Mayor v. Stokes

• Citation: 94 A.3d 159,217 Md.App. 471
• Decision Date: 25 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 0333,Sept. Term, 2013.,0333
• Parties: The MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. Agnes STOKES, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

217 Md.App. 471

94 A.3d 159

The MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE

v.Agnes STOKES, et al.

No. 0333, Sept. Term, 2013.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 25, 2014.

Sara E. Gross (George Nilson, City Solicitor, Baltimore City Department of Law, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellant.

Harold L. Burgin (Stoner, Preston & Boswell, Chartered, Towson, MD) O'Neil S. King (Leftwich & Ludaway, LLC, Washington, D.C.) Harold R. Weisbaum (Blum & Weisbaum, PA, Baltimore, MD) (Lon C. Engel, Hans J. Phillips, Pamela K. Loya, Engel & Engel, PA, on the brief, Baltimore, MD), for appellee.

Panel: GRAEFF, HOTTEN, CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.^*

HOTTEN, J.

This appeal and cross-appeal stem from a Baltimore City automobile accident. Driver, appellee/cross-appellant, Agnes Stokes, and her passenger, appellee/cross-appellant, Bertha Stokes, brought a negligence action against the driver of the other vehicle, cross-appellee, Doreatha Maynor. Ms. Maynor filed a third-party complaint against appellant, the Mayor and the City Council of Baltimore. The City moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, a dismissal of the claims by Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes (collectively “Stokes appellees”) for failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Local Government Tort Claims Act. The trial court denied both motions and at the conclusion of the evidence, granted motions for judgment as to Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. Maynor. The jury returned a verdict against the City. The City noted an appeal against Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes, and presents the following three questions for our review ¹:

1. Did the lower court err in finding that Bertha Stokes and Agnes Stokes had substantially complied with the LGTCA's notice requirement for their personal injury claims by relying on the notice of property damage claim filed by another party to satisfy a condition precedent?

2. Did the lower court err in finding that Bertha Stokes had good cause for failing to comply with the notice requirement of the LGTCA when she failed to present evidence of good cause and did not file a request for judicial waiver of the notice requirement?

3. Did the lower court err in considering the issue of whether the City was prejudiced by the lack of LGTCA notice before Agnes Stokes presented evidence of good cause for her failure to comply with the notice requirement?

Ms. A. Stokes filed a cross-appeal, presenting the following question:

1. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict in favor of [c]ross-[a]ppellee, Doreatha Maynor, when there was credible evidence presented of her negligence?

Also on cross appeal, Ms. B. Stokes presents the following question:

1. Did the trial court err in directing verdicts in favor of [c]ross-[a]ppellees, Agnes Stokes and Doreatha Maynor, when there was credible evidence presented of their negligence?

For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse the judgments of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 15, 2009, appellee/cross-appellee, Doreatha Maynor (“Ms. Maynor”), was driving her automobile in the 600 Block of North Mount Street in Baltimore City approaching Edmondson Avenue. At the same time, appellee/cross-appellant, Agnes Stokes (“Ms. A. Stokes”), was driving down Edmondson Avenue with a passenger, Bertha Stokes (“Ms. B. Stokes”). Ms. Maynor entered the intersection without stopping and struck Ms. A. Stokes' vehicle, allegedly due to the fact that the stop sign at the intersection of North Mount Street and Edmondson Avenue was on the ground and not in the proper standing position. Police responded to the scene and took a police report, which noted that the stop sign that is normally at the intersection was on the ground instead of standing upright in its correct position.

On December 11, 2009, Ms. Maynor's insurance company, State Farm, sent a letter to the City Solicitor, informing the City of a potential claim Ms. Maynor had for property damages to her vehicle. This letter was sent pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”), Maryland Code, (2006, Repl.Vol. 2013), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article [hereinafter Cts. & Jud. Proc.] § 5–304(b)–(c)(3)(i),² which requires that a claimant file notice within 180 days of the date of the alleged tort. On February 24, 2012, Ms. A. Stokes filed a lawsuit in trial court against Ms. Maynor for injuries resulting from the automobile accident. Ms. Maynor filed a third-party complaint against the City, alleging negligence. According to Ms. Maynor, the stop sign was on the ground as a result of a prior automobile accident that the City was aware of, yet it had not repaired the sign. Ms. B. Stokes filed a complaint against Ms. A. Stokes, Ms. Maynor and the City.

