Mayweathers v. Newland

• Decision Date: 10 April 2001
• Docket Number: DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,No. 00-16708,00-16708
• Parties: (9th Cir. 2001) KARLUK M. MAYWEATHERS; DIETRICH J. PENNINGTON; JESUS JIHAD; TERRANCE MATHEWS; ASWAD JACKSON; ANSAR KEES,, v. ANTHONY C. NEWLAND, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY; BARRY SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CAL A. TERHUNE; N. BENNETT; M.E. VALDEZ,,, 01-15170
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 930

258 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2001)

KARLUK M. MAYWEATHERS; DIETRICH J. PENNINGTON; JESUS JIHAD; TERRANCE MATHEWS; ASWAD JACKSON; ANSAR KEES, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. ANTHONY C. NEWLAND, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY; BARRY SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CAL A. TERHUNE; N. BENNETT; M.E. VALDEZ, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

No. 00-16708,, 01-15170

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted April 10, 2001--San Francisco, California

Filed August 2, 2001

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Counsel Jill T. Bowers, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for the defendants-appellants.

Shelley G. Bryant and Shanee Y. Williams, Certified Law Students; Susan D. Christian, Supervising Attorney, King Hall Civil Rights Clinic, University of California at Davis, for the plaintiffs-appellees.

D.C. No. CV-96-01582-LKK Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, Dorothy W. Nelson, and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

D.W. Nelson, Circuit Judge

California State Prison administrators appeal a preliminary injunction granted and later renewed by the district court in a class action brought by Muslim inmates at California State Prison, Solano ("Solano"). The injunctions forbade prison administrators from disciplining inmates for missing work to attend hour-long Friday Sabbath services called Jumu'ah. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Solano is a medium security prison about thirty-five miles southwest of Sacramento. Nearly 4,500 inmates out of a total of about 5,800 are enrolled in the prison's work incentive program, in which every day of participation may reduce their sentences by one day. Inmates serving life sentences cannot receive sentence reduction credits but still participate in the program. Prison administrators assign inmates to appropriate programs "with or without the inmate's consent. " Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15, 3040 (c) & (f) (2001).

If inmates miss work without the approval of their supervisors, they receive an unexcused absence, known as an"A day," which can be grounds for discipline. Being late or "absent without authorization from a work or program assignment" is an "administrative rule violation," id. at §§ 3314(a)(3)(H), and "[r]efusal to perform work or participate in a program as ordered or assigned" is a "serious rule violation." Id. at §§ 3315(a)(3)(J). The punishment for such violations includes suspension of privileges, confinement to quarters, forfeiture of up to thirty days of sentence credits, change in work incentive program eligibility, and transfer to a higher level prison. Id. at §§§§ 3314(e), 3315(f), 3323(h), 3375.

The plaintiff class in the present case is comprised of Muslim inmates at Solano. The plaintiffs allege that the work incentive program rules inhibit the free exercise of religion because missing work to attend Jumu'ah services may be grounds for discipline. According to witnesses for the plaintiffs, attendance at these services is commanded by the Qur'an, and these services differ from daily prayer in that they must be held collectively under the leadership of an Imam. Cf. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987). One of the named plaintiffs, Terrance Mathews, currently has a Friday work assignment and has received unexcused absences for attending Jumu'ah. None of the others currently has a Friday work or education assignment, but in the past, all have either missed Jumu'ah because of work or have received unexcused absences for leaving work to attend services.

On September 3, 1996, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on a number of issues regarding the treatment of Muslim inmates. The only issue relevant in the present appeal involves Jumu'ah services. The district court certified the class action on November 19, 1998, and allowed the plaintiffs to file a fifth amended complaint on January 28, 2000. On March 29, 2000, a magistrate judge entered findings and recommendations in support of a preliminary injunction to allow inmates "to attend Jumu'ah services during the pendency of this action without receiving disciplinary action or forfeiting good-time credits." The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations in an order filed on July 31, 2000. After the injunction was entered, Solano's warden ordered that prison officials must still record unexcused absences for inmates who leave work for Jumu'ah but that such absences would not subject those inmates to discipline. The defendants timely filed an interlocutory appeal of the first injunction.

The district court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") mandated that the preliminary injunction expire on October 29, 2000. Nevertheless, the court entered an identical preliminary injunction on December 19, 2000. Again, the defendants filed a timely interlocutory appeal. On March 2, 2001, this panel consolidated the two appeals.¹

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We reverse the grant of a preliminary injunction only when the district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact." Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). Standing is a question of law reviewed de novo. Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court's interpretation of the PLRA is reviewed de novo. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO SEEK INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Appellants argue that the representative plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit. In order to have standing, plaintiffs must allege "actual or imminent harm"; "merely the status of being subject to a governmental institution that was not organized or managed properly" does not raise a prisoner's claim to the level of a case or controversy. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that inmates in Arizona prisons did not have standing by virtue of being prisoners to bring suit alleging that inadequate libraries deprived them of meaningful access to the courts. Rather, to satisfy standing requirements, an inmate must "demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library . . . hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. at 351.

The plaintiffs in the present case have standing not merely because they are Muslim prisoners. Rather, one named plaintiff currently has a Friday work assignment and has received unexcused absences for attending Jumu'ah services. The other plaintiffs testified that they have either received unexcused absences for missing work to attend Jumu'ah services or have missed services for fear of facing disciplinary proceedings. Although the others do not presently work on Fridays, prison officials retain the power to change their assignments back to ones that conflict with the Muslim Sabbath. See Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15, §§ 3040. The named plaintiffs either face or have faced the choice between following work incentive program rules and obeying the Qur'an. Prison officials do not argue that the named plaintiffs are somehow immune from having to work on Fridays in the future. The prisoners have standing to seek injunctive relief, and a holding to the contrary would allow prison officials to defeat prisoners' claims simply by changing individual plaintiffs' work schedules as soon as they file suit.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER A SECOND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHILE THE FIRST ONE WAS BEING APPEALED

When a notice of appeal is filed, jurisdiction over the matters being appealed normally transfers from the district court to the appeals court. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985) ("In general, filing of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal."). An exception exists under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, that allows the district court to retain jurisdiction to "suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal . . . as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). Appellants challenge the district court's jurisdiction to grant a second injunction pending an interlocutory appeal of the first.

"The district court retains jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal to act to preserve the status quo." Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. Southwest Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Rule 62(c) " `does not restore jurisdiction to the district court to adjudicate anew the merits of the case.' " Id. (quoting McClatchy Newspapers v. Central Valley Typographical Union No. 46, 636 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1982)). The district court's exercise of jurisdiction should not "materially alter the status of the case on appeal." Id. (citation omitted).

The district court in the present case neither changed the status quo at the time of the first appeal nor materially altered the status of the appeal. The defendants argue that the district court enlarged the injunction by ordering briefing on whether to expand it, but this argument is moot because the district court refused to expand the injunction in an order dated March 7, 2001. The defendants further argue that any district court action during the pendency of the first appeal had to be designed to preserve their rights because by the terms of Rule 62(c), they were the "adve...