Mays v. Kirk

• Decision Date: 20 August 1969
• Docket Number: No. 26568.,26568.
• Citation: 414 F.2d 131
• Parties: John D. MAYS and Laura F. Mays, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Claude R. KIRK, Jr., as Governor, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

414 F.2d 131 (1969)

John D. MAYS and Laura F. Mays, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Claude R. KIRK, Jr., as Governor, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 26568.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

July 10, 1969.

Rehearing Denied August 20, 1969.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen. of Fla., J. Kenneth Ballinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for appellants.

John B. L'Engle, J. Turner Butler, Jacksonville, Fla., for appellees.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and GEWIN and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

This non-diversity action involves the title to certain land in St. John's County, Florida. Because title suits are not the customary business of the Federal Courts,¹ this Court has closely examined the question of federal jurisdiction and, after calling for supplemental briefs, has concluded that this case does not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. A. § 1331. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court should have dismissed the action for want of a substantial federal question.

This action is characterized by the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Mays,² as a "suit to remove a cloud on title" — a designation that we accept for purposes of this appeal. The cloud on title is a conveyance, made in 1882, from the United States to the State of Florida, pursuant to the Swamp Lands Act of 1850, 43 U. S.C.A. § 982 et seq. Mays makes the double-barreled contention that the United States did not own the land it purported to transfer and that the land was not "swamp and overflowed" within the meaning of the Act.³

The characterization of the action as one to remove a cloud is critical to Mays's case because it provides an escape from, or at least a path around, the usual rule of federal jurisdiction that the plaintiff is not permitted to anticipate defenses in his complaint. See generally C. Wright, Federal Courts § 18, at 53-55 (1963). There are two essential elements in a cause of action to remove a cloud on title. The plaintiff must prove facts showing (1) his own title and (2) the existence and invalidity of the instrument or record sought to be eliminated as a cloud upon the title. Hopkins v. Walker, 1917, 244 U.S. 486, 37 S.Ct. 711, 61 L.Ed. 1270. See also Woodruff v. Taylor, Fla. Ct.App., 1960, 118 So.2d 822. Thus, although the inclusion in the complaint of matter covered by element (2) might under usual principles be considered the anticipation of a defense, it is settled that these allegations are proper in this kind of action and may provide the source of a federal question. Hopkins v. Walker, supra. See generally 1 Moore, Fed. Practice ¶ 0.608-3, at 632-34 (2d ed. 1964).

Mays contends that federal questions appear both in the allegations in his complaint relating to his own title and in those relating to the cloud on title (the claim of the State of Florida). We shall discuss each group of allegations separately and state our reasons for holding that no federal question appears in either.

First, Mays traces his own title in almost exactly the same manner as the plaintiff in an earlier case in this court, Huckins v. Duval County, 5 Cir., 1960, 286 F.2d 46, cert. denied, 1961, 366 U.S. 945, 81 S.Ct. 1673, 6 L.Ed.2d 856. Briefly, Mays claims that the land in question was first deeded to a private owner in an eighteenth century Spanish land grant. Claiming that from that time forward the land remained privately owned, he then traces the title through the Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits in 1819, several statutes enacted by Congress in the 1820's to implement certain parts of the Treaty, an allegedly erroneous Government survey in 1834, and eventually up to the present.⁴ Accordingly, Mays contends that his rights in the land were created by a treaty and laws of the United States and are an essential element in his cause of action, and also that these rights will be supported if the treaty or laws receive one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.

The test of federal question jurisdiction is a familiar one:

"To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff\'s cause of action. * * * The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another."

Gully v. First National Bank, 1936, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97, 81 L.Ed. 70, 72. See also Fountain v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 5 Cir., 1967, 387 F.2d 343. The same rule applies where a treaty is relied upon. Hidalgo County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 7 v. Hedrick, 5 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 1956, 350 U.S. 983, 76 S.Ct. 469, 100 L.Ed. 851. Applying this test to the allegations in the complaint related to Mays's title, we hold that this case is controlled by the principles enunciated in Huckins v. Duval County, supra:

"Here, it may be said, there is a right claimed by the appellants which was created by a treaty and laws of the United States and such right is an essential element of the appellants\' cause of action. But it is not such that it will be supported if the treaty or laws receive one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.

