 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 3:09-CV-220-MU.,3:09-CV-220-MU.
• Citation: 713 F.Supp.2d 527
• Parties: Jeremy Allen MAYFIELD and Mayfield Motorsports, Inc., Plaintiffs,v.NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR STOCK CAR AUTO RACING, INC., et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

713 F.Supp.2d 527

Jeremy Allen MAYFIELD and Mayfield Motorsports, Inc., Plaintiffs,v.NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR STOCK CAR AUTO RACING, INC., et al, Defendants.

No. 3:09-CV-220-MU.

United States District Court,

W.D. North Carolina,

Charlotte Division.

May 18, 2010.

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James B. Maxwell, Maxwell, Freeman & Bowman, P.A., Durham, NC, Mark J. Geragos, Shelly Kaufman, Geragos & Geragos, APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Helen M. Maher, Jack Arthur Wilson, Kelly Ann Hoffman, Olav Antonie Haazen, Jarrod F. Reich, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Armonk, NY, James F. Wyatt, III, Robert Adams Blake, Jr., Wyatt & Blake, LLP, Charlotte, NC, Michael M. Merley, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, New York, NY, Gary K. Harris, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Orlando, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

GRAHAM C. MULLEN, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. For reasons given below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jeremy Mayfield and Mayfield Motorsports, Inc. (“MMI”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring suit against Defendants National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. (“NASCAR”), Brian Zachary France, Aegis Sciences Corporation (“Aegis”), David Lee Black, Ph.D., and Douglas F. Aukerman, M.D (collectively “Defendants”). This suit arises out of NASCAR's suspension of Mr. Mayfield after he was reported to have tested positive for prohibited substances, which violated NASCAR's Substance Abuse Policy (“the Policy”).

Mr. Mayfield is a professional race car driver who participated in NASCAR sponsored events across the United States, including North Carolina. NASCAR provides the races and rules, and independent businesses provide the racecars, drivers, and crews. MMI is one such independent business, and Mr. Mayfield is its principal owner and driver.

To participate in NASCAR's “Sprint Cup” series, Plaintiffs had to sign several NASCAR agreements: the NASCAR Sprint Cup Series 2009 Driver and Car Owner Agreement (“the Agreement”); the NASCAR Competition Membership and License Application NASCAR Sprint Cup Series Drivers (“Drivers Application”) (emphasis in original); and the NASCAR Competition Membership and License Application NASCAR Sprint Cup Series Car Owners (“Owners Application”) (emphasis in original). Mr. Mayfield signed all three forms as a driver, a car owner, or both.

The Agreement requires that both driver and car owner “abide by the NASCAR Substance Abuse Policy [“the Policy”], and car owner covenants that driver and the team's crew members are additionally tested for substance abuse under the car owner's or team's substance abuse policy.” (Def. Mot. J. Plead. Doc. 71-5 Ex. 3, NASCAR Agree. § 16.) Under the Policy, competitors must submit to random drug tests. All testing is to “be done at a facility or facilities ... that have been certified by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [“SAMHSA”] of the United States Department of Health and Human Services [“HHS”] and/or by the College of American Pathologists Forensic Urine Drug Testing Program.” (Compl. Doc. 1-1 Ex. A, NASCAR Policy § 5.) If a competitor tests positive for a prohibited substance, his NASCAR license will be revoked for an indefinite period. “Prohibited substances are those substances that, in NASCAR's determination, may affect adversely the safety and well-being of the Competitors, Officials and/or spectators or the performance of a Competitor or Official in or at a NASCAR Event, including but not limited to illegal drugs.” ( Id. at § 1.A.) NASCAR teams were also sent a list of drugs that must be included in their own team confirmation tests: the list includes amphetamines and methamphetamines. (NASCAR Answer Doc. 3-1 at 2.). The Policy has the following release:

NASCAR may publish the results of any test or tests conducted pursuant to this Policy and the circumstances giving rise to such test to such third parties as NASCAR, in its sole discretion, deems reasonable under the circumstances. The Competitor or Official shall have no claim or cause of action of any kind against NASCAR or any director, officer, employee, or agent of NASCAR with respect to such publication.

(Compl. Doc. 1-1 Ex. A, NASCAR Policy § 7.C.)

