Mayor v. Pearl
Decision Date | 31 December 1850 |
Citation | 30 Tenn. 249 |
Parties | MAYOR AND ALDERMEN v. PEARL. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
This is a distress warrant issued at the instance of the mayor and aldermen of Nashville against Dyer Pearl.It was removed by the defendant, Pearl, to the circuit court of Davidson county, where the warrant was quashed by the presiding judge, Maney.The mayor and aldermen appealed.
Edward H. Ewing, for the plaintiff; Meigs, for the defendant.
On the 22d February, 1850, a distress warrant was issued by the recorder of the “Mayor and Aldermen of the city of Nashville” against Dyer Pearl & Co., for “exercising the privilege of keeping a broker's office within the corporation, without having obtained a license from the corporation.”
This warrant was issued under the authority of an ordinance, or by-law of the corporation, similar, in substance, in its provisions, to the act of the General Assembly of 1847-48, ch. 3, sec. 5.
The warrant runs in the name of the “Corporation of Nashville.”The constable of the corporation, by virtue of said warrant, levied on certain bank notes, the property of said defendant, Pearl, amounting to $110, that being the sum he was commanded to distrain for.
On the defendant's petition to a circuit judge, the warrant was superseded, and removed into the circuit court by writ of certiorari, and, at the return term, was quashed upon his motion.The corporation appealed in error to this court.
For the defendant, it is urged that the warrant was properly quashed for several reasons, one of which we think ample without noticing others, to maintain the judgment of the circuit court, namely, that the warrant is in the name of the corporation.The constitution of this State (art 6, sec. 12), requires, that “all writs, and other process, shall run in the name of the State of Tennessee.”This requirement applies to all process, civil or criminal, issued by any court, or tribunal established by law having authority to issue process; to process issued under a valid corporation ordinance, or by-law, as much as to process from a court of record, or justice of the peace.The warrant in the present case, is a “process” in the legal sense, and also in sense of the constitution; a process, too, not only more summary, but of greater combined force and efficacy, than any other known to our practice in civil proceedings.By force of this peculiar process alone, without notice, suit, or judgment, the property of the person against whom it issues, may be seized and sold by the officer, thus uniting and concentrating in one, all the essential objects and ends of both original and final process.This process is of a character entitled to no particular favor.In its issuance, as well as in its substantial forms and modes of execution, there must be a strict...
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State v. Huskey
...a valid corporation ordinance, or by-law, as much as to process from a court of record, or justice of the peace." Mayor of Nashville v. Pearl, 30 Tenn. 249, 251 (1850) (holding that a distress warrant in the name of the Corporation of Nashville was properly quashed); see McLendon v. State, ......
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State, Dept. of Revenue v. Moore
...v. Bennett, 68 Tenn. 582 (1877); Lyle v. Longley, 65 Tenn. 286 (1873); State v. Scott, 32 Tenn. 332 (1852); Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Nashville v. Pearl, 30 Tenn. 249 (1850); Reynolds v. Lowthrop, 7 Tenn.Civ.App. 12 (1916). These cases deal with the sufficiency of process issued by ......
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Tritschler v. Cartwright
... ... Spears v. Loague, 6 Cold. 420 [46 Tenn. 420]; Mayor, etc. v. Pearl, [46 Tenn.App. 679] 11 Humph. 249 [30 Tenn. 249].' Alexander v. Henderson, 105 Tenn. 431, 435, 58 S.W. 648, 649 ... ...
- Nuthill v. State