"The appellants, in stating the question involved, make the assertion that the treaty and the congressional acts `should be construed\' as fixing the northern boundary of the grant. The appellants, in their complaint, allege that the appellees contend that the congressional acts should be construed as requiring a survey before the title was complete and so authorized the United States to change the boundary of the grant, and hence, the appellants urge, there is Federal jurisdiction. The appellees do not find any such question presented nor do we.

"We are unable to see any necessity for a construction of the Treaty or the Acts of Congress in order to make a disposition of the case.

"The question here is one of conflicting claims as to the boundaries of the land embraced within the Spanish grant to Atkinson. The answer to the question may involve a construction of the grant, a determination of the consequences of the proceedings held and the action taken by the Commissioners, a decision as to the validity of the patent to the State of Florida, or an ascertaining of the effect of the Government surveys. There may be presented some or all of these questions. There may be issues of fact which require adjudication. It is not enough for the plaintiffs to show that their claim is dependent upon a treaty or on an act of Congress or that the adverse claim has its origin in a patent of the United States. To sustain the jurisdiction it must appear from the complaint `that the suit is one which really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy as to a right which depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United States; that the suit, in whole or in part, arose out of such controversy, or that a decision of the case depended upon such construction.\' Kirklin v. Ellerbe, 5 Cir., 1922, 278 F. 168, 170. The appellants do not make the required showing. The complaint was properly dismissed." 286 F.2d at 49.

In summary, the question whether the land involved in this case was owned by the United States or by a private individual at the time the Federal Government purported to convey it to Florida (see note 4 supra) simply does not present a federal question. Apparently, the District Judge too felt that under Huckins Mays's allegations of title did not present a substantial federal question for he turned to the allegations dealing with the cloud on title to find a jurisdictional foundation.

As previously stated, the cloud on the title is the patent of the United States to the State of Florida pursuant to the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850. One of Mays's contentions is that the land purportedly conveyed to the State was not "swamp and overflowed lands" within the meaning of the statute, 43 U.S.C.A. § 982.⁵ In overruling the State's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, the District Judge held that the question whether the lands were in fact swamp and overflowed lands within the meaning of the Act presented a valid federal question. We cannot agree.

For jurisdictional purposes a federal question must be substantial and not frivolous. See Gully v. First National Bank, 1936, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70. See generally 1 W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 25 (Wright ed. 1960). Substantiality may be determined by a two-pronged test:

"Lack of substantiality in a federal question may appear either because it is obviously without merit or because its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of the Supreme Court as to foreclose the subject."

California Water Serv. Co. v. City of Redding, 1938, 304 U.S. 252, 255, 58 S.Ct. 865, 867, 82 L.Ed. 1323, 1325; Green v. Board of Elections, 2 Cir., 1967, 380 F.2d 445, cert. denied, 1968, 389 U.S. 1048, 88 S.Ct. 768, 19 L.Ed.2d 840.

In evaluating the substantiality of the question asserted here, we have carefully considered the Swamp Lands Act of 1850 and the Supreme Court's decisions construing that Act. The Court's decision in United States v. O'Donnell, 1938, 303 U.S. 501, 58 S.Ct. 708, 82 L.Ed. 980, contains a useful, brief summary of the purpose and effect of the statute:

"The Swamp Lands Act of 1850 was effective to transfer an interest in the lands described in the Act, only so far as they were part of the public domain of the United States and thus subject to the disposal of Congress. The Act in terms purported to grant to the several states all swamp and overflowed lands located within their respective boundaries `which shall remain unsold at the passage of this Act.\' Section 2

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