Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Home Credit Co.
Decision Date | 26 May 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 22.,22. |
Parties | MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. HOME CREDIT CO. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore Court of Common Pleas; Joseph N. Ulman, Judge.
Action by the Home Credit Company, a corporation, against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, a body politic and corporate. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, DIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.
Lawrence B. Fenneman and J. Francis Ireton, Asst. City Sols., both of Baltimore (R. E. Lee Marshall, City Sol., and Hector J. Ciotti, Asst. City Sol., both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Francis Key Murray, of Baltimore (Thomas J. Tingley, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
This appeal is from a judgment recovered by the appellee, the Home Credit Company, against the mayor and city council of Baltimore, the appellant, for the money alleged to have been erroneously and mistakenly paid to the appellant as taxes for the years 1930, 1931, and 1932.
The case was tried by the court sitting without a jury. The verdict was for the plaintiff for the sum of $1,783.02, and a judgment for that amount was entered thereon in favor of the plaintiff. The appeal in this case was taken from that judgment.
In the trial of the case three exceptions were taken to the rulings of the court upon the evidence and one upon its rulings on the prayers. The plaintiff offered two prayers, both of which were granted; and the defendant offered seven, all of which were refused except his last or seventh prayer.
As shown by agreed Statement of facts appearing in the record, "the Home Credit Company * * * is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal office and place of business in the City of Baltimore, State of Maryland, where it is engaged in the purchasing and discounting of promissory notes and transacting a general finance business.
The two schedules and returns mentioned in the agreed statement of facts were filed in evidence. These schedules are inquisitorial in their nature. In them are inserted different kinds of property; for example, under the head of intangible property they have "Mortgages on Real Property," "Chattel Mortgages," "Notes on Loans," "Securities (Shares of Stocks and Bonds)." Following each of these items is a blank space in which the taxpayer is expected to write his answer thereto, stating if he has any such property and, if so, the amount or extent of it.
In addition to the facts contained in the stipulation above set out and the contents of the schedule and return, the record contains the further evidence as to the character of the "Notes on Loans," and the reasons why the tax thereon was paid without protest or appeal. The president, treasurer, and assistant treasurer of the appellee company each swore that these notes were made by individuals and not by corporations, and that the company held no bonds or certificates of indebtedness of any kind of any corporation. The president, Joseph T. Polk, testified further that the company did not protest against the payment of taxes on these notes as it was thought by its officials at the time of the payment of the taxes, and for a long time thereafter, that notes signed by individuals were under the law subject to assessment and taxation.
The three exceptions to the testimony were taken to the court's ruling in admitting the evidence of these witnesses.
The court, sitting as a jury, was told by the plaintiff's first prayer, which was granted, that should it find from the evidence "that the Plaintiff paid to the Defendant monies as an intangible property tax, for the years 1930, 1931 and 1932, and that said tax was based on an assessment of notes, then if the Court * * * shall further find that all of said notes were in fact signed or issued by individuals, and shall further find that said monies were paid under a belief by the Plaintiff that the same were legally due and owing, the verdict of the Court, sitting as a jury, must be for the Plaintiff."
The plaintiff's second prayer, a damage prayer, is consistent with the defendant's seventh prayer, and no objection is urged against it.
The defendant's first and second prayers asked for a directed verdict for the defendant, the first upon the general assertion that there was no evidence in the case legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover, and the second that under the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover "by virtue of article 81, § 153 of the 1929 Supplement to the Annotated Code."
By defendant's third prayer the court, sitting as a jury, was told that should it find that the "taxes were levied upon assessments made by the Appeal...
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