Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken v. Martin

• Decision Date: 29 November 1939
• Docket Number: Nos. 43-47, 62, 69-71.,s. 43-47, 62, 69-71.
• Citation: 123 N.J.L. 442,9 A.2d 332
• Parties: MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF CITY OF HOBOKEN v. MARTIN, State Tax Commissioner, et al. CITY OF CAMDEN v. STATE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS et al. JERSEY CITY v. MARTIN, State Tax Commissioner, et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

9 A.2d 332

123 N.J.L. 442

MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF CITY OF HOBOKEN

v. MARTIN, State Tax Commissioner, et al.

CITY OF CAMDEN

v. STATE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS et al.

JERSEY CITY

v. MARTIN, State Tax Commissioner, et al.

Nos. 43-47, 62, 69-71.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 29, 1939.

Syllabus by the Court.

Held, that so much of P.L.1938, Chapters 7 and 8, N.J.S.A. 54:31-15.1 et seq., 54:-31-29 et seq., as purports to provide for the distribution of excise taxes is unconstitutional in that they fail to set up a basic plan or standard to guide or control the State Tax Commissioner in the fixing or ascertaining the "unit of measure" for "a fair and equitable apportionment of the excise taxes" known as gross receipt taxes and, therefore, attempt to clothe an administrative officer with legislative power and authority.

PARKER and BODINE, Justices, and HETFIELD and WELLS, Judges, dissenting.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Certiorari proceedings by the Mayor and Council of the City of Hoboken against J. H. Thayer Martin, State Tax Commissioner, and others, by the City of Camden against the State Board of Tax Appeals, J. H. Thayer Martin, State Tax Commissioner, and others, and by the City of Jersey City against J. H. Thayer Martin, State Tax Commissioner, and others, to review the distribution of gross receipt taxes under statutes dealing with franchise tax on occupancy of streets by corporations generally, and by street railway, traction, gas and electric light, and heat and power corporations. From judgments of the Supreme Court, 122 N.J.L. 264, 4 A.2d 697, 122 N.J.L. 269, 4 A.2d 699, and 122 N.J. 253, 4 A.2d 700, the prosecutors appeal.

Judgments reversed, and all proceedings set aside.

Edward P. Stout, of Jersey City, for Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken.

David T. Wilentz, Atty. Gen., for State Tax Commissioner and another.

Herbert J. Hannoch, of Newark, for Town of Westfield and other municipalities.

Firmin Michel, of Camden, for City of Camden.

S. Lewis Davis, of Camden, for Runnemede Borough.

George D. Rothermel, of Camden, for Voorhees Tp.

Vincent DeP. Costello, of Camden, for Barrington Borough.

Gene R. Mariano, of Camden, for Delaware Tp.

James A. Hamill, of Jersey City (Edward P. Stout, of Jersey City, of counsel), for Jersey City.

THE CHANCELLOR.

All of these causes are appeals from judgments of the Supreme Court, on certiorari, reviewing the distribution of gross receipt taxes under Chapters 7 and 8, P.L. 1938, N.J.S.A. 54:31-15.1 et seq., 54:31-29 et seq., 122 N.J.L. 264, 4 A.2d 697.

In causes 43 to 47 and 69 to 71, the judgments were that the action of the State Tax Commissioner be affirmed and that the writs be dismissed.

In cause 62 the situation was different from the other causes in this respect; that the City of Camden had appealed from the action of the State Tax Commissioner to the State Board of Tax Appeals, which heard the cause and rendered judgment "that the valuations for the apportionment of excise tax, fixed by the State Tax Commissioner on property of the New Jersey Water Company for the year 1938 be affirmed and that the appeal of the City of Camden be dismissed."

A writ of certiorari was then issued directed to the State Board of Tax Appeals, the State Tax Commissioner, and others. The judgment of the Supreme Court is "that the judgment of the State Board of Tax Appeals be and the same is hereby in all things affirmed and that the writ of certiorari heretofore allowed herein be dismissed * * *".

All of the causes can be treated together inasmuch as the constitutionality of Chapters 7 and 8 of the Laws of 1938 is raised in all.

The fact that we find, as we do, that such statutes are in part unconstitutional, makes it unnecessary to consider any other grounds of appeal raised and urged in the several causes.

We reach the conclusion stated because we can find in the legislative enactments no basic plan or standard to guide or control the State Tax Commissioner in fixing or ascertaining the "unit of measure" for the apportionment of the taxes.

The legislature says "the State Tax Commissioner shall annually * * * establish a valuation as herein defined * * *". N.J.S.A. 54:31-15.5.

Value or valuation as defined by Section 2, subdivision (c), N.J.S.A. 54:31-15.2(c), says the "'valuation' means a value or valuation fixed at a figure determined by the State Tax Commissioner for the purpose of providing a unit of measure for a fair and equitable apportionment of the excise taxes imposed by this act, to the end that the apportionment of the [excise] taxes imposed by this act shall be fairly and equitably apportioned upon a uniform basis among the municipalities entitled thereto."

The statutes further provide "For the purpose of securing a fair and equitable apportionment * * * upon a uniform basis among the several municipalities, the State Tax Commissioner shall annually * * * establish a valuation as herein defined * * * of each taxpayer * * *." N.J.S.A. 54:13-15.5.

Dissatisfaction with previous methods is clearly declared by the statutes under review, as well as is the legislative desire to secure some ...