Mays v. Springborn

• Decision Date: 11 August 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 01-CV-1254
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois
• Parties: TIBERIUS MAYS, Plaintiff, v. JEROME SPRINGBORN, et al., Defendants.

TIBERIUS MAYS, Plaintiff,
v.
JEROME SPRINGBORN, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 01-CV-1254

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS URBANA DIVISION

August 11, 2014

OPINION

On May 22, 2014, following the presentation of evidence at jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff Tiberius Mays and against Defendants Darryl Johnson and Michael Etheridge on Counts 2 and 3 of the Indictment. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant Jerome Springborn on Counts 2 and 3 of the Indictment and for Defendants Hantelmann and Hoyt on Count 1 of the Indictment. On Counts 2 and 3, the jury awarded Plaintiff a total of $2,500 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages against Defendants Johnson and Etheridge. Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial (#375) on June 24, 2014 and a Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (#381) on July 2, 2014. Those motions are now fully briefed. For the following reasons, both motions (#375, 379) are DENIED.

RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Defendants raise multiple arguments in their Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (#381). The court will address each argument in turn.

Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) states:

"If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No

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later than 28 days after the entry of judgment- or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged-the movant may file a motion for a renewed judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:

(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;

(2) order a new trial; or

(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).

In deciding a Rule 50 motion, the court construes the evidence strictly in favor of the party who prevailed before the jury and examines the evidence only to determine whether the jury's verdict could be reasonably based on that evidence. Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 659 (7^th Cir. 2012). The court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence and, although the court reviews the entire record, the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury was not required to believe. Passananti, 689 F.3d at 659. When faced with such a motion, the court is obliged to leave the judgment undisturbed unless the moving party can show that no rational jury could have brought in a verdict against it. Hossack v. Floor Covering Associates of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 859 (7^th Cir. 2007).

Qualified Immunity

Defendants first argue that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they were government officials performing discretionary functions that did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Plaintiff responds that he claimed, and the verdict indicates the jury believed, that Defendants made up the fact they saw a white substance in Plaintiff's anal cavity and subjected him to an invasive and humiliating cavity search. Plaintiff claims this was done in retaliation for his informing Defendants that they were violating prison rules and not properly doing their jobs. Plaintiff

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argues that such evidence, believed by the jury, is enough to overcome qualified immunity.

"Governmental actors performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from suits for damages 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7^th Cir. 2013), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "'Qualified immunity balances two important interests- the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officers from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Abbott, 705 F.3d at 713, quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). "To overcome the defendant's invocation of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show both (1) that the facts make out a constitutional violation, and (2) that the constitutional right was 'clearly established' at the time of the official's alleged misconduct." Abbott, 705 F.3d at 713. Once the qualified immunity defense is raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to defeat the defense and show that she had clearly established rights that the defendant violated. Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 404 (7^th Cir. 2012).

Under the facts adduced at trial, and testified to by Plaintiff, it is reasonable to find that qualified immunity did not apply. Based on Plaintiff's allegations and testimony, Defendants subjected him to an extended and humiliating strip search, against prison rules, in retaliation for Plaintiff exercising his First Amendment rights. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants were able to understand from the relevant case law that the strip search violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. However, "some governmental actions are so clearly beyond the pale that a reasonable person should have known of their unconstitutionality even without a closely analogous case." Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1022 (7^th Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit has held that federal courts have long recognized a prisoner's right to seek administrative or judicial remedy of conditions of confinement, and that a reasonable public

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official in Defendants' positions would understand that retaliating against a prisoner on the basis of his complaints about prison conditions is unlawful. See Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 741-42 (7^th Cir. 2006). The court here construes the evidence strictly in favor of the non-moving party. The court agrees with Plaintiff that "[b]eing well aware of the prison rule against strip searches and having conducted a humiliating, retaliatory ruse against [Plaintiff] because he exercised his First Amendment right to complain about Defendants' breaking the prison rule, the constitutional violations are 'so obvious' that Defendants are thus not entitled to qualified immunity."

Personal Involvement of Defendants

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff cannot show Defendants were personally involved in his being taken to the healthcare unit, where he was forced to wear a short gown and was handcuffed, causing injury to his wrists. Plaintiff responds that Defendant Johnson instructed Defendant Etheridge, and possibly others, to carry out a retaliatory ruse against Plaintiff that led directly to a more extreme medical search.

Section 1983 requires "personal involvement" in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7^th Cir. 2010). In order for a supervisor to be liable under § 1983, they must be personally responsible for the deprivation of the constitutional right, and to show personal involvement, the supervisor must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7^th Cir. 2012).

The court agrees with Plaintiff that the evidence at trial, construed strictly in favor of Plaintiff, would allow a rational jury to find Defendants were personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. As noted by Plaintiff, both Defendants were aware of what would happen to Plaintiff when they escorted him to the healthcare unit. Defendant Johnson testified it was a frequent occurrence for prisoners suspected of having

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contraband to be taken to the healthcare unit. The court gave jurors instructions that Defendants' actions had to be the proximate cause of harm to Plaintiff. The court also provided a proximate cause instruction for the jury that defined proximate cause as "a cause that, in the natural or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff's injury. It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury." Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the court agrees with Plaintiff that a rational jury could have considered the evidence favorable to Plaintiff and made appropriate inferences that Defendants were personally involved and were the proximate cause of the constitutional deprivations and harm suffered by Plaintiff.

Was the Evidence Sufficient to Support a Finding of Violation of Constitutional Rights

Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to find they violated Plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. Plaintiff responds that he produced sufficient evidence at trial for a jury to find for him.

Under a sufficiency of the evidence claim on a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, the evidence available to the jury is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and the jury's verdict will only be reversed if no reasonable juror could have found in the non-moving...