Mays v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 17 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. S149455.,S149455.
• Citation: 180 P.3d 935,74 Cal.Rptr.3d 891,43 Cal.4th 313
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Jon MAYS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

74 Cal.Rptr.3d 891

43 Cal.4th 313

180 P.3d 935

Jon MAYS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S149455.

Supreme Court of California.

April 17, 2008.

Diane Marchant, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine, Stephen H. Silver, Santa Monica, Enrique A. Hernandez, Los Angeles, Susan Silver and Elizabeth Silver Tourgeman, Santa Monica, for Los Angeles Protective League and California Association of Highway Patrolmen as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Clishman & Sortor, William H. Sorter, San Francisco, and Lawrence J. Friedman for Peace Officers Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorney, and Gerald Masahiro Sato, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.

GEORGE, C.J.

This case concerns the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. (Gov.Code, § 3300 et seq.)¹ Section 3304, subdivision (d) (section 3304(d)), provides a limitations period specifying that "no punitive action" may be imposed upon any public safety officer for alleged misconduct unless the public agency investigating the allegations "complete[s] its investigation and notifie[s] the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action" within one year of discovering the alleged misconduct. We granted review to address the question of whether the notice required by section 3304(d) is satisfied by informing an accused officer, within the statutory one-year period, that the agency proposes that certain misconduct charges "be adjudicated by a Board of Rights."

In the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), a "Board of Rights" is an administrative tribunal charged under the Los Angeles City Charter (L.A.Charter) with the adjudication of charges of police officer misconduct. (L.A.Charter, § 1070(a).) At the conclusion of a Board of Rights hearing, the board is required to make a finding of "guilty" or "not guilty" on each charge and to prescribe, for any positive finding of misconduct, a penalty from a specified range of disciplinary options including reprimand, suspension, demotion, and dismissal. (Id., § 1070(n).) The Los Angeles Chief of Police (Chief of Police) has the discretion to accept or reduce, but not to increase, any punishment recommended by the Board of Rights. (Id., § 1070(p).)

The Court of Appeal held that a notice informing plaintiff that the LAPD was proposing to the Chief of Police that several counts of misconduct "be adjudicated by a Board of Rights" failed to comply with section 3304(d) because the notice did not specifically identify any contemplated punishment or discipline. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon language from Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1069, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 188 (Sanchez). The Court of Appeal also concluded that a second notice subsequently provided to plaintiff, although sufficiently specific, was served upon him too late— slightly more than one year after discovery of the alleged misconduct. Accordingly, the appellate court directed the trial court to issue a writ of mandate setting aside the discipline (a written reprimand) that ultimately was imposed upon plaintiff for the misconduct at issue.

We conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in interpreting section 3304(d) to require notice of specific proposed punishment. To the contrary, the notice contemplated by the language and context of section 3304(d) is simply notice that the public agency, having completed its investigation into the alleged misconduct within the statutory period, has decided that it may take disciplinary action against the officer for specified misconduct. Although the agency is not precluded from proposing specific discipline at that time, it is not required by section 3304(d) to do so. A notice informing an officer of a proposed Board of Rights adjudication not only informs him or her that disciplinary action may be taken as the result of the investigation into the alleged misconduct—the notice required by the statute—but also identifies the procedural mechanism by which the officer's punishment, if any, will be determined. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is therefore reversed.

I.

We provide only a very brief summary of the facts of this case sufficient to enable us to address the question upon which review was granted. On July 23, 2002, plaintiff, Sergeant Jon Mays, received a written form entitled "Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action" from his employer, the LAPD. The notice and related materials advised plaintiff that he faced disciplinary charges for, among other things, failing to (1) adequately secure confidential department materials or (2) promptly report their loss.² This.form listed four "penalties" that could be proposed to the Chief of Police for misconduct involving sworn tenured employees: (1) suspension for a specified period of days; (2) demotion to a specified rank; (3) suspension for a specified period of days plus demotion to a specified rank; or (4) "[t]hat the matter be adjudicated by a Board of Rights."³ Only the last option was checked on the form provided to plaintiff.⁴ Accordingly, the notice informed plaintiff that the LAPD was proposing to the Chief of Police that the disciplinary charges alleged against plaintiff go forward and be adjudicated by a Board of Rights.

Section 1070(n) of the L.A. Charter sets forth the possible punishment that may be prescribed by a Board of Rights upon a positive finding of officer misconduct. These options range from reprimand to removal. (See L.A. Charter, § 1070(n); Board of Rights Manual (12th ed.2005) § 272.30.) But, following a series of procedural complications that are not relevant to the issue before us, two of the charges of alleged misconduct contained in the July 23, 2002 notice—that is (1) the failure to secure confidential materials adequately and (2) the failure to report their loss promptly—ultimately were not submitted to a Board of Rights hearing, but instead were sustained by the Chief of Police in the official letter of reprimand at issue in this case.⁵

Plaintiff challenged the reprimand by initiating an administrative appeal and filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. In the writ proceeding, plaintiff asserted, among other claims, that the notice he received on July 23, 2002, did not satisfy section 3304(d), because no specific penalty was mentioned. The trial court denied the petition, finding that plaintiff was adequately notified within one year of the "proposed disciplinary action," as required by section 3304(d) when he received the July 23, 2002 notice.

The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding in relevant part that the notice received by plaintiff on July 23, 2002, although given within one year of discovery of the alleged misconduct, was insufficient to satisfy section 3304(d), because it informed him only of the action proposed to the Chief of Police that the misconduct be adjudicated by a Board of Rights, and "did not specify any `proposed disciplinary action' as explicitly required by section [3304(d) ]." We granted review to address the Court of Appeal's holding that section 3304(d) requires that an accused officer be notified of a specific proposed discipline.

II.

This case calls upon us to interpret a provision of the Peace Officers Bill of Rights Act. Initially enacted in 1976 (Stats. 1976, ch. 465, § 1, p. 1202), POBRA "sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers [citation] by the public entities which employ them. It is a catalogue of the minimum rights [citation] the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations [citation]." (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135, 185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874; see also White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681, 183 Cal.Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191 [noting that POBRA "is concerned primarily with affording individual police officers certain procedural rights during the course of proceedings which might lead to the imposition of penalties against them"].) The various procedural protections provided by POBRA "balance the public interest in maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the police force with the police officer's interest in receiving fair treatment." (Jackson v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 899, 909, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 (Jackson), citing Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 569, 273 Cal.Rptr. 584, 797 P.2d 608.)

Section 3304 provides a number of procedural rights for public safety officers who may be accused of misconduct in the course of their employment. Subdivision (d), providing for a limitations period, states in pertinent part: "Except [as otherwise provided,] no punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission or other allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed within one year of the public agency's discovery ... of an act, omission, or other misconduct. This one-year limitation period shall apply only if the act, omission, or other misconduct occurred on or after January 1, 1998. In the event that the public agency determines that discipline may be taken, it shall complete its investigation and notify the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action within that year, except [as specifically provided]." (§ 3304(d).)⁶

At issue in this appeal is the meaning of the language in section 3304(d) requiring a public agency to "notify the public safety officer of its proposed disciplinary action." Defendants contend that the quoted language requires only that notice of the misconduct charges be provided. Plaintiff and the Court of Appeal, however, view section 3304(d) as mandating notice of...