Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Williams
Decision Date | 03 October 1932 |
Docket Number | 3351.,No. 3347,3347 |
Citation | 61 F.2d 374 |
Parties | MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. WILLIAMS. MAYOR, COUNSELOR & ALDERMEN OF CITY OF ANNAPOLIS v. SAME. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Lawrence B. Fenneman and R. E. Lee Marshall, both of Baltimore, Md. (Hector J. Ciotti, of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellant Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.
Roscoe C. Rowe, of Annapolis, Md., for appellant Mayor, Counselor, and Aldermen of City of Annapolis.
William L. Rawls and George Weems Williams, both of Baltimore, Md., for appellee.
Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and GLENN, District Judge.
These are appeals by the mayor and city council of Baltimore and the mayor, counselor and aldermen of the city of Annapolis from orders of the court below denying claims filed with the receiver of the Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Railway Company. The claims filed were for taxes assessed by the cities of Baltimore and Annapolis for the year 1931 upon the property of the railway company, and for the amounts due under the provisions of ordinances under which the company was allowed to construct and maintain its tracks over the streets of the respective cities. The claims were denied under the authority of chapter 497 of the Acts of Maryland of 1931, which is as follows:
The claims which were denied include taxes imposed by the cities upon the property of the railway company pursuant to article 81 of the Maryland Code (Supp. 1929). The taxes so imposed by the city of Baltimore amount to approximately $50,000; those imposed by the city of Annapolis, to approximately $3,000. They also include so-called taxes due under franchise ordinances granted by the cities. These in the case of the city of Baltimore amount to approximately $20,000; in the case of the city of Annapolis, to approximately $2,000. The franchise ordinances of the two cities are substantially similar. The pertinent portions of the Baltimore ordinance, which was passed April 27, 1906, are as follows:
Before coming to the question of the constitutionality of this statute, which is the question argued before us by counsel, we think it well to observe that, as we interpret the statute, it has no application to the moneys due by the railway company under the franchise ordinances, and consequently does not affect the liability of the railway company with regard thereto. It will be observed that it is "the railroad property" which is exempted from taxation; and it is exempted, so far as counties and cities are concerned, only from "county and city taxes and charges in the nature of a tax."
"A tax is an enforced contribution of money or other property, assessed in accordance with some reasonable rule of apportionment by authority of a sovereign state on persons or property within its jurisdiction, for the purpose of defraying the public expenses." 26 R. C. L. 13. It differs from a payment due under a contract in that the latter arises out of the agreement of the party from whom it is due, whereas a tax depends not upon consent but upon the sovereign power of the state. State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 278, 21 L. Ed. 146. A charge exacted by a city for the use of its streets is not a tax. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 97, 13 S. Ct. 485, 487, 37 L. Ed. 380; Postal Tel. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 79 Md. 502, 29 A. 819, 24 L. R. A. 161; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 84 Md. 1, 35 A. 17, 33 L. R. A. 503; City of Springfield v. Postal Tel. Co., 253 Ill. 346, 97 N. E. 672; Postal Tel. Co. v. City of Newport, 76 S. W. 159, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 635; 26 R. C. L. 14. And see McQuillin Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) vol. 4, § 1772, where the rule as to requiring compensation upon the granting of a franchise is stated as follows:
A payment required as a condition of the granting of a franchise to use the streets of a city is not different in principle from the exaction of any other payment by a city as a return for the use of property or facilities furnished by it; and it is uniformly held...
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