The Drivers Application and Owners Application are both two pages long, the second of which contains two release sections. Each release section is specifically titled, in bold and capital letters, as a “release.” Each section has a signature line. One part of the first release section reads as follows:

I recognize that the NASCAR Substance Abuse Policy promotes the integrity of NASCAR-sanctioned racing and the safety of NASCAR Competitors, Officials, and spectators. Accordingly, I HEREBY RELEASE, DISCHARGE, COVENANT NOT TO SUE, AND AGREE TO HOLD HARMLESS NASCAR, its officers, employees, directors, agents, and such testing facilities and Medical Review Officers as NASCAR retains or selects in connection with implementation of the Policy, as well as the officers, employees, and agents of each of them, and any other persons or entities against whom I might have a claim, from and/or for claims, damages, losses, or expenses of any kind, whether caused by negligence or otherwise, arising out of the implementation of the Policy, or any act or omission in connection therewith, including and without limitation, the testing of specimens and the publication of the test results and circumstances giving rise to such test or tests to any third party or parties by NASCAR or said testing facilities or said MRO, as well as the officers, employees, and agents of each of them, or any other persons or entities.

(Def. Mot. J. Plead. Doc. 71-5 Ex. 1, Driver Application at 3, Ex. 2, Owner Application at 3) (emphasis in original).

On May 1, 2009, a NASCAR official asked Mr. Mayfield to take a random drug test. The test was performed by Aegis, a SAMHSA certified laboratory. Inside the testing trailer, Mr. Mayfield was instructed on the procedures for providing a urine sample. Mr. Mayfield alleges that he was told “to select a urine cup from a cluttered non-sterilized table,” which he did. (Compl. Doc. 1 ¶ 44.) Mr. Mayfield allegedly disclosed that “he had taken two Claritin-D pills within the past twenty-four hours,” and he was told to tell Mr. Black-Aegis's CEO and test administrator-about his prescription drug use. Id. At that time, he did not disclose his use of Adderall XR. Mr. Mayfield was told to provide his sample in a restroom that, allegedly, “was neither secure nor sterilized.” ( Id. at ¶ 47.) He was then asked to initial two adhesive labels, which he gave to the specimen collector. Mr. Mayfield alleges that he did not see if the labels were affixed to his sample cup. Before leaving, Mr. Mayfield was given Mr. Black's contact information.

Mr. Mayfield alleges that he attempted to call Mr. Black immediately after providing his sample. They spoke two days later. Mr. Mayfield allegedly told Mr. Black that he took Claritin-D and added that he was taking Adderall XR pursuant to a prescription.

On May 7, 2009, Dr. Aukerman called and told Mr. Mayfield that his urine sample tested positive for a prohibited substance and asked for Mr. Mayfield's medical records. Mr. Mayfield provided his medical records that same day.

Mr. Mayfield alleges that Dr. Aukerman also called on May 8, 2009. During one of their two conversations, it is alleged that Dr. Aukerman said Aegis may have made a mistake in testing. Dr. Aukerman allegedly said that Aegis had frozen part of his urine sample, and that “Mayfield may want to have them [Aegis] test his ‘B’ specimen.” ( Id. at ¶¶ 61, 64) (emphasis in original). Mr. Mayfield alleges that he neither tried to prevent them from testing his B specimen nor authorized them.

Mr. Mayfield alleges that he then called Mr. Black and asked for a copy of his results, Mr. Black allegedly refused, “stating that the results were the ‘property of NASCAR.’ ” ( Id. at ¶ 67.) After several weeks, NASCAR sent the test results to Mr. Mayfield.

Mr. Mayfield alleges that on May 9, 2009, Aegis tested his B specimen and forwarded the results of both tests to NASCAR.

Later that day, a NASCAR representative informed Mr. Mayfield that he was indefinitely suspended from competition as both driver and owner. On May 11, 2009, Mr. Mayfield received a letter from NASCAR, which informed him of his opportunities for regaining his licenses to compete.

On May 15, Mr. France-NASCAR's chairman-held a press conference in which “he stated to reporters that Mayfield was suspended because he took a ‘performance-enhancing’ or ‘recreational’ drug.' ” ( Id. at ¶ 73.) Mr. Black also told reporters that “Mayfield's positive drug test results were not related to an over-the-counter drug or a prescription medication. Black stated, “ ‘They were not the cause, and could not be the cause, of his result.’ ” ( Id. at ¶ 75.) Mr. France and Mr. Black's remarks were allegedly “intentional, malicious, reckless and false, and [they] know or should have known their statements were false.” ( Id. at ¶ 76.)

Mr. Mayfield brought suit in the Superior Court of the State of North Carolina, County of Mecklenburg, and this matter has been removed on diversity jurisdiction. Mr. Mayfield prays for injunctive and monetary relief.

DISCUSSIONI. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is judged using the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Indep. News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir.2009). When a court rules on a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true, and reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir.1999). But a court need not accept as true legal conclusions or “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Wahi v. Charleston...