Mayweather v. Rapelje

Decision Date27 June 2013
Docket NumberCase Number 10-15005
PartiesISAIAH MAYWEATHER, #311753, Petitioner, v. LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Petitioner, Michigan prisoner Isaiah Mayweather, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder, assault with intent to commit murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony following a jury trial in the Macomb County Circuit Court. He was sentenced as a second habitual offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the murder conviction, concurrent terms of 35 to 65 years' imprisonment on the assault, armed robbery, and conspiracy convictions, a concurrent term of one to five years' imprisonment on the felon in possession conviction, and a consecutive term of five years' imprisonment on the felony firearm conviction in 2008. In his pleadings, he raises claims concerning the trial court's refusal to suppress identification testimony, the admission of lay opinion testimony, and the admission of impeachment testimony. The claims lack merit and are barred by procedural default; the petitionwill be denied. A certificate of appealability will be denied as will leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

I

Petitioner's convictions arise from his conduct during a party store robbery and shooting that occurred in Eastpointe, Michigan on September 27, 2007. He acted that evening with co-defendant Winfred Roger Phillips. The facts were set forth by the Michigan Court of Appeals, and are presumed to be correct on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009). Those facts are as follows:

This case arises out of a robbery and shootings at a party store on Gratiot Avenue in Eastpointe on September 27, 2007. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Mayweather entered the store, purchased some cigar wrappers, and left. At approximately 10:45 p.m., Phillips entered the store wearing a white t-shirt, jeans, and a red bandana. Phillips walked to the back, where an employee, Mohammed Al-Harbi, was working. Seconds later, Mayweather, wearing a black shirt and carrying a black backpack, re-entered the store, approached the manager, Sinan Hanna, at the counter, and asked for a bottle of vodka. Hanna requested Mayweather's identification and Mayweather refused. At the same time, Hanna heard gunshots from the back of the store. Hanna observed Phillips, armed with a gun, chasing Al-Harbi from the store's kitchen toward the office, and heard additional gunshots. Al-Harbi eventually died after having been shot 11 times. While Phillips chased Al-Harbi, Mayweather pointed a gun at Hanna, moved behind the counter with the gun and stood two or three feet from Hanna. After Hanna opened the cash register and lottery drawers, he put his hands up and Mayweather took the contents of both drawers. Next, Mayweather demanded the store's security videotapes. Security cameras recorded the incident, but Hanna told Mayweather that the store was not equipped with them. Following this rebuff, Mayweather cursed at Hanna and shot Hanna in the head. Hanna survived his suffered injuries, requiring surgery and hospitalization for several days.
Following the robbery, the police released footage from the security cameras to the media. Consequently, the police received several tips identifying defendants as the perpetrators. One informant who immediately identified both defendants was Patricia Pitts. Pitts was formerly Phillips's foster mother, and had other children who are friends with Mayweather. Hanna also participated in a photographic lineup while he was recovering in the hospital. While he was unable to positively identify the person who shot him, he narrowed his choice to two photographs including Mayweather and another individual.
On the day after the robbery, Mayweather drove his wife's Intrepid to visit his sister, Barbara Hamilton. On direct examination by the prosecution, Hamilton denied that she and Mayweather discussed the incident at the store or watched the footage. She also denied that Mayweather requested she care for his children because he planned to leave town. Following Hamilton's testimony, the prosecution called Daniel Nash, Mayweather's parole agent, and Lieutenant Leo Borowsky, who each testified, over the objection by Mayweather, that she had discussed his involvement in the incident with Mayweather and that he requested she care for his children because he was leaving town. Mayweather did, in fact, leave Michigan, and he was arrested by police, after being located through the use of global positioning data, in a Chicago train station. At the time of his arrest, Mayweather initially provided a fictitious name to an officer, but then provided his given name and stated, "I'm the one you are looking for...." The police recovered $343 in small denominations from him and recovered a dozen $5 bills and five $20 bills from his home. The police also searched Mayweather's wife's Intrepid and recovered a $71 receipt for the delivery of 7-Up to the party store by a 7-Up distributor on September 27 at 11:31 a.m., 11 hours prior to the robbery. The store owner testified that this receipt would have been in the cash register at the time of the robbery.
Several days after the robbery, the police also arrested Phillips in a Grand Rapids home. In the basement of that home, the police recovered a red bandana and jeans similar to those worn by Al-Harbi's shooter.

People v. Mayweather, No. 288415, 2010 WL 364198, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2010) (unpublished). At the close of trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the charged offenses and the trial court sentenced him to the terms of imprisonment previously set forth.

Following sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising several claims of error, including the three claims presented on habeas review. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on those claims and affirmed his convictions and sentence. Id. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Mayweather, 788 N.W.2d 427 (2010).

Petitioner thereafter submitted his federal habeas petition, raising the following claims as grounds for relief:

I. The trial court violated his due process rights when it refused to suppress the identification testimony of Sinan Hanna, which was the product of an unduly suggestive identification procedure and lacked support independent of the tainted process.
II. The trial court violated his constitutional rights and state law by admitting opinion testimony concerning his guilt.
III. The trial court violated his due process rights when it admitted impeachment evidence that had the effect of a confession in the minds of the jury.

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied because the claims lack merit and are procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has filed a reply to that answer.

II

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which governs this case, permits a federal court to issue the writ only if the state court decision on a federal issue "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or it amounted to "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998).

Mere error by the state court does not justify issuance of the writ; rather, the state court's application of federal law "must have been objectively unreasonable." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (internal quotes omitted)). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct."); see also West v. Seabold,73 F.3d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The court gives complete deference to state court findings of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.").

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent, the Supreme Court explains, "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases . . . . A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.

A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established precedent, the Court explains, "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The Court cautions, however, that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. Unanimously emphasizing the limited nature of this review in Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), the Court reiterated that AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings: "A state court's determination that a [petitioner's] claim lacks merit precludes habeas...

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