Mays v. Bd. of Comm'rs Port of New Orleans
| Decision Date | 29 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION CASE NO. 14-1014 SECTION: "G"(3) |
| Parties | KIM L. MAYS v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS PORT OF NEW ORLEANS, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Defendants Board of Commissioners, Port of New Orleans' (the "Port") and Ryan Bylsma's ("Bylsma") (collectively, "Defendants") "Motion for Summary Judgment."1 Having considered the motion, the memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part.
According to the original complaint in this matter, Plaintiff Kim Mays is an African-American female and veteran of the United States Army who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").3 She initially filed this lawsuit against her employer, the Port, as well as against two Port employees: Bylsma and Armand Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), although all claims againstRodriguez were dismissed with prejudice on July 6, 2015, and he is no longer a party to this case.4
Plaintiff initially alleged that Defendants violated her rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985; Title VII; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"); and Louisiana state discrimination statutes. She additionally brought causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and conspiracy. The Court has twice granted motions to dismiss in this case, dismissing the claims for IIED and conspiracy. Therefore, the only claims remaining in the case are Mays' claims pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, the FMLA, state law discrimination, and retaliation.5
Mays was first hired by the Port in June 2011 as an Administrative Coordinator.6 Plaintiff alleges in her original complaint that, in July 2011, Rodriguez made an "inappropriate sexually oriented remark" to her.7 She alleges that she reported the incident to her immediate supervisor, but claims that "the only actions taken by the Port's management was [sic] to counsel Mr. Rodriguez and request that he apologize."8 On August 1, 2012, Mays complained of generalized race discrimination.9 On August 10, 2012, Human Resources responded to the complaint, but Mays did not follow up afterward.10
Bylsma became Mays' supervisor toward the end of 2013 or beginning of 2014.11 Defendants contend, and Plaintiff contests, that in anticipation of Plaintiff eventually coming under his direct supervision, Bylsma made plans in March 2013 to have Plaintiff share an office with another administrative coordinator near Bylsma's office.12 Plaintiff asserts that on November 23, 2013, Rodriguez sent her "an inappropriate e-mail that was sexual in nature," which she reported to Bylsma, who was her supervisor at the time.13 Defendants claim, and Plaintiff contests, that the e-mail in question was sent to a group of individuals, including males and females, and both former and current Port employees.14 Mays did not read the body of the e-mail, but only the subject line.15 On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff alleged that she had been sexually harassed by Rodriguez's e-mail.16 On that same date, Gwen Hager ("Hager"), who worked in human resources, asked Mays about the e-mail address used by Rodriguez.17 On December 2, 2013, Rodriguez was issued a restriction forbidding further e-mails to Mays, regardless of content, and limiting all other communication to essential work communications.18 The following day, on December 3, 2013, Hager e-mailed Plaintiff to set up a time to discuss her complaint.19 Mays did not respond to Hager'se-mail, and after receiving Rodriguez's e-mail, Mays did not see Rodriguez in person again.20
On December 4, 2013, Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Costales, requested the Port allow Plaintiff "reasonable accommodation of working from home; working from space where [Rodriguez] is not; or moving [Rodriguez] from her workspace," and advised that Plaintiff was not released to work.21 On December 6, 2013, Bylsma placed Rodriguez on suspension pending an investigation pursuant to Civil Service Rule 12.10.22 Plaintiff was informed on December 8 and 11, 2013 that Rodriguez had been suspended and was no longer at work.23 Rodriguez never returned to the Port and retired on January 15, 2014.24 However, Plaintiff informed Bylsma that it was "impossible" for her to come up with a return to work plan on December 11, 2013, and on the following day, December 12, 2013, Bylsma requested that the Port proceed by terminating Mays.25
Defendants contend, and Plaintiff contests, that the Port issued a pre-deprivation notice under Civil Service Rule 12.6(a)(1) to Mays on December 13, 2013, and that after the notice had been mailed, the Port received notice from the EEOC that Mays had filed a charge with the agency.26 Plaintiff alleges in her original complaint, however, that she filed a charge with the EEOC on December 4, 2013, and that in retaliation for filing that charge, the Port issued a "pre-deprivation notice recommendation for a non-disciplinary removal," removed her name plate from her officedoor, packed her personal items from her office, removed her name from the organizational chart, and conspired to place her in a shared office.27 On December 18, 2013, Plaintiff notified the Port that she was exercising her FMLA rights.28 Her leave request was approved, as was a prior FMLA leave request in August and September of 2013.29
