Mayle v. Urban Realty Works, LLC
| Decision Date | 23 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1-21-0470 |
| Parties | Ken MAYLE, Antonio Clark, Tony Sisilliano, Zachary Blews, and Phil Bobroff, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. URBAN REALTY WORKS, LLC; 660 Lake LLC; Demetrios Koulioufas; Harry Koulioufas; Irene Koulioufas; Anthony Rouches; Eric Johnstone ; and Bay-Ron Parker, Defendants (Urban Realty Works, LLC, Demetrios Koulioufas, Irene Koulioufas, Harry Koulioufas, Anthony Rouches, and Eric Johnstone, Defendants-Appellees). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Joan M. Fenstermaker and Nicholas Bailey, of Joan M. Fenstermaker, P.C., of Chicago, for appellants.
Kurt H. Feuer, of Evanston, and Robert T. Metz, of Oak Brook, for appellees Urban Realty Works, LLC, Anthony Rouches, and Eric Johnstone.
Marc D. Sherman, of Marc D. Sherman & Colleagues, P.C., of Lincolnwood, for other appellees.
¶ 1 In 2013, plaintiffs Ken Mayle, Antonio Clark, Tony Sisilliano, Zachary Blews, and Phil Bobroff were evicted from their Chicago apartment. In the course of the eviction process, plaintiffs allege that several of the defendants unlawfully entered the premises and disposed of plaintiffs’ personal property. As a result, plaintiffs filed an 11-count complaint against defendants, alleging violations of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (RLTO) (Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-010 et seq. (amended Mar. 31, 2004)) and common-law conversion. The trial court dismissed the six counts of the complaint arising under the RLTO, based on the statute of limitations, and subsequently dismissed the remaining five counts of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs appealed to this court, and we found that we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the court had not disposed of the claims relating to one of the defendants. Mayle v. Urban Realty Works, LLC , 2020 IL App (1st) 191018, ¶ 46, 439 Ill.Dec. 820, 148 N.E.3d 873. Upon remand, the remaining defendant was dismissed from the case, and plaintiffs again appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
¶ 3 As noted, this is the second time this case has been before us. Since almost all of the relevant facts occurred prior to the first appeal, we take our facts from our prior opinion except where we supplement them with facts occurring subsequent to the issuance of that opinion.
¶ 4 On June 22, 2017, plaintiffs filed an 11-count complaint against defendants Urban Realty Works, LLC (Urban Realty Works); 660 Lake, LLC (660 Lake); Demetrios Koulioufas; Harry Koulioufas;1 Irene Koulioufas; Anthony Rouches; Eric Johnstone; and Bay-Ron Parker. The complaint alleged that, in September 2012, plaintiffs moved into an apartment on Lake Street in Chicago, which was owned by Chicago Title Land Trust Company as trustee under trust number 1090074, dated June 23, 1987.2 According to the complaint, defendants Demetrios Koulioufas, Harry Koulioufas, and Irene Koulioufas (collectively, the Koulioufas defendants) were the beneficiaries of the trust. On August 8, 2013, the trust conveyed ownership of the apartment to defendant 660 Lake. Prior to the sale, and in contemplation of the sale, the Koulioufas defendants engaged defendant Urban Realty Works to manage the premises "and to remove Plaintiffs from the Premises so that the Premises would be vacant at the time of sale." The complaint alleged that defendants Rouches, Johnstone, and Parker "acted in furtherance of the plan to remove Plaintiffs from the Premises so that the Premises would be vacant at the time of sale."
¶ 5 The complaint alleged that, on July 31, 2013, defendants Urban Realty Works and Parker served a five-day notice on " ‘Josh and all occupants’ "3 of the apartment; the complaint alleged that "[d]efendants, individually or through their agents," unlawfully entered the premises to serve plaintiff Clark with the notice. Prior to receiving the notice, plaintiffs paid $1600 per month to defendant Demetrios Koulioufas.
