Mays v. U.S., 85-2029

Decision Date05 December 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-2029,85-2029
Citation806 F.2d 976
PartiesRebel Ann MAYS and Everett F. Mays, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Nancy E. Rice, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Robert N. Miller, U.S. Atty., with her on the brief), for defendant-appellant.

Alan E. Richman, of Breit, Best, Richman and Bosch, Denver, Colo. (Patricia A. Pritchard, of Breit, Best, Richman and Bosch, Denver, Colo., with him on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, TACHA, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, * District Judge.

TACHA, Circuit Judge.

This case presents another opportunity to consider the application of the collateral source rule in Colorado. In Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978, (10th Cir., 1986), a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) decided this day, we held that Medicare hospital insurance benefits are a collateral source. In the present case we consider whether benefits received from the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) are a collateral source to a FTCA award.

Rebel Ann Mays, the wife of a retired member of the United States Air Force, died from cancer in 1982. This suit was filed by the Mayses against the United States claiming that the Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center (hospital) failed to diagnose and treat her for cancer. The district court found that the hospital had acted negligently and awarded damages of $504,300. 1 The government does not challenge the finding of liability. The only question raised before this court is whether the $195,055 in CHAMPUS benefits received by Rebel Ann Mays should be deducted from the damages awarded to the Mays.

In Berg, we recognized that Colorado has adopted the collateral source rule. At 984. Colorado courts have interpreted the collateral source rule to provide that "compensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 545, 481 P.2d 722, 724 (1971) quoted in Berg, at 984. A plaintiff in a FTCA suit can recover damages from the United States in addition to compensation from a collateral source. We held in Berg that government payments are collateral if the payments come from "a special fund that is separate and distinct from general government revenues" and to which the plaintiff has contributed. At 985. Our question in this case, therefore, is whether CHAMPUS benefits satisfy this test. 2

The CHAMPUS program provides medical benefits to, inter alia, the dependents of certain retired members of the armed services. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1079. "The funds used by the CHAMPUS program are appropriated funds furnished by the Congress through the annual Appropriations Act for the Department of Defense and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [now the Department of Health and Human Services]." 32 C.F.R. Sec. 199.7(e-1) (1985). All of the money for the CHAMPUS program comes from the general treasury of the United States; no money is paid directly into the fund by the recipients of CHAMPUS benefits. We cannot view these general appropriations to the CHAMPUS program as "a special fund that is separate and distinct from general government revenues." Berg, at 985. 3 CHAMPUS payments come exclusively from the general revenues of the United States. Therefore, such payments are not from a source collateral to the United States.

Everett Mays argues that his contribution to the CHAMPUS program consists of his twenty-one years of service in the Air Force. Rebel Ann Mays would not have been eligible for CHAMPUS benefits if her husband had not served at least twenty years in the armed services. 32 C.F.R. Sec. 199.9(b) (1985); 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1331(a)(2). This service, however, is not the type of contribution required by the collateral source rule. Rebel Ann Mays received CHAMPUS benefits because of her husband's status, not because of a monetary investment. A showing that one's status makes one eligible for government benefits is not a showing that one has "contributed to a special fund" from which benefits are now being received.

In Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.1977), we held that veterans disability benefits were not a collateral source in a FTCA suit. The military service that made the plaintiff eligible for veterans disability benefits was not regarded as a "contribution" in Steckler. 549 F.2d at 1379; see also, Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 933-34 (3d Cir.1964). Accordingly, we will not characterize the military service of Everett Mays as a contribution for the purposes of the collateral source rule here.

The plaintiffs also suggest that the CHAMPUS program...

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28 cases
  • Reilly v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 16 septembre 1988
    ...at least one circuit has ruled that CHAMPUS payments do not qualify for offset under a collateral source law. See Mays v. United States, 806 F.2d 976, 977 (10th Cir.1986) (CHAMPUS payments, because they derive exclusively from general federal revenues are not from a source "collateral" to t......
  • Wehner v. Weinstein
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    • West Virginia Supreme Court
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    ...on other grounds, 586 F.2d 1206 (1977); Mays v. United States, 608 F.Supp. 1476 (D.C.Colo.1985), reversed on other grounds, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 3184, 96 L.Ed.2d 673 (1987); Cincotta v. United States, 362 F.Supp. 386 (D.C.Md.1973); Szimonisz v.......
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    ...at twenty-five percent of such losses to reflect value of lost chance to survive; applying Colorado law), rev'd on other grounds, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 3184, 96 L.Ed.2d 673 (1987); James v. United States, 483 F.Supp. 581, 585-87 (N.D.Cal.1980) (......
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    ...covered51 or will be covered by Tricare/CHAMPUS on the basis that Tricare/CHAMPUS benefits are not a collateral source. Mays v. U.S., 806 F.2d 976, 977 (10th Cir.1986). The collateral source law in Maryland52 permits "an injured person to recover in tort the full amount of his provable dama......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Medical Malpractice
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 76, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...of damages method, has been followed by many courts. See, e.g., Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-83 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986); Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85......
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    ...Inc., 828 F.2d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 1987). 27. Mays v. United States, 608 F.Supp. 1476, 1482 (D.Colo. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986). 28. Ford v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 677 P.2d 358, 360 (Colo.App. 1983). 29. See C.J.I.---Civ.3d § 10:3A; Speiser, Krause and Madol......

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