On January 16, 2014, the Port rescinded the pre-deprivation notice.30 Although Mays filed a Civil Service appeal regarding the December 13, 2013 pre-deprivation notice, the Civil Service Commission dismissed her appeal as premature because she had not been removed from her position.31 By the time Plaintiff returned to the Port on December 23, 2013, her nameplate had been restored.32 Furthermore, Mays received a restricted leave memorandum on December 23, 2013 requiring her to get pre-approval for annual leave and to provide medical documentation for sick leave.33 Mays continued to take and be granted leave after being placed on a restricted leave policy.34 Defendants contend, and Plaintiff contests, that Rodriguez was also placed on a restrictive leave policy by the Port from April 24, 2006 through July 8, 2007.35
On April 8, 2014, Dr. Costales requested that Plaintiff be given the accommodation ofmoving back into her personal office or another private space.36 The Port contacted Plaintiff on April 10, April 21, and May 8 of 2014 regarding her ADA accommodation request, and asked Plaintiff to complete a medical authorization so that the Port could evaluate the request.37 Defendants contend, and Plaintiff contests, that Mays did not respond to the Port's requests for ADA documentation.38 Defendants also assert, and Plaintiff contests, that on May 27, 2014, Plaintiff's therapist contacted Bylsma and reported that Plaintiff had made a threat against Bylsma and advised that he should take precautions and contact law enforcement.39
Mays has been on leave from Port without pay since May 2014.40 She was never demoted or suspended, and her pay rate did not decrease.41
Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this matter on May 2, 2014.42 On June 17, 2014, Port and Bylsma filed a "Rule 12(b)(6) Partial Motion to Dismiss."43 In a March 18, 2015 Order, the Court: (1) dismissed Plaintiff's Title VII and ADA claims against Bylsma in his individual and official capacities; (2) dismissed Plaintiff's state law discrimination claims against Bylsma; (3) granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to allege Title VII and ADA claims against the Port;(4) granted the Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to sufficiently allege IIED claims against the Port and Bylsma; (5) granted Plaintiff leave to amend to sufficiently allege her conspiracy claim under sections 1981 and 1985 against the Port and Bylsma; (6) granted Plaintiff leave to amend to sufficiently allege her section 1983 claim against the Port and Bylsma; (7) dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages under the ADA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 against the Port; (8) dismissed Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Bylsma under Title VII and the ADA; and (9) dismissed Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages under the FMLA and Louisiana state law against the Port and Bylsma.44
Plaintiff subsequently filed three amended complaints.45 On April 16, Defendants filed another motion to dismiss.46 Armand Rodriguez filed his own motion to dismiss on May 11, 2015.47 On July 6, 2015, the Court granted Rodriguez's motion to dismiss in full and Defendants' motion in part, thereby dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's claims for IIED and for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 against both Port and Bylsma, as well as her request for punitive damages against Bylsma.48 Thus, the claims remaining in the case are Mays' claims pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, the FMLA, state law discrimination, and retaliation.49
On September 15, 2015, Defendants filed the pending motion for summary judgment on allclaims remaining in the case.50 Plaintiff filed an opposition on September 22, 2015.51 On September 29, 2015, Defendants sought leave of Court to file a reply,52 which Plaintiff challenged.53 On October 22, 2015, the Court rejected Plaintiff's challenge and granted leave for Defendants to file a reply.54 On the same date, the Court granted leave for Plaintiff to file a sur-reply.55
Defendants first argue, as a preliminary matter, that Mays testified that FMLA determinations at the Port were handled by Heather Horan in Human Resources, and that, as such, Mays' FMLA claim against Blysma should be dismissed.56 Next, Defendants state that to establish a prima facie FMLA interference case, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she was an eligible employee; (2) the defendant was an employer...
To continue reading
Request your trial