Maytag v. United States
Citation | 493 F.2d 995 |
Decision Date | 30 January 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 73-1556.,73-1556. |
Parties | Cornelia H. MAYTAG, and the First National Bank of Colorado Springs, Colorado, as Co-Executors of the Estate of James B. Maytag, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
Mac Asbill, Jr., Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D. C. (William A. Sutherland and Carolyn P. Chiechi, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D. C., and Joseph F. Colantuno, Morrato, Gueck & Colantuno, Denver, Colo., on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.
William S. Estabrook, III, Atty. Tax Div., Dept. of Justice (Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks, Bennett N. Hollander and Robert S. Watkins, Attys., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, and James L. Treece, U. S. Atty., of counsel, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before HILL, BARRETT and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.
Appellants seek reversal of a United States District Court decision denying to the estate of James B. Maytag (the taxpayer) refund of federal estate taxes in the amount of $612,708.41, which sum was paid by appellant following ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the value of the assets of two inter vivos trusts were part of the taxable assets of the gross estate of James B. Maytag. The basis for the decision was that the decedent possessed a general power of appointment. Section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1
At trial both parties filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court denied taxpayers' motions and granted the government's motion for summary judgment. The court rendered a Memorandum Opinion and Order on November 6, 1972. Final judgment was entered on March 26, 1973.
The undisputed evidence shows that in 1944, Lewis B. Maytag created two inter vivos trusts for his son, decedent James B. Maytag. These were dated March 8, 1944 and December 20, 1944. Both were irrevocable and contained substantially identical provisions; James B. Maytag was designated the principal beneficiary in each.
The crucial provisions of the March trust called for mandatory distributions to decedent when he attained the ages of 21, 25 and 30,2 with "the entire remainder of the Estate in Trust" to be distributed to decedent upon his attaining the age of 35. The December trust provided for distribution of the entire corpus to the decedent when James reached the age of 40.3
The trusts named the First National Bank of Colorado Springs, Colorado as trustee. In addition, the settlor appointed two individual co-trustees, providing that the decedent would also become a co-trustee upon attaining the age of 21. The co-trustees were granted "the supreme power in respect to the management, administration and control of the Trust Estate," whereas the trustee was relieved of all responsibility "when acting in conformity with the directions and instructions of the co-trustees."
Both trust instruments contained the following discretionary termination provision:
The federal estate tax return filed for decedent's estate reflected a taxable estate of $1,146,449.83, which amount did not include the value of the 1944 trusts.
The Internal Revenue Service determined that the decedent possessed a general power of appointment at the time of his death and that the trusts were therefore to be included in the decedent's gross estate under § 2041. This determination was based on the theory that the decedent, as both a beneficiary and a co-trustee of the 1944 trusts, had the power (in conjunction with the trustee and the other co-trustee) to terminate the trusts and thereby to acquire all of the trust assets for himself.
The sole issue on appeal is then whether the discretionary termination provision in the trust instruments vested decedent with a general power of appointment over the trust property.
Assuming the existence of a general power of appointment, as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b) (1) there can be no question that the property to which that general power applies is included in decedent's estate for tax purposes. The fact that decedent had not exercised the power prior to his death would not change this. Peoples Trust Co. of Bergen County v. United States, 412 F.2d 1156, 1158 (3rd Cir. 1969). Nor is the fact that decedent shared the power with a corporate trustee or other co-trustee of significance. Jones v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 35 (1971), aff'd without opinion, 474 F.2d 1338 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820, 94 S.Ct. 115, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973). Appellants' sole argument in support of their position is that the trust provisions did not under Colorado law give the decedent the power to participate in a decision as co-trustee so as to allow him to distribute the trust property to himself as beneficiary and therefore he did not actually possess a general power of appointment.
Though this case arises under the federal estate tax laws, the issue in dispute turns on the proper interpretation of the meaning and effect of the trust provisions, a question governed by Colorado rather than federal law. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 60 S. Ct. 424, 84 L.Ed. 585, 1035 (1940); Peoples Trust Co. of Bergen County v. United States, supra, 412 F.2d at 1159. In construing or interpreting these trusts, the established guiding principle under Colorado law is that the intent of the settlor is to prevail unless that intent is in violation of public policy or statutory enactment. Ketcham v. International Trust Co., 117 Colo. 559, 192 P. 2d 426 (1948). Each trust is unique, requiring that it be examined independently in ascertaining the intent of the settlor.
Based upon the above general principles and on an examination of the trust instruments, we are convinced that the District Court reached the correct result and that the judgment must be affirmed. The settlor's specific appointment of decedent as a co-trustee, the extensive powers granted to him as a co-trustee under the trust instruments,4 and the settlor's clear expression of his desire that decedent play an active and authoritative role in management of the trusts once he reached the age of majority, together with the language of the trusts, support the conclusion that settlor intended that decedent participate in any decision to terminate the trusts prior to the time they would expire through disbursements to decedent according to the settlor's preferred schedule.
Further support for this conclusion as to the settlor's intent is found in the fact that in those instances when the settlor desired the decedent as co-trustee to be treated differently from the other co-trustees, he made specific provisions for such differing treatment. For example, the trusts specifically provide that the beneficiary as co-trustee cannot be removed from office, as can the other co-trustees. (March trust, Art. III, R. 52; December trust, Art. III, R. 83.) The beneficiary is specifically excluded from receiving compensation for performing functions of a co-trustee, while the other co-trustees are entitled to be compensated. (March trust, Art. IV, R. 52, 53; December trust, Art. IV, R. 83, 84.) And the beneficiary is specifically excluded from participating in a decision to distribute one-fourth of the corpus of the March trust to himself at any time after he became twenty-one (Art. X(16), R. 65).5
Appellants assert that a Colorado court considering this case would rule that, absent a very clear and specific expression of intent to the contrary by a settlor, a beneficiary of a trust is prohibited from participating as a trustee in any decision to distribute trust corpus to himself. Appellants concede there are no Colorado cases so holding. They depend on cases from other jurisdictions, primarily New York, to support their assertion that Colorado would adopt such a rule.6 These authorities are not persuasive in the present context. The New York cases are based on the fact that New York as a statute prohibiting beneficiaries from participating as trustees in decisions to distribute trust assets to themselves. Also, the cases cited by appellants involve instances of outright prohibitions on trustee activities as beneficiaries. Appellants here urge us to establish a Colorado rule of interpretation, not prohibition, which would still permit a...
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