Mayfield v. State
Decision Date | 01 September 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 55,55 |
Citation | 302 Md. 624,490 A.2d 687 |
Parties | Louis Garland MAYFIELD v. STATE of Maryland. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Victoria S. Keating, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Deborah K. Chasanow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ., and EDWARD D. HIGINBOTHOM, Associate Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit (retired), Specially Assigned.
The question presented in this criminal case is whether, after a jury informs the trial judge that it is deadlocked and discloses the numerical majority-minority division, it is erroneous as a matter of law for the trial judge to give an Allen -type charge in the form recommended by the American Bar Association (ABA).
The underlying facts, taken largely from the parties' agreed statement of facts pursuant to Maryland Rule 828 g, are as follows. Louis Garland Mayfield was indicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for attempted armed robbery and related offenses, and he demanded a jury trial. The charges which were submitted to the jury were (1) attempted armed robbery of Brent Thacker, (2) use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, (3) assault with intent to avoid lawful apprehension, (4) false imprisonment of Brent Thacker, and (5) false imprisonment of Raymond Thacker.
The following evidence was presented at trial. At 9:30 p.m., on Wednesday, June 2, 1982, Raymond Thacker stopped his automobile in front of the subway station in Capitol Heights, Maryland, in order to meet his nephew, Brent Thacker, who was returning from work and who was waiting for his uncle on the sidewalk in front of the subway station. Just as the car was brought to a stop, a man with a gun grabbed Brent Thacker from behind and said: "Give it up or I'll blow you away." Brent Thacker resisted, and the gunman shoved him into the front seat of Raymond Thacker's car. Three other armed men got into the back seat of the car and told Raymond Thacker to drive on.
An off-duty police officer, Alonzo Joy, who was driving past the scene, observed the incident. Joy stopped his own car, got out of it and quickly returned to Raymond Thacker's car. He observed the armed men get out of Raymond Thacker's car and stroll toward the subway station. Joy called to them to stop. The men split up, with one running down the street and the others quickly disappearing into the station. After calling for help, Joy pursued the man fleeing down the street and chased him into a grove of trees. After a K-9 dog eventually located the defendant Mayfield hiding in the woods, Joy identified him as the man whom he had pursued.
The Thackers were not able to identify the defendant as one of the armed men. Moreover, the defendant testified that he lived in the neighborhood and just happened to be jogging in the area when a man with a gun suddenly started to chase him. The defendant stated that he did not know that the man was a police officer, and, as a result, he ran from him.
After the presentation of evidence, jury instructions and closing arguments, the case was submitted to the jury at 4:50 p.m. on November 17, 1982. At 7:10 p.m. that evening, the jury sent a note asking to review testimony of Officer Joy as well as a written statement of a witness which had been alluded to at trial. The court explained that it could not accomodate the jury in this request. The court arranged for the jurors to order dinner to be sent in to the jury room. At 10:09 p.m., the jury sent the following note:
The defendant Mayfield moved for a mistrial and objected to the court's stated intention to give an Allen -type charge. 1 Mayfield also objected to a portion of the actual language to be used, and the court agreed to delete it.
At 10:17 p.m., the court had the jury return to the courtroom and gave them the ABA approved Allen -type charge, as follows:
At 10:20 p.m., the jury again retired. At 10:45 p.m., defense counsel renewed the request for a mistrial, stating that "I don't think it's appropriate for those individuals being in there trying to hound my one guy into conviction." The court stated that it would "take the matter under reservation" and that if the jury had not reached a verdict at "about 11:15; 11:20," it would reconsider.
At 11:19, defense counsel renewed his request for a mistrial. Over objection, the court stated that what it proposed to do was to bring the jury in, ask again if there were a possibility of the jury's reaching a verdict, and declare a mistrial if the answer were no. The Bailiff then sent for the jury and reported back that the jury had asked for a "few more minutes," Defense counsel again objected. The court stated that it would have the jury deliberate for another fifteen minutes. At 11:39, the court stated again that it proposed to call the jury in, ask if there were a possibility of reaching a verdict, and declare a mistrial if the answer were no. Defense counsel again asked for the declaration of an immediate mistrial and objected to bringing the jury in to question it about the possibility of reaching a verdict. The court decided that it would not do anything until 12:00 midnight. At 11:59 the jury sent a note stating that it had reached verdicts with respect to all counts except for "charge # 3," which was assault with intent to avoid lawful apprehension. The court then declared a mistrial with respect to the assault charge 2 and took the verdicts on the remaining charges. The verdicts were "guilty" on all remaining counts. A poll, conducted at defense counsel's request, confirmed the unanimous verdicts.
The defendant was sentenced and then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court, by a 2-1 vote, affirmed in an unreported opinion. The majority decided that the trial judge's giving the Allen -type charge was not error, saying:
"The fact that the court knew the jury was split 11-1 for conviction at the time the Allen charge was given, in our opinion, has little or no different coercive effect than if the court had given the Allen charge not knowing what the split happened to be at the time."
The dissenting judge in the Court of Special Appeals, however, reasoned as follows:
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Booth v. State, 20
... ... It was not coercive simply because the proceeding involved potential capital sentencing. Compare Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 412-13, 601 A.2d 131, 137-38 (1992) (modified Allen charge is not per se coercive even if the jury reveals the numerical division) and Mayfield v. State, 302 Md. 624, 631-32, 490 A.2d 687, 691-92 (1985) (same). Nor, considering the evidence and the seriousness of the matter to Booth and to the community, did the court abuse its discretion in repeating the Allen -type instruction ... Trifurcation ... Booth moved that ... ...
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...a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is therefore accorded great deference by a reviewing court. Mayfield v. State , 302 Md. 624, 631, 490 A.2d 687, 691 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Newton v. State , 455 Md. 341, 364, 168 A.3d 1, 14 (2017), set forth the following ......
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Nash v. State
...charge should be used and 'when to employ it ... are best left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.'"Mayfield v. State, 302 Md. 624, 630, 490 A.2d 687, 691 (1985) (quoting Kelly 270 Md. at 143, 310 A.2d at 538). Furthermore, a trial judge's exercise of that discretion in electing "to......
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Nash v. State
...charge should be used and ‘when to employ it ... are best left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.’ ” Mayfield v. State, 302 Md. 624, 630, 490 A.2d 687, 691 (1985) (quoting Kelly, 270 Md. at 143, 310 A.2d at 538). Furthermore, a trial judge's exercise of that discretion in electing ......