Maynard v. Florida Board of Education, Case No. 2D06-5367 (Fla. App. 4/23/2008), Case No. 2D06-5367.
| Decision Date | 23 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D06-5367. |
| Parties | DONALD MAYNARD, Appellant, v. THE FLORIDA BOARD OF EDUCATION, acting by and through the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, James D. Arnold and Gregory P. Holder, Judges.
Wendolyn S. Busch and J. Meredith Wester of Mechanik Nuccio Hearne & Wester, P.A., Lutz, for Appellant.
Marie Tomassi, John D. Goldsmith, and Brigid A. Merenda of Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A., St. Petersburg; and Jane Haughney, Assistant Attorney, University of South Florida, Tampa, for Appellee.
This action arises out of a contract between Donald Maynard and the University of South Florida ("the University") that regulated the terms and conditions of Maynard's participation as a resident in the University's surgical residency program. The University's decision to terminate Maynard from the program resulted in both state and federal litigation, culminating in the instant appeal.
On appeal, Maynard challenges the trial court's final judgment entered on the jury's verdict finding against him on his breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith, and retaliation claims and finding in favor of the University on its counterclaim for malicious prosecution. Maynard argues that the jury's verdict on the University's counterclaim is barred by law and that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to sever his claims from the University's counterclaim for trial. We reverse.
As a participant in the University's surgical residency program, Maynard entered into a contract with the University that regulated the terms and conditions of his continued participation in the five-year program. As Maynard completed his fourth year of the program, he was advised by the University that there were concerns about his progress in the program. An agreement was reached as to what the University expected of him; however, there was no agreement as to whether the University's concerns were valid. As a result, Maynard filed discrimination complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") and the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") in December 1999, alleging that he was the victim of racial discrimination.
On April 17, 2000, Maynard was notified by the University that his contract had been terminated and that he was no longer a resident in the program. In August 2000, Maynard filed a nine-count complaint against the University in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The complaint included a claim for breach of contract, several claims under Title 42, United States Code Section 1983, several claims under sections of the Florida Constitution, a claim for Equal Protection under the United States Constitution, and a claim for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In response, the University moved for summary judgment.
In September 2002, the federal district court granted the University's motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divested the federal courts of jurisdiction over certain claims made by a citizen against a state. This applied to the Equal Protection claim, the alleged violations of 42 USC § 1983, and the breach of contract claim. Finally, the federal district court ruled against Maynard on count four, the alleged violation of Title VII, finding that he had failed to plead a prima facie case. Specifically, the district court found that Maynard had not alleged that other similarly situated individuals were treated differently than himself. The district court's ruling was thereafter affirmed on appeal by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Immediately thereafter, Maynard filed his three-count complaint in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. In his complaint, Maynard alleged breach of contract, breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and retaliation under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In response, the University filed its answer and included counterclaims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The University alleged that the ruling of the federal district court resolved all of the issues and that the filing of "this civil suit" was motivated by malice and intended to embarrass the University.1
During the course of the litigation, Maynard moved to sever his claims from those of the University. He argued that to allow the jury to learn of the federal district court's ruling would prejudice the jury's consideration of his claims. The University argued that the counterclaims were compulsory and should be tried along with Maynard's claims. The trial court denied Maynard's motion, and the issues proceeded to jury trial. The jury found for the University both on Maynard's claims and on the University's counterclaims. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court entered a final judgment ordering Maynard to pay the University $167,993 for the malicious prosecution claim.
Following the entry of final judgment, Maynard filed a motion to set aside the verdict and judgment on the malicious prosecution counterclaim and a motion for new trial. The basis of the motion to set aside was that the University lacked standing to file the claim, rendering the judgment null and void due to the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. At the hearing, Maynard pointed out that pursuant to Cate v. Oldham, 450 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1984), the University, as a state entity, could not maintain an action for malicious prosecution against one who has sued the state without success. Maynard suggested that this prohibition on the state seeking relief on a malicious prosecution claim was tantamount to the court lacking jurisdiction to hear the claim and that any relief awarded was a nullity. He further argued that if the trial court granted his motion to set aside the malicious prosecution verdict, he would be entitled to a new trial on his claims because much of the evidence admitted in support of the malicious prosecution claim was prejudicial to his claims and would have been inadmissible but for the malicious prosecution claim.
The University argued that a lack of standing is not the same as lack of jurisdiction and that Maynard had waived this defense by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense. The trial court denied Maynard's motion to set aside the verdict and judgment and his motion for new trial. Maynard now appeals the final judgment.
To resolve the challenge to the judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, we must first determine if the University may bring such a claim and, if not, whether this defense is waived if not pleaded as an affirmative defense. We begin with an analysis of Cate, 450 So. 2d 224. In that case, the Florida Supreme Court responded to a certified question posed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals: "Under the common law of Florida, may a state official who has been sued in his official capacity for alleged negligence in the exercise of his official duties, maintain an action for malicious prosecution against plaintiffs in the negligence action?" Id. at 224. The supreme court responded in the negative.
The facts of Cate are complex. Mary Bradham died as the result of a battery committed by her estranged husband. Kenneth Cate, on behalf of Bradham's estate, filed a wrongful death action against the state and Gordon Oldham, the state attorney. In that action, Cate alleged that Oldham knew of Bradham's husband's dangerous propensities but that he did not properly investigate and prosecute the husband. The action ended with the trial court entering a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Oldham individually then filed a malicious prosecution action against Cate and his law firm, alleging that the action was based on malice. Subsequently, the state and Oldham in his capacity as state attorney filed an additional malicious prosecution action against Cate.
Cate moved to dismiss the individual action, but the motion was denied. Cate then filed a petition for injunctive relief and declaratory relief in the federal district court. He alleged that the malicious prosecution actions were a violation of his first amendment right to free speech. The federal district court dismissed Cate's petition related to the state and Oldham in his official capacity. Cate appealed that ruling to the Eleventh Circuit, which then certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court determined that the right to present a complaint to the government regarding the government's conduct is essential. The court also determined that at common law there must be a showing of special damage before an action of malicious prosecution could be brought. That is, establishing the malicious nature of the prosecution was insufficient. With these two findings, and after a review of the scarce case law on the subject, the Florida Supreme Court concluded: Id. at 227 (citation omitted). Based on this conclusion, the court determined that the common law of Florida does not allow a state official who has been sued in his official capacity to "maintain" a malicious prosecution action. Id.
Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit read this holding in a broader context: United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1207 at n.7 (11th Cir. 2002). This broader interpretation is based on the Cate cou...
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