In May 2012, the City moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to dismiss, arguing that neither Ms. Maynor, nor Ms. B. Stokes properly complied with LGTCA's notice requirement. Judge Nance denied the motion, finding that Ms. Maynor's letter from State Farm satisfied the notice requirement for both her and Ms. B. Stokes because the letter was sufficientto inform the City of their claims. He also found that, in the alternative, Ms. B. Stokes had good cause for not strictly complying. Following this hearing, Ms. A. Stokes amended her complaint to include claims against the City. The City then moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, to dismiss Ms. A. Stokes' claims, asserting that she had failed to comply with the LGTCA's notice requirement. Arguments were held before Judge Murdock, who denied the motion, finding that Ms. Maynor's timely letter was sufficient to put the City on notice and that Ms. A. Stokes had therefore substantially complied with the notice requirement.

The case proceeded to trial on March 28, 2013. At the conclusion of the evidence, Ms. Maynor and Ms. A. Stokes moved for judgment. The trial court granted the motions. Accordingly, the jury only decided whether the City was liable for the injuries suffered by the parties. The jury returned a verdict against the City. The City noted a timely appeal against Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes, challenging the motions courts' findings ³ that they had substantially complied with the LGTCA's notice requirement. Ms. A. Stokes noted a cross-appeal against Ms. Maynor, challenging the trial court's grant of Ms. Maynor's motion for judgment. Ms. B. Stokes also noted a cross-appeal, against Ms. Maynor and Ms. A. Stokes, challenging the trial court's grant of their respective motions for judgment.

Additional facts shall be provided infra, to the extent they prove relevant in addressing the issues presented.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's finding that there was substantial compliance with the LGTCA's notice requirement or good cause for failing to comply with the notice requirement under an abuse of discretion standard. See Moore v. Norouzi, 371 Md. 154, 168, 807 A.2d 632 (2002). “An abuse of discretion exists when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court [ ] ... or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court[ ] ... or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic.” Mitchell v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, 200 Md.App. 176, 205, 26 A.3d 1012 (2011) (citing Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 198, 867 A.2d 1077 (2005)) (internal quotations omitted).

I. APPEAL

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the City contends that appellee's claims are barred due to their failure to comply with the LGTCA's notice requirement. It advances three arguments in support. First, that the court erred in finding that both parties had substantially complied with the notice requirement. Second, that the court erred in finding that they had good cause for failing to comply. Third, that the court erred in considering whether the City was prejudiced by the lack of notice before appellees had presented evidence of their good cause failure.

1. Was there substantial compliance with the LGTCA's notice requirement?

The City argues the motions courts erred in denying its motions for summary judgment against the Stokes appellees because they did not substantially comply with the notice requirement. The automobile accident occurred on November 15, 2009. On December 11, 2009, Ms. Maynor's insurance company filed a Statement of Claim as to property damage with the City. Neither Ms. A. Stokes nor Ms. B. Stokes filed a similar claim. Prior to trial, the City filed two separate motions for summary judgment or, in the alternative, motions to dismiss, against Ms. A. Stokes and Ms. B. Stokes respectively, asserting that their claims were barred for failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement. Each motion was heard before a different judge, yet both motions were denied after the respective judges found that both parties had substantially complied with the notice requirement, by virtue of the State Farm Statement of Claim.

The LGTCA was enacted to provide a remedy for members of the public who are injured by tortious acts of employees of local governments. See Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 107–08, 660 A.2d 447 (1995). It requires that local governments in Maryland defend lawsuits resulting from torts committed by its officers and employees within the scope of employment. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–302(a). In order to maintain a civil action against a local government or its employees, an injured party must provide notice to the designated government official within 180 days of the injury. See Rios v. Montgomery County, 157 Md.App. 462, 480, 852 A.2d 1005 (2004) (“Serving timely notice is essential to preserve a claimant's right to file suit at any time during the limitations period.”); see also§ 5–304(b)(1). Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 5–304(b)–(c)(3)(i), the LGTCA's notice...