Mayor and Common Council of Hyattsville v. Washington, W. & G.R. Co.

• Citation: 90 A. 515,122 Md. 660
• Decision Date: 25 February 1914
• Docket Number: 13.
• Parties: MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF HYATTSVILLE v. WASHINGTON, W. & G. R. CO.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

90 A. 515

122 Md. 660

MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF HYATTSVILLE v. WASHINGTON, W. & G. R. CO.

No. 13.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

February 25, 1914

Appeal from Circuit Court, Prince George's County; Fillmore Beall, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Condemnation proceedings by the Washington, Westminster & Gettysburg Railroad Company against the Mayor and Common Council of Hyattsville. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed and remanded.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

Vincent A. Sheehy, of Washington, D. C., for appellants.

T Howard Duckett, of Washington, D. C. (Marion Duckett, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

BOYD C.J.

This case was before us several terms ago, and the conclusions then reached by us are reported in 120 Md. 128, 87 A. 828. The question which then gave us most difficulty was whether the termini were sufficiently described to comply with our statute. After considering the various points presented, we said: "In our judgment, then, the general railroad law of this state requires the termini to be fixed in this state and naming two cities out of the state as the termini would not ordinarily be sufficient to show a compliance with the statute in that respect. But we are also of the opinion, as indicated and explained above, that if it be shown by evidence that a road running from Washington, D. C., to Gettysburg, Pa., through the counties, and at or near the towns mentioned in this charter, will cross the state lines within such distance that the points of crossing can be said to be fixed with reasonable certainty, in the light of the decisions above referred to and of what we have said, such points can be treated as the termini in this state, and hence, if such be the case, the description of the termini in this charter must be treated as a substantial compliance wtih the requirement of the statute. And, if it be shown that the lines of Washington and of the District of Columbia are coextensive, that is sufficient for the southerly terminus." It was contended in the former case by the attorneys for the appellee that those lines were coextensive, and it was for that reason that they were referred to. The testimony taken after the case was remanded does not sustain that contention. It may be true that there is but one government for the whole district, including the city of Washington, but the limits of the city seem to be well established and are practically the same they have been for many years, excepting Georgetown is now a part of Washington.

If Washington and Gettysburg had been within the state of Maryland, naming them as the termini of the railroad would have been sufficient, without stating from what part of the one the road was to begin, and at what part of the other it was to terminate. The theory upon which we remanded the case, therefore, was that if it could be shown that a railroad constructed from the one place to the other, and passing through the counties and by or near the towns named, would cross the state lines within such distances on those lines as made those points of crossing reasonably certain and fixed, then those points could be accepted as the termini of the road. It was determined in Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., 105 Md. 12, 65 A. 409, that it was not necessary under our statute that a railroad company shall have its termini at or in a city, town, or village; and in the charter involved in P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Speelman, 67 Md. 260, 10 A. 77, 293, the description of one terminus was: "Beginning at a point in Allegany county, in said state, opposite to the junction of the West Virginia. Central & Pittsburg Railway Company with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company above Piedmont, in West Virginia." Therefore reference to a point at either state line on a road to be built from Washington, D. C., to Gettysburg, Pa., would answer the requirement of the statute, if such point could be made sufficiently definite. It was said in Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., supra, that: "In requiring that the termini shall be specified in its act of incorporation, it would seem that the only reasonable intent to be imputed to the law is that the railroad shall have such termini definitely ascertained and fixed so as to indicate its general direction and location." That there can be no objection to a railroad being chartered in this state with the view to connect with and in effect form part of a road chartered by another state was decided in P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Speelman, and the conditions shown in that case still exist, just as in the part of the Western Maryland System east of Cumberland, where the road crosses and recrosses the Potomac river a number of times.

We said in the former opinion that, if the lines of Washington were coextensive with those of the District, a point on the dividing line between the District and Maryland "would be sufficient for the southerly terminus, for if, for example, one terminus of a railroad was Baltimore city, it would not be necessary to name the particular street or part of the city to or from which it ran." We spoke of the fact that there were a number of special charters in this state in which one or both of the termini were more uncertain and indefinite than those in this charter, if we treat the termini in this state as the points where the route crosses the state lines from Washington and Gettysburg, and we referred to Speelman's Case and that of Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co. to show that this court had in effect placed railroads chartered under the general law on the same basis as those having special charters, in respect to their termini and routes. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad was not only one of the first built in this country, but its charter has been the guide in this state in granting charters to other railroads, in reference to the description of routes, the exercise of eminent domain, and in other respects. Chapter 158 of the Acts of 1830 was the original act by which what is known as the Washington Branch of that company was authorized, being entitled "An act to promote internal improvement, by the construction of a railroad from Baltimore to the city of Washington." That company was empowered and authorized to construct that railroad "from such point or place on that part of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad already constructed, and in use, not exceeding eight miles from the city of Baltimore, as the said company may deem most convenient, to the line of this state adjoining the District of Columbia in a direction toward the city of Washington, along the most direct and suitable route that may be reasonably and conveniently practicable."

The precise point of crossing the state or District line was certainly as indefinite in the route of a road from the beginning named to the District line "in a direction towards the city of Washington" as the point of crossing such line would be in the route of a road from the city of Washington to Gettysburg, through the counties and at or near the towns named in this charter. It is true that was a special charter, but, in view of what was said in the cases above referred to, we would not be at liberty to strike down this charter merely because the precise point of crossing the line was not fixed, when the general direction and location of the railroad are indicated by the description given, and that special charter, moreover, does show that the Legislature of this state did not deem it necessary to fix in advance the precise point of crossing state lines. Chapter 634 of Acts of 1900, which changed the name of the Frederick, Thurmont & Northern Railway Company to the Washington, Frederick & Gettysburg Railway Company, authorized that company to construct a railroad from some point in Frederick City "to some point at or near the boundary line between the state of Maryland and the state of Pennsylvania, and run through or near the towns of Thurmont and Emmittsburg, in said Frederick county, and to extend from Frederick City southerly through Frederick and Montgomery counties to the boundary line of the District of Columbia, or to such point in Montgomery county as may, by said directors, be deemed most expedient to connect with some railroad entering said District of Columbia." Other special charters might be cited; and, while we do not mean to say that the Legislature could not by a special charter grant some special powers which the general law does not, such designations of termini as those we have mentioned reflect upon the intent of the Legislature in reference to them. We will repeat what we quoted in the other opinion from the case of Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., in speaking of the provisions of the general law as to termini. It was there said: "The language of the provisions in question may be somewhat lacking in clearness, but the question here is not one of philological accuracy in the expressions employed therein but of legislative intent upon a view of the whole statute and of the object of it. This court has said that the statute in question is of remedial character and to be liberally construed. Piedmont & Cumb. Ry. Co. v. Speelman, 67 Md. 260 . Its object is to promote and facilitate the organization of corporations for the building of railroads and supplying means of transportation as the necessities and convenience of any community in the state and its industrial and commercial development may require. Where doubt may be suggested as to the construction of the law, it ought to be resolved with a view of bringing the practical operation of the law into harmony with its purpose."

In determining the sufficiency of the description of the termini in this charter, we must be controlled by the...