Mays v. Buckeye Electric Cooperative Inc. & Parker
| Decision Date | 26 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-3918,00-3918 |
| Citation | 277 F.3d 873 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2002) Charlotte Mays, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Buckeye Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Frederick B. Parker, Defendants-Appellees. Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. No. 98-00655--Susan J. Dlott, District Judge.
Gary M. Smith, (argued and briefed), Kimberly M. Skaggs (briefed), Equal Justice Foundation, Columbus, OH, for Charlotte Whitney Mays.
William R. Case (argued and briefed), Michael N. Beekhuizen (briefed), Thompson, Hine & Flory LLP, Columbus, OH, for Buckeye Rural Electric Co-op
William R. Case (argued and briefed), Thompson, Hine & Flory LLP, Columbus, OH, for Frederick B. Parker.
Before: JONES and CLAY, Circuit Judges; DOWD, District Judge.*
Plaintiff, Charlotte Mays, appeals from the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's claims of discrimination on the basis of marital status, pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691(a)(1), and provisions of Regulation B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. 202; deprivation of "due process and natural justice;" and violations of Ohio statutes and common law. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM IN PART, VACATE IN PART, AND REMAND with instructions to dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff's claim of a deprivation of due process and natural justice.
Defendant Buckeye Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Buckeye"), a non-profit cooperative electrical utility, is the exclusive provider of electricity in nine counties in southeastern Ohio. Defendant Buckeye's electricity customers are members of the corporation and elect Buckeye's governing board of trustees. Defendant Frederick B. Parker is Buckeye's vice president of finance.
In 1987, while Plaintiff was married to Larry Mays ("Mays"), Mays sought electricity service from Defendants. Defendants supplied Plaintiff and Mays with a membership application form. Describing itself as a "joint use application," the form required "husband and wife" to complete it and provided separate lines for the signatures and social security numbers of "Applicant" and "Spouse." Mays signed as "Applicant" and Plaintiff signed as "Spouse." After accepting the application for service, Defendants addressed electricity bills to "LARRY E MAYS."
In October of 1997, Plaintiff filed for divorce from Mays. Mays then moved out of the couple's home and into a camper located on the jointly-owned real estate. Mays supplied electricity to the camper via extension cords connecting the camper with the home. While living in the camper, Mays began neglecting work and failing to pay bills. By January of 1998, the account serving the home and camper was in arrears and Defendants disconnected electricity service. Within a month, Plaintiff secured a restraining order against Mays and forced him to leave the property. Plaintiff, who had never worked outside the home, then obtained gainful employment.
On March 10 or 11, 1998, about two months after Defendants disconnected service, Plaintiff sought to establish an individual account with Defendants and restore electricity to the home. Plaintiff telephoned Defendants and learned she could not restore service to the home until the entire outstanding balance on the disconnected account was satisfied. Defendants later informed Plaintiff she could obtain an individual account without satisfying the outstanding balance if she documented her separation or divorce from Mays and documented Mays' individual responsibility for the disconnected account.
On September 2, 1998, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants for discrimination on the basis of marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. 1691(a)(1), and provisions of Regulation B of the ECOA, 12 C.F.R. 202.5(c) and (d); 202.9(a), (b), and (c); and 202.7(a), (b), and (d).1 Plaintiff also asserted a due process deprivation claim and claims arising under Ohio statutes and common law, and sought certification of the litigation as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2).
On November 5, 1998, Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On January 6, 2000, Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hogan issued a Report and Recommendation regarding Defendants' dispositive motion. Because Plaintiff and Defendants had filed evidentiary materials outside the pleadings, the magistrate judge treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's ECOA and due process claims, and declining to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under Ohio law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367. The magistrate judge reasoned summary judgment was proper because: (1) the regulations Plaintiff relied upon for the ECOA claims exempted Defendants from compliance; (2) Plaintiff could not assert claims arising out of signing an electricity service application in 1987 because the two-year statute of limitations of 15 U.S.C. 1691e(f) had run; and (3) Defendants' actions did not constitute "state action" for due process purposes. The magistrate judge did not address Plaintiff's motion for class certification.
On June 20, 2000, the district court issued an order adopting the recommendations of the magistrate judge. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's claims arising under the ECOA, Federal Reserve Board regulations, and due process, and dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff's claims arising under Ohio statutes and common law. The district court did not rule on Plaintiff's motion for class certification.
The ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating against any credit applicant "with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or marital status." 15 U.S.C. 1691(a)(1). As an entity granting members the ability "to defer payment of a debt or to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment therefor," Defendant Buckeye is a "creditor" within the meaning of the ECOA. 15 U.S.C. 1691a(d); Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207, 1209 (6th Cir. 1997) (); see also Shaumyan v. Sidetex Co., Inc., 900 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (). "The purpose of the ECOA is to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for individual credit." Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., Assocs., Inc., 605 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
Given the similar purposes of the ECOA and Title VII, the burden-allocation system of federal employment discrimination law provides an analytical framework for claims of credit discrimination. See Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000) (). But see Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1998) (). Under this analytical framework, Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of credit discrimination by showing: (1) Plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) Plaintiff applied for credit from Defendants; (3) Plaintiff was qualified for the credit; and (4) despite Plaintiff's qualification, Defendants denied her credit application. See, e.g., Matthieusen v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 173 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999).
In concluding Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of credit discrimination on the basis of marital status pursuant to this framework, the magistrate judge effectively focused on the absence of the first element: Plaintiff's membership in a protected class. Rather than directly stating Plaintiff had failed to satisfy this element, however, the magistrate judge concluded that many of the Federal Reserve Board regulations named in Plaintiff's complaint exempted Defendants from compliance. In other words, Plaintiff could not show she was a member of a protected class because the Federal Reserve Board regulations establishing certain of her claims did not apply to Defendants. Specifically, the magistrate judge determined that Defendants provide "incidental credit" as defined in 12 C.F.R. 202.3(c)(1), and were therefore entitled to exemptions listed in 202.3(c)(2). Summary judgment, the magistrate judge recommended, would be appropriate on Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to regulations for which 202.3(c)(2) provided compliance exemptions. The magistrate judge also recommended summary judgment on Plaintiff's statutory and regulatory claims outside the exemption provisions, concluding that the two-year statute of limitations of 15 U.S.C. 1691e(f) barred those claims.
Although the magistrate judge addressed Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims in summary judgment terms, the district court, in adopting the magistrate judge's recommendations, did not specifically grant summary judgment. Instead, the district court characterized its order as granting Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's claims arising under federal law, and dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff's claims arising under state law. Because the district court and the magistrate judge looked to materials beyond Plaintiff's complaint in ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pfennig v. Household Credit Services, Inc.
...under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we are limited to reviewing the facts as they appear in the complaint. Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 277 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2002); Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir.2000). Second, the plaintiff's assertion in her......
-
Beard v. Worldwide Mortgage Corp.
...to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment therefor....'" Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 277 F.3d 873, 873 (6th Cir.2002) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d) and holding that defendant was a creditor under the ECOA based on the definition ......
-
Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp.
...qualified for the credit; and (4) that their credit applications were denied despite their qualifications. Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 277 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation The elements for a prima facie case under ECOA can be adapted to the Plaintiffs' reverse redlining clai......
-
RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC
...women, especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for individual credit.” Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Coop., 277 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir.2002) (quotation marks omitted). In Congress' judgment, one's marital status—along with race, religion, and other traits, wh......