Maynes v. Atwater

• Decision Date: 10 February 1879
• Citation: 88 Pa. 496
• Parties: Maynes <I>versus</I> Atwater.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

88 Pa. 496

Maynes versus Atwater.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 30, 1879.

February 10, 1879.

January 30th 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, WOODWARD, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 4, of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1878, No. 233.

Harold Goodwin, for plaintiff in error.—The plaintiff never intended to part with the goods. Intention is exclusively for the jury: Hoopes v. Garver, 3 Harris 517; Miller v. Shaw, 7 S. & R. 129; Holbert v. Holbert, 21 Mo. 277; Winter v. Norton, 1 Oregon 42. The meaning of words in a conversation is for the jury: Brubaker v. Okeson, 12 Casey 519. A chattel purchased at a sheriff's sale may be left in the possession of the former owner, and such possession is not index of fraud, nor does it amount to a gift to the donor: Walter v. Gernant, 1 Harris 515. The case should go to the jury if there is evidence from which an inference favorable to the plaintiff may be drawn: Baker v. Lewis, 9 Casey 301; Bevan v. Insurance Co., 9 W. & S. 187.

S. W. Pettit, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice TRUNKEY delivered the opinion of the court, February 10th 1879.

No opinion having been filed in the court below we are not informed of what was deemed a fatal defect in the plaintiff's case. As it appears we think it ought to have been submitted to the jury.

Upon a motion for nonsuit the rule is, that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every inference of fact which the jury might draw from the evidence, the defendant being considered as admitting every fact which the evidence tends to prove: Smyth v. Craig, 3 W. & S. 14; Bevan v. Insurance Co., 9 Id. 187. Where there is any evidence which would justify an inference of the disputed fact it must go to the jury, but not where there is no evidence to authorize the inference: Howard Express Co. v. Wile, 14 P. F. Smith 201; Railroad Co. v. Heil, 5 W. N. C. 91. The sense of words used in connection with what the parties intended to express by them is exclusively for the jury to determine. The judge may not put a legal interpretation on oral words, and make it a matter of positive direction. It is the province of the court to expound the meaning of an instrument, but not of words uttered of which there can be no tenor: McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55; Brubaker v. Okeson, 12 Casey 519. It is the province of the jury, who hear and observe the witness, to determine the meaning of what he says. Only when oral testimony fails to establish a disputed fact can the judge withhold it.

"Retention of possession by the former owner of a chattel sold at sheriff's sale, is not an index of fraud, because the sale is not the act of the person retaining, but of the law; and because a judicial sale, being conducted by the sworn officer of the court, shall be deemed fair, till it be proved otherwise:" Myers v. Harvey 2 P. & W. 478; Craig's Appeal, 27 P. F. Smith 448. "It is certainly not a fraud to leave property purchased at sheriff's sale in the possession of the former owner for his use, or even for his consumption. No presumption of fraud arises from retention of possession after a sale, which being made under supervision of the law, cannot be colorable; and permission to use or enjoy the thing bought, is an act of benevolence which does not amount to a gift of it, or revest it in the debtor:" Walter v. Gernant, 1 Harris 515. The legal presumption that the sale was fair continues until overcome by sufficient proof that it was collusive or fraudulent. Leaving the property with the former owner is not of itself evidence of collusion, nor does it warrant an inference that the purchaser made an absolute gift, or sale of it to him. In absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary the inference is that such leaving was an act of benevolence. It is by no means uncommon for a friend of a distressed debtor to purchase his goods at...