¶ 6 The document titled "Landlord's Five Day Notice," which was attached to plaintiffs’ complaint, was directed to "Josh and all occupants" and provided:
The notice was dated July 31, 2013, and was signed by "Ashley Moore" on behalf of defendant Urban Realty Works. The notice also contains an "affidavit of service" signed by defendant Parker, who was listed as the property manager, which stated that he served the notice on that date; the notice purports to be notarized, with a signature on a notary line, but bears no notary stamp, and no date is written into the space above the notary's signature line. Also attached to the complaint were copies of several canceled checks to defendants Demetrios Koulioufas and Harry Koulioufas, which were each for $1600, many of which contained the word "rent" on the memo line.
¶ 7 Count I of the complaint was against all defendants and alleged that defendants violated section 5-12-060 of the RLTO (Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-060 (amended Nov. 6, 1991)), which provides that a tenant may obtain relief "[i]f the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner or makes repeated unreasonable demands for entry otherwise lawful, but which have the effect of harassing the tenant." Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated section 5-12-060 by making an unlawful entry into the apartment.
¶ 8 Counts II through VI were by each plaintiff against all defendants, and all alleged that defendants violated section 5-12-160 of the RLTO (Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-160 (amended Nov. 6, 1991)), which provides, in relevant part, that "[i]t is unlawful for any landlord or any person acting at his direction knowingly to oust or dispossess or threaten or attempt to oust or dispossess any tenant from a dwelling unit without authority of law *** by removing a tenant's personal property from said unit." Counts II through VI alleged that, after service of the five-day notice, between August 6 and August 21, 2013, defendants "individually or through their agents" unlawfully entered the apartment and removed and disposed of plaintiffs’ personal property.
¶ 9 Counts VII through XI were by each plaintiff against all defendants and alleged conversion of personal property. Each count alleged that the named plaintiff had an absolute and unconditional right to possession of the property; that he had demanded possession of the property; and that "Defendants" wrongfully assumed control, dominion, and ownership of the property. Each count also alleged that the actions of "Defendants" were done with malicious intent. Each plaintiff also attached to the complaint itemized lists of personal items allegedly converted by defendants.
¶ 10 On October 23, 2017, defendant Rouches filed a motion to dismiss counts I through VI of the complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016) ), claiming that the building in which plaintiffs allegedly lived was commercial, not residential, meaning that the RLTO did not apply, and further claiming that plaintiffs’ claims under the RLTO were time-barred.
¶ 11 On November 15, 2017, defendant Johnstone filed a combined motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016) ), seeking dismissal of counts I though IV under section 2-619 and of counts VII through XI under section 2-615 ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016) ). With respect to counts I through VI, like Rouches, Johnstone claimed that the counts based on the RLTO were time-barred. With respect to counts VII through XI, Johnstone claimed that none of the counts contained specific allegations that would subject him to liability for conversion. Instead, Johnstone argued that "each Plaintiff has merely alleged conclusory legal boilerplate in support of their conversion claims, and not a single specific factual allegation as to Defendant Johnstone."
¶ 12 On November 30, 2017, the Koulioufas defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code, claiming that counts I through VI should be dismissed under section 2-619 because they were time-barred and that the entire complaint should be dismissed under section 2-615 for failure to plead sufficient facts to support any of plaintiffs’ causes of action.
¶ 13 On January 17, 2018, the trial court entered an order dismissing counts I through VI with prejudice based on the statute of limitations. The court further struck counts VII through XI with leave to replead them.4
¶ 14 On March 13, 2018, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding a number of factual allegations. Counts I through VI of the amended complaint were identical to the previously dismissed counts I through VI of the original complaint, repleaded to preserve them for appeal. Counts VII through XI were also identical to the prior versions of those counts, other than incorporating the additional factual allegations. The amended complaint also included the same exhibits as the original complaint, namely, the "Landlord's Five Day Notice," the cancelled checks, and the lists of personal property.
¶ 15 On April 11, 2018, defendant Johnstone filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code, claiming that the allegations of the complaint directed at him merely set forth conduct that was consistent with the usual, lawful conduct of the agent for the purchaser of a property and that plaintiffs had...
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