Maynard v. United States
Decision Date | 07 November 1927 |
Docket Number | No. 4539.,4539. |
Citation | 57 App. DC 314,23 F.2d 141 |
Parties | MAYNARD v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
T. M. Wampler, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Peyton Gordon, H. W. Orcutt, and D. A. Hart, all of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
On February 25, 1925, the United States filed in the court below a bill for injunction against the appellant and one Terry A. Rodden, under section 22 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305 27 USCA § 34), for the abatement of a nuisance, on the alleged ground that the premises were being operated and maintained as a place where intoxicating liquor was sold, kept, and bartered. Sufficient facts were averred in the bill to justify the court in issuing an order pendente lite, restraining the defendants from conducting, carrying on, maintaining, or permitting to be conducted, carried on, or maintained, the nuisance complained of in the bill.
It appears that the place in question, No. 1416 K street in the city of Washington, was conducted and known as the Maple Inn Cafeteria, and on March 16, 1926, an information in equity for contempt was filed, alleging, among other things, that on February 5, 1926, appellant sold one pint of gin to one Daniel P. Lyon, and on February 6, 1926, he sold two pints of gin to one George F. Breen, and that thereafter the appellant kept for sale upon said premises certain quantities of intoxicating liquor. A bench warrant against the appellant Maynard was issued and duly served. On hearing the defendant was adjudged guilty of contempt of court in disobeying the order of injunction, and sentenced to pay a fine in the sum of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment in the Washington asylum and jail for a period of one year. From the judgment this appeal was prosecuted.
The denial of defendant's motion for a jury trial is assigned as error. A court of equity has power to punish for contempt of its orders and decrees, and the defendant, in such contempt proceedings, is not generally entitled to a trial by jury. Counsel for defendant, however, attempts to sustain his contention under the terms of the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 738), section 21 (28 USCA § 386 Comp. St. § 1245-a) of which provides that any person willfully disobeying any order of a court of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, shall be proceeded against for contempt of court. Section 22 (28 USCA § 387 Comp. St. § 1245b) provides: "In all cases within the purview of this act such trial may be by the court, or, upon demand of the accused, by a jury; in which latter event the court may impanel a jury," as in the trial of a misdemeanor, and the case shall be tried according to the practice in criminal cases.
These provisions, however, are confined to cases coming within the purview of the Clayton Act, and are not applicable to cases for contempt of a decree of court issued in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. McGibbony v. Lancaster, et al. (C. C. A.) 286 F. 129. The Clayton Act is in the nature of a special statute, and the provision for the trial of contempt by a jury, being a limitation upon the inherent general power of the court to punish for contempt, must be limited strictly to cases arising under the statute, and should not be extended to the matter of the punishment of contempt generally. In Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 10 S. Ct. 424, 33 L. Ed. 801, the court said:
This construction of the Clayton Act in no way affects either the general power of the courts to punish for contempt or the limitation placed upon the federal courts by section 725 of the Revised Statutes, as now embodied in section 268 of the Judicial Code (36 Stat. 1087 28 USCA § 385; Comp. St. § 1245), as follows: "Such power to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts."
This, however, in no way affects the summary power of the court to punish for contempt. The court, interpreting this statute in the Eilenbecker Case, said: ...
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