Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser
Decision Date | 12 October 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 18680.,18680. |
Citation | 383 F.2d 653 |
Parties | MAYO CLINIC, Edward S. Judd and D. O. Ferris, Appellants, v. Edward KAISER, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Henry Halladay, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellants; Curtis D. Forslund, Minneapolis, Minn., and Gregg Orwoll, Rochester, Minn., on the brief.
Walter J. Sebo, Canton, Ill., for appellee.
Before MATTHES, MEHAFFY and LAY, Circuit Judges.
Edward Kaiser, a citizen of Illinois and appellee here, brought a medical malpractice suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois against Mayo Clinic, an association of individuals, and three of Mayo's staff doctors, all citizens of Minnesota. Summons was issued on the day the complaint was filed and service attempted about ten days thereafter in Rochester, Minnesota. Mayo Clinic and its doctors moved to quash the service of process and to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Kaiser countered with a motion to transfer to the proper federal District Court in Minnesota. The Illinois District Court granted Mayo's motion to quash but also granted Kaiser's motion to transfer. Thereafter, summons was issued out of the Minnesota court and service had on Mayo Clinic and two of the doctors, but Dr. Fogle, the third doctor named in the complaint, was not served and is not an appellant here. After this Minnesota service of process, Mayo and the doctors moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and on the additional ground that the action was barred by the Minnesota statute of limitations, Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1). The District Court in Minnesota dismissed the latter mentioned Mayo motion, holding in an exhaustive opinion reported at 260 F.Supp. 900 (1966) that the action was transferable either under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a), and further that the action was not barred by limitations. We affirm the District Court but confine our holding as to transferability to the authorization of § 1406 (a), as it is our view that the Supreme Court opinion in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed. 2d 39 (1962), controls.
The sole issues here are the propriety of the transfer of the case under the circumstances and the effect, if any, of the Minnesota statute of limitations, Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a) provides:
"The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought."
Appellants contend that venue is proper since Illinois is the district of Kaiser's residence and since 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (a) provides that a civil action founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all the plaintiffs and all the defendants reside, and as a consequence thereof § 1406(a) is inapplicable. As authority for their view, appellants cite First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 190 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903, 71 S.Ct. 612, 95 L.Ed. 1342 (1951), rev'd on other grounds, 342 U.S. 396, 72 S.Ct. 421, 96 L.Ed. 441 (1952), which held that § 1406 (a) applied only when the case had been filed in the wrong venue. The later Supreme Court case of Goldlawr, supra, teaches, however, that § 1406(a) should be construed wherever possible to remove procedural obstacles which would prevent an expeditious and orderly adjudication of a case on its merits. Goldlawr was a private antitrust action under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts. There, venue was improperly laid under the applicable statute, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22, as the corporate defendants could not be found in, nor were they doing business in, the forum in which the suit was filed, and neither could service of process be had upon the defendants. This case was transferred from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to § 1406(a) to the New York District where the parties could be served, but the District Court in New York dismissed the action on the ground that the Pennsylvania court did not have power to transfer since it had no personal jurisdiction over the parties. The Supreme Court in Goldlawr reversed, holding:
Since the case at bar was submitted to this court, the Fifth Circuit has had occasion in Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967), to consider a similar case from a factual standpoint and...
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...§ 1391 sense in order to permit transfer under that section. Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967); Taylor v. Love, 415 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1023, 90 S.Ct. 1257, 25 L.Ed.2d 533 (1970); see 1 Moo......
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