Mazepink v. State

• Decision Date: 28 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Citation: 336 Ark. 171,987 S.W.2d 648
• Parties: Walter Don MAZEPINK and Janice Gail Schnitzlein, Appellants, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 98-330.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 648

987 S.W.2d 648

336 Ark. 171

Walter Don MAZEPINK and Janice Gail Schnitzlein, Appellants, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 98-330.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 28, 1999.

Barry D. Neal, Fort Smith, for Appellant.

Winston Bryant, Attorney General, Vada Berger, Assistant Attorney General, Little Rock, for Appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

Appellants Walter Don Mazepink and Janice Gail Schnitzlein appeal the judgment of the Sebastian County Circuit Court denying their motion to suppress evidence obtained after a search of their home. Appellants argue on appeal that the trial court erred in denying their suppression motion because the officers executing the search warrant failed to knock and announce their presence in compliance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Our jurisdiction of this appeal is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(1). We find merit to Appellants' argument, and we reverse.

The record reflects that on December 20, 1996, Fort Smith Police officers obtained a search warrant for Appellants' residence. The search warrant did not contain a no-knock provision. At the time they executed the warrant, officers were aware that the house was occupied only by Appellant Schnitzlein and her adult daughter; Appellant Mazepink had been seen by surveillance officers leaving the residence shortly before the search. When the officers approached the residence, they knocked on the front door and shouted, "Police, search warrant[.]" Two or three seconds later, the officers broke open the door with a battering ram and entered the house. Once inside, officers seized approximately twelve ounces of methamphetamine and various items of drug paraphernalia.

Appellants were subsequently arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellants filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of their house on the basis that the officers' failure to comply with the "knock and announce" requirement violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court found that the officers' actions were reasonable under the circumstances and thus denied the suppression motion. Both Appellants then entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere to the charges, pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 24.3. Appellant Mazepink was sentenced to a total of forty years' imprisonment, with imposition of twenty years suspended. Appellant Schnitzlein was sentenced to a total of forty years' imprisonment, with imposition of ten years suspended. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellants do not contest that the police officers knocked on their door and announced their presence immediately prior to entering the house and conducting the search. They argue that the officers' announcement nonetheless violated Fourth Amendment standards because the interval of time between the announcement and subsequent entry was not sufficient to allow the occupants an opportunity to comply with the law and permit the officers to enter prior to the officers breaking in the door and forcing their way into the home. They contend that under the guidelines recently established by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995), and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), the entry into their home was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The State initially argues that the officers complied with the guidelines set out by the Court. Alternatively, the State asserts that there were exigent circumstances that would have allowed the officers to forego the "knock and announce" requirement altogether. The State argues further that even if the officers' entry into the house was illegal, suppression of the evidence was not warranted because the officers had a valid search warrant, and the items of evidence seized would therefore have been discovered despite the illegal entry.

When we review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, and reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Moya v. State, 335 Ark. 193, 981 S.W.2d 521 (1998); Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 972 S.W.2d 222 (1998). To resolve the issue presented here, we must first decide whether the officers executing the warrant complied with the "knock and announce" rules established by the Supreme Court. If we determine that the officers did not comply with those rules, we must then decide whether there were exigent circumstances that would permit them to enter Appellants' home unannounced. Lastly, if we conclude that there were not any such exigent circumstances, we must then decide the appropriate remedy for the officers' illegal conduct, specifically whether exclusion or suppression of the evidence is warranted. Before we begin an analysis of the merits, however, we must first address the issue of standing raised by the State.

I. Mazepink's Fourth Amendment Rights

The State argues that Appellant Mazepink lacks standing to challenge the officers' method of entry into his residence because he was not present at the time the officers entered the house. The State contends that the purposes of the "knock and announce" rule are to (1) inform the occupants of the premises that it is about to be legally invaded, (2) give them an opportunity to comply with the law, and (3) avoid damage to property. See Richards, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S.Ct. 1416. Given those purposes, the State asserts that persons not present at the time of entry cannot claim that their rights have been infringed upon by officers who do not comply with the "knock and announce" rule. The State urges us to reject traditional Fourth Amendment analysis pertaining to the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched and the items seized. Under the particular facts of this case, we are not persuaded by the State's argument.

In Wilson, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914, the Court established that the "common-law 'knock and announce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 929, 115 S.Ct. 1914. The doctrine of standing to invoke the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule focuses on the defendant's substantive Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Hamzy, 288 Ark. 561, 709 S.W.2d 397 (1986) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). Thus, we must determine:

whether the challenged search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. 421. Using this analysis, the court should not exclude evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights; his rights are violated only if the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy, rather than that of a third party. Hamzy, 288 Ark. 561, 709 S.W.2d 397 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980); Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421). Thus, the pertinent inquiry here is whether Mazepink manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. See McCoy v. State, 325 Ark. 155, 925 S.W.2d 391 (1996).

In Rakas, the Court indicated that a legitimate expectation of privacy means more than a defendant's subjective expectation of not being discovered. The Court explained:

Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, ... and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude. ... No better demonstration of this proposition exists than the decision in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), where the Court held that an individual's property interest in his own home was so great as to allow him to object to electronic surveillance of conversations emanating from his home, even though he himself was not a party to the conversations.

439 U.S. at 144 n. 12 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This court has likewise recognized that where the defendant owns or possesses the property searched, he or she has standing to challenge the search under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Hodge v. State, 332 Ark. 377, 965 S.W.2d 766 (1998); Stanley v. State, 330 Ark. 642, 956 S.W.2d 170 (1997). Here, the State does not dispute that Mazepink resided in the house that was the subject of the search. Thus, under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, Mazepink has standing to challenge the legality of the search, which, pursuant to the Court's holding in Wilson, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914, includes the method of entry and execution of the search.

The State relies on the holdings in State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 1006 (Alaska Ct.App.1986), and State v. Papineau, 146 Ariz. 272, 705 P.2d 949 (Ariz.Ct.App.1985). In both cases, the appellants sought to exclude evidence obtained with search warrants on the ground that the officers did not knock and announce their presence prior to entering the premises. Both courts held that the appellants, who were not present at the time the police entered the premises, lacked standing to challenge the method of...