Maynard v. Williams

• Decision Date: 12 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-2629,94-2629
• Citation: 72 F.3d 848
• Parties: Collene MAYNARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert WILLIAMS, John Awad, Dr., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 848

72 F.3d 848

64 USLW 2460

Collene MAYNARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert WILLIAMS, John Awad, Dr., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 94-2629.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 12, 1996.

George L. Waas, Attorney General's Office, Department of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, FL, for appellants.

Anne Swerlick, Cindy Huddleston, Florida Legal Services, Inc., Tallahassee, FL, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before COX, Circuit Judge, and CLARK and WOOD ^*, Jr., Senior Circuit Judges.

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge:

James Towey, the Secretary ¹ of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and John Awad, the District Administrator of District II of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, (together, "HRS") appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tanja Mathis. Mathis and two others brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 after HRS imposed a freeze on the provision of child care services to recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") who were, or who wished to be, engaged in an approved education or training program as detailed in Title IV-F of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 681, et seq. Mathis alleged that HRS was required to provide child care services to all such AFDC recipients pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(g), as amended by the Family Support Act of 1988. HRS argues that summary judgment was improperly granted because (1) no private right of action exists under Sec. 1983 to enforce Sec. 602(g)'s child care provisions; (2) the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not been officially approved to participate in an education or training program; and (3) Sec. 602(g) does not, on the merits, require states to provide child care to all AFDC recipients who are, or who seek to be, enrolled in an approved education or training program. We conclude that no private right of action exists here under Sec. 1983, and we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mathis.

I. BACKGROUND

The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, authorized by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, is a cooperative federal-state program which provides a variety of financial assistance to needy families with minor children. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq. Participation in the program is voluntary, but participating states, such as Florida, must comply with the requirements imposed by the Social Security Act and with the regulations issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"). Turner v. Ledbetter, 906 F.2d 606, 609 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928, 111 S.Ct. 2041, 114 L.Ed.2d 125 (1991).

One such requirement mandates the creation and operation of a "job opportunities and basic skills training program" ("JOBS program"). 42 U.S.C. Sec. 681, et seq. ("Title IV-F"). The JOBS program is designed to provide a bootstrap to families receiving AFDC assistance; through education and training, the JOBS program seeks to help recipients avoid long-term welfare dependence. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 681. Florida's JOBS program is entitled "Project Independence."

Recognizing that the high cost of child care services prohibits many parents or guardians of minor children from participating in the JOBS program, Congress amended Title IV of the Social Security Act in an effort to make the JOBS program more available to those individuals who, arguably, need it most. Therefore, pursuant to the Family Support Act of 1988, persons participating in a JOBS program are now eligible to receive child care services. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(g). Section 602(g) provides:

Each State agency must guarantee child care in accordance with subparagraph (B)--

....

(II) for each individual participating in an education and training activity (including participation in a program that meets the requirements of subsection (a)(19) of this section and part F of this subchapter) if the State agency approves the activity and determines that the individual is satisfactorily participating in the activity.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(g)(1)(A)(i). ²

This lawsuit stems from the decision of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the state agency responsible for administering Florida's JOBS program, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 409.029(4)(a), to freeze the provision of child care services effective July 10, 1992. The freeze does not apply to individuals who were receiving child care services prior to the cut-off date. A projected budget deficit was cited as the reason for this action.

Thereafter, this suit was filed with Collene Maynard, Darlene Michal, and Tanja Mathis named as plaintiffs. They claim that the child care freeze forced them to forgo their education plans. ³ The plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction as well as a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs hinged their suit upon Sec. 602(g)'s "guarantee" of child care. They alleged that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(g) imposes a statutory obligation, regardless of a state's fiscal situation, to supply child care services to all AFDC recipients who are, or who wish to be, enrolled in an approved education or training program. In response, HRS primarily argues that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(19), when read in pari materia with Sec. 602(g), specifically allows a state to take its financial health into consideration when it decides on the extent to which it will make child care services available.

In brief, Sec. 602(a) requires a state that wishes to participate in the AFDC program to submit a plan to the Secretary that details the state's proposed administration of the AFDC program. See Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 189, 105 S.Ct. 1138, 1141, 84 L.Ed.2d 138 (1985). Section 602(a)(19) details one required provision of a state's plan:

A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must--

....

(19) provide--

(A) that the State has in effect and operation a [JOBS] program which meets the requirements of part F of this subchapter;

(B) that--

(i) the State will (except as otherwise provided in this paragraph or part F of this subchapter), to the extent that the program is available in the political subdivision involved and State resources otherwise permit--

(I) require all recipients of [AFDC] in such subdivision with respect to whom the State guarantees child care in accordance with section 602(g) of this title to participate in the program; and (II) allow applicants for and recipients of [AFDC] ... who are not required under subclause (I) to participate in the program to do so on a voluntary basis....

42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(19)(A)-(B)(i) (emphasis added). The named plaintiffs were all participating in Project Independence on a voluntary basis.

The litigants subsequently filed competing motions for summary judgment and HRS also filed a motion to dismiss the action. On April 15, 1994, the district court denied HRS's motions and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The district court's opinion, however, was specifically limited to Mathis; Maynard and Michal had failed to respond to an earlier order of the district court which directed them to update the court on their status. ⁴ This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court's opinion is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, as it did not adjudicate the claims of all of the parties to this action, and as it did not direct entry of a final judgment in favor of Mathis "upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay." Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The district court's opinion is justiciable, however, as it enjoined HRS from denying child care to Mathis. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1).

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment by considering all factual issues in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (herein HRS) and determining de novo whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact requiring submission of the case to the finder of fact or whether judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719, 721 (11th Cir.1993) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Private Right of Action Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983

The appellants argue that summary judgment was wrongly granted below as no private right of action exists under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 to enable Mathis to enforce Sec. 602(g)'s child care provisions. Section 1983 creates a cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. The Supreme Court has held that this language is not limited to constitutional violations; Sec. 1983 potentially encompasses violations of all federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980).

The Court has, however, defined two exceptions to the applicability of Sec. 1983 to claims based on statutory violations: (1) For an action to be cognizable under Sec. 1983, it is not enough that the conduct in question merely violates federal law--that violation must trammel a "right" secured by federal law, Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106, 110 S.Ct. 444, 448-49, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989); Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027, 110 S.Ct. 1472, 108 L.Ed.2d 609 (1990); (2) Even if the statute in question creates such a right, a private right of action under Sec. 1983 may still be unavailable if "Congress has foreclosed private enforcement in the enactment of the statute" through the inclusion of sufficiently comprehensive remedial devices. Wehunt, 875 F.2d at 1563 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626-27, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981)).

A. Existence of a Federal Right

...