Mayhew v. ILA Local 1771
| Decision Date | 30 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 2:11-03226-PMD |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | John R. Mayhew, Plaintiff, v. ILA Local 1771 (Clerks & Checkers), South Carolina Stevedores Association, Ceres Marine Terminals, APM Terminals, Ports America Stevedoring Contract Co., SSA/Cooper Stevedoring Co., and Charleston Gate, LLC, Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court upon two separate motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Both the first motion, filed by Defendant ILA Local 1771 ("Local 1771"), and the second motion, filed by Defendants South Carolina Stevedores Association ("SCSA"), Ceres Marine Terminals, APM Terminals, Ports America Stevedoring Contract Co., SSA/Cooper Stevedoring Co., and Charleston Gate, LLC, (collectively, "Defendants") request dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint based upon the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendants' motions to dismiss. However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a hybrid claim for which relief can be granted and hereby gives notice of its intention to enter an Order dismissing sua sponte.
Plaintiff John Mayhew ("Mayhew") is a member of the International Longshoremen's Association ("ILA") and its local organization, Local 1771. Local 1771 operates an exclusive1 hiring hall through which all persons desiring to be employed as union Clerks and Checkers at the South Carolina State Port Authority ("SCSPA") must be employed. The terms and conditions of his employment are governed by a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement ("CBA" or "Master Contract"). The CBA contains many job classifications to be performed by union members. Relevant here, is the job of "TIR men" or gate workers who provide paperwork to commercial truckers to facilitate the movement of containerized cargo. Historically, location/yardwork men were hired along with these TIR men to assist with the work. Several years ago, Local 1771 provided the SCSPA with a special accommodation that permitted the SCSPA (instead of Local 1771 members) to perform the TIR function for small bulk line containers. However, in June, 2010, Local 1771 entered into an agreement (hereinafter "June Agreement") with ILA employers and the SCSA that restored the job of TIR men to members of Local 1771, creating forty-two job positions for union members.
Mayhew states that on or about January 16, 2011, he learned of this June Agreement. However, he alleges that as a result, 10 to 15 location/yardwork jobs were not transferred back to Local 1771 members as required by the Master Contract. Instead, the agreement allowed the employers to form a separate company comprised of non-union bargaining units to perform these jobs that were traditionally assigned to union members. Mayhew filed a written grievance withhis union on January 21, 2011 about the illegal loss of these jobs. A week later, he requested copies of all CBAs between his union and employers that had an effect on his employment opportunities. On February 9, 2011, Mayhew filed an unfair labor practice claim with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") against the union, alleging that Local 1771 had "failed to properly represent members by entering into agreements with [Management] that had not been approved or ratified by the members." See Exh.4, attached to Def. Local 1771's Mot. Dismiss. Then, on February 24, 2011, Plaintiff received a letter from Local 1771 denying his grievance after careful consideration. Thereafter, Plaintiff contacted the NLRB to assist him in obtaining copies of all documents that may have an impact on his employment opportunities. On March 24, 2011, the NLRB sent him copies of Local 1771's Constitution and Bylaws, as well as a copy of the June Agreement. The June Agreement references another agreement to be made between Defendants, so Plaintiff subsequently requested it as well. The NLRB denied this request and told Plaintiff that the agreement was still a "work in progress." On April 26, 2011, the NLRB dismissed Plaintiff's unfair labor charge on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over internal union procedures. Additionally, the NLRB found that the union did not act in an "arbitrary or capricious manner" in providing the documents requested by Plaintiff. Finally, on May 31, 2011 Plaintiff filed a formal grievance with the Local Industry Grievance Committee (LIGI), as required by Article XIII, Section 1 of the Master Contract, titled "Grievance Procedure."2 To date, Plaintiff states that he has not received a response. On June 27, 2011, Mayhew re-filed his grievance with Local 1771, asking them to reverse their February 24, 2011 decision, but Local 1771 did not respond.
On November 28, 2011, Mayhew brought a "hybrid"3 claim against both his union, Local 1771, for violation of its duty of fair representation and his employers for breach of the CBA, in violation of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Essentially, Mayhew alleges Local 1771 breached its duty of fair representation when it entered into the June Agreement that had the effect of denying him certain jobs guaranteed by the CBA.4 Similarly, he alleges that his employers (or "Management") breached the CBA by entering into this agreement.
In nearly identical motions to dismiss, Defendants assert a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff then filed a responsive motion, and Defendants replied.
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of a complaint." F.T.C. v. Innovative Mktg., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (D. Md. 2009). The Supreme Court recently held that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1940 (citing Twombly,550 U.S. at 556). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950; see also Harman v. Unisys Corp., No. 09-1298, 2009 WL 4506463, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 2009). The Court added that "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions," and that "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The Court further noted that "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1950.
Generally, on a 12(b)(6) motion a court cannot consider material outside the complaint, however, a court may consider exhibits submitted with the complaint. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see e.g., Brazell v. Windsor, 384 S.C. 512, 514 (S.C. 2009) ().
The statute of limitations for a hybrid claim is governed by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), which states that a plaintiff must file suit within six months of when hiscause of action accrued. DelCostello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170-72 (1983). When a cause of action "accrues" is determined by federal law, but "the general rule is that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know that a violation of his rights has occurred." Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975). In this context, the time begins to run when the employee "obtains actual or imputed knowledge of the conduct alleged to constitute a breach of the union's duty of fair representation." Mincey v. United States Postal Serv., 879 F. Supp. 567, 572 (D.S.C. 1995). Mayhew filed his complaint on November 28, 2011, so the question is whether his claim accrued within six months prior to this date, or if not, whether the limitations period was tolled.
Mayhew provides several instances whereby he claims his union breached its duty of fair representation, such as, it arbitrarily entered into the June Agreement, and denied him the right to have his grievance processed. Mayhew filed a grievance on January 21, 2011, which specifically referred to an "outside" Agreement between Defendants and stated his contention that the assignment of several jobs to non-bargaining unit employees without membership approval violated the CBA. Arguably, Mayhew had at least some knowledge of the union's conduct that allegedly violated his rights when he filed that grievance. See Follin v. Safeway, Inc., 166 F.3d 332, 1998 WL 808374, at *2 (4th Cir. 1998) (). Shortly thereafter, on February 9, 2011, Mayhew also filed an unfair labor practice...
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