Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int'l, LLC

• Citation: 746 F.3d 1264
• Decision Date: 31 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–10250.,12–10250.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
• Parties: Anthony MAZZEO, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. COLOR RESOLUTIONS INT'L, LLC, Defendant–Appellee.

746 F.3d 1264

Anthony MAZZEO, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.COLOR RESOLUTIONS INT'L, LLC, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–10250.

United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

March 31, 2014.

David B. Sacks, Rachel A. Compton, Law Office of David B. Sacks, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Chelsie Joy Flynn, Jessica T. Walberg, Aaron L. Zandy, Ford & Harrison, LLP, Orlando, FL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 3:10–cv–01108–RBD–JRK.

Before JORDAN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and ALBRITTON,^* District Judge.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

Anthony Mazzeo sued his former employer, Color Resolutions International, LLC, claiming discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the “ADA”), the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (the “ADEA”), and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.10 (the “FCRA”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CRI. With respect to the disability claims, the district court concluded that Mr. Mazzeo did not present a prima facie case because he failed to show that he either suffered from a disability or was regarded by CRI as having a disability. As to the age discrimination claims, the district court ruled that Mr. Mazzeo failed to state a prima facie case pursuant to a reduction-in-force theory.

Mr. Mazzeo's appeal requires us to address the application of certain recent amendments to the ADA. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that, in light of these amendments, Mr. Mazzeo submitted sufficient evidence on his ADA and FCRA disability claims to make out a prima facie case. We also conclude that the district court erroneously applied the prima facie standard created for reduction-in-force cases to Mr. Mazzeo's age discrimination claims. We therefore vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of CRI and remand for further proceedings.

I

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record and drawing all factual inferences in a light most favorable to Mr. Mazzeo. See D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir.2005). CRI, as the party moving for summary judgment, had the burden of demonstrating that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact, and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Disability and age-related discrimination actions under the FCRA are analyzed under the same frameworks as the ADA and ADEA, respectively. See Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir.2000) (ADA); Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1455 n. 2 (11th Cir.1997) (ADEA). As a result, our discussion of the ADA and ADEA governs the FCRA claims.

II

Starting in 2004, CRI employed Mr. Mazzeo to provide technical and sales service to its customers in Florida and southern Georgia. Mr. Mazzeo's employment claims revolve around his termination by CRI in early 2009.

In 2007, Mr. Mazzeo was diagnosed with a herniated disc and torn ligaments in his back. The herniated disc caused pain along Mr. Mazzeo's lower back, which spread down his right leg and intermittently affected his ability to walk, sit, stand, bend, run, and lift objects weighing greater than ten pounds. In October of 2008, Mr. Mazzeo first discussed his condition with his supervisor at CRI, Hixon Boyd, and with the supervisor of human resources at CRI, Phyllis Arellano. Between January and March of 2009, Mr. Mazzeo had at least three discussions with Mr. Boyd regarding his possible back surgery, which would require him to miss two weeks of work and have three to six months of restricted activity. Mr. Boyd is alleged to have remarked, whether in concern for Mr. Mazzeo's well-being or out of a self-serving business interest, that such a surgical procedure would likely require a longer recovery period of six to eight weeks.

On February 25, 2009, Mr. Mazzeo informed Mr. Boyd that his back surgery had been scheduled for the second week of March. The very next day, Mr. Boyd initiated the paperwork for Mr. Mazzeo's termination. According to CRI, the reason for the termination was the declining sales revenue, over a period of several years, in Mr. Mazzeo's Florida territory. Mr. Boyd handed the termination papers to Mr. Mazzeo two days before his scheduled surgery. When CRI terminated him on March 10, 2009, Mr. Mazzeo was 46.

Ten days after Mr. Mazzeo's termination, CRI offered a similar sales position to a 23–year–old recent college graduate, Jeremy Kyzer, who began working for CRI on March 23, 2009. CRI asserted that Mr. Kyzer—who had no sales experience—was hired solely to replace a different, retiring CRI employee, Vivian Lumpkin, who covered a different territory than Mr. Mazzeo. Mr. Boyd's deposition testimony, however, suggests that, at the time it hired Mr. Kyzer, CRI intended (or at least envisioned) that he would service the areas formerly serviced by both Mr. Mazzeo and Ms. Lumpkin.

Mr. Mazzeo maintains that, prior to his termination, he had requested this same opportunity, i.e., to merge his service area with the territory assigned to the retiring Ms. Lumpkin. According to Mr. Mazzeo, Mr. Boyd rejected this request and explained that the new business opportunities arising from his Florida territory would require Mr. Mazzeo's full attention. Yet, at around this same time in early 2009, CRI had already decided to terminate Mr. Mazzeo.

III

We start with the disability claim under the ADA. In part as a reaction to Supreme Court decisions in cases like Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (whether an individual is disabled must be determined with reference to corrective measures), and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196–97, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (interpreting the phrase “substantially limits” to mean limiting to a considerable or large degree, and the phrase “major life activities” to mean activities that are of central importance to daily life), Congress made significant changes to the ADA by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (the “ADAAA”), Pub.L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553, which became effective on January 1, 2009. Because the critical events in this case—Mr. Mazzeo's continued back problems, scheduled surgery, and termination—took place after the ADAAA went into effect, we apply the post-ADAAA version of the ADA. See, e.g., McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 642 n. 5 (2d Cir.2012) (“The ADAAA became effective on January 1, 2009, and applies to claims, such as McElwee's, which arose after that date.”).¹

The ADA prohibits discrimination by an employer “against a qualified individual on the basis of a disability” in any of the “terms, conditions, [or] privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. at § 12111(8). To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that, at the time of the adverse employment action, he had a disability, he was a qualified individual, and he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his disability. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255–56 (11th Cir.2007).

When it enacted the ADAAA, Congress indicated that one of its purposes was to “convey that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note.² The ADA defines the term “disability” as (1) a physical or mental impairment that “substantially limits one or more” of an individual's “major life activities,” (2) a “record of such an impairment,” or (3) “being regarded as having such an impairment” as described in subsection (1). 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Under the ADA, “major life activities include, but are not limited to, ... sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, ... [and] bending[.]” Id. at § 12102(2)(A).

Dr. Christopher Roberts, Mr. Mazzeo's treating physician, submitted an affidavit stating that degenerative disc disease and a herniated disc impacted Mr. Mazzeo's ability to walk, bend, sleep, and lift more than ten pounds, and that Mr. Mazzeo's pain would increase with prolonged sitting and standing. The district court thought this affidavit was insufficient, conclusory, and did not demonstrate that Mr. Mazzeo was disabled because it “contain[ed] no detailed discussion as to whether [the] back condition affected any of [Mr. Mazzeo's] life activities.” D.E. 33 at 9. The district court cited to a pre-ADAAA Eleventh Circuit opinion for the proposition that there could be “no disability based on physician's lifting restrictions where the plaintiff testified she could still work.” Id. (citing Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1228 (11th Cir.1999)). The district court also noted that the post-surgery work restrictions Mr. Mazzeo discussed with Mr. Boyd were no more than a transitory impairment and, therefore, insufficient to establish that CRI regarded Mr. Mazzeo as disabled. For several reasons, we disagree with the district court's analysis as to the matter of disability.

First, although the district court relied on one of our pre-ADAAA cases, Hilburn, 181 F.3d at 1228, to support its conclusion that Dr. Roberts' affidavit was conclusory, that case is distinguishable. In Hilburn, the physician opined, without articulating any specific facts, that the plaintiff was “substantially limited in performing manual tasks.” Id. Given that the plaintiff herself testified that she could walk, run, sit, stand, sleep, eat, bathe, dress, write, work around the house, cook, and work, we held that